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ABSTRACT

This volume of proceedings presents papers in four sections: the keynote address, the presidential address, a focus book symposium, and concurrent sessions. The following papers are included: (1) Keynote Address, "Living With Our Deepest Differences: Reforging a Public Philosophy for Public Education" (Charles C. Haynes); (2) Presidential Address, "The Reconciliation of Theology and Philosophy in Educational Thought: A Personal Journey" (William Losito); (3) "With Liberty and Justice for All: The Teaching of the Democratic Value of Social Justice" (Warren Strandberg); (4) "Thomas Jefferson on 'Human Interposition,' Freedom of Religion and Inquiry: Problems and Paradoxes" (James W. Garrison and Thomas C. Hunt); (5) "Sects Education in a Democracy Is Like Sex Education in a Democracy" (Robert D. Heslep); (6) book symposium, "The Moral and Spiritual Crisis in Education: A Response" (J. Don Reeves); (7) "The Supreme Court, Fundamentalist Logic and the Term 'Religion'" (David McKenzie); (8) "The Perceptions of American Youth Regarding Their Own and Foreign Religions and Political Systems" (Gail McEachron-Hirsch); (9) "Religion in the Schools" (Robert Mulvaney); (10) "Beyond Tomorrow as an Extension of Today: Spirituality in Education" (Paul Bitting and Cheryl Southworth); (11) "Horace Mann: A Unitarian Perspective on Religion in the Public Schools" (JoAnne Z. Wagner); (12) "Teaching about Religion in the Public School Curriculum: A Legal Prospective" (Bruce Beezer); (13) "Grace in Teaching" (Eric Bredo); and (14) The Alienated Student, the Restless Heart and Religious Study" (Thomas W. Mahan). In cases where there were responses to papers, the responses are included. (LL)

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PROCEEDINGS

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THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION

PROCEEDINGS

of the

Thirty-fifth Annual Meeting

of the

South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society

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Williamsburg, Virginia
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Editor's Introduction

The 1990 Annual Meeting of the South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society was held in the historic community of Williamsburg, Virginia. The College of William and Mary, under the able leadership of William Losito, acted as our gracious host for the two-day conference. One encouraging sign of the strength of the Society was the high level of attendance. Another was the collective strength of the papers presented. The combination contributed to a very stimulating two days.

One highlight of the Annual Meeting was the presentation of our Keynote Speaker, Charles C. Haynes. He is a national leader in the on-going discussion of the role of religion in the public schools. His comments were most helpful in providing a framework for continuing dialogue on this critical issue. Another highlight was the Focus Book Symposium. David Purpel, author of *The Moral and Spiritual Crisis in Education: A Curriculum for Justice and Compassion in Education*, graciously entertained reactions to his book. A most spirited and engaging session.

Along with the participants at the Annual Meeting, I am confident that the readers of this volume will be stimulated by the careful, reflective attention given to each of the topics presented in this volume.

Warren Strandberg
Editor

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LIVING WITH OUR DEEPEST DIFFERENCES:

REFORGING A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION

Charles C. Haynes
The First Liberty Institute at George Mason University

After six years on the front lines of the culture wars in the United States, I am convinced that the bitter conflicts over the role of religion in public life are a major threat to the future of public education. Americans in communities throughout the country continue to shout past one another about "school prayer," "creation science," "values education," "secular humanism," "cultural bias," and the many other controversies that have made public schools a battleground of conflicting values and world views.

Exploding pluralism in America has contributed to these widening divisions and deepening tensions in what is now a nation of some three thousand different religious groups. Religious diversity has expanded from the largely Protestant pluralism of the eighteenth century to a pluralism that today includes growing numbers of believers from all of the world's religions. Islam, to cite just one significant example, will soon be, if it is not already, the second largest faith in the United States after Christianity generally. We must also take into consideration the dramatic increase in the number of Americans with no religious preference at all (up from 2% of the population in the 1960s to nearly 12% today).[1]

The Battle in California

Nowhere are the culture wars and the challenges of pluralism more evident than in California, a state that receives nearly one third of the world's immigration, and where there is now a "minority majority" in public school enrollment.[2] Two weeks ago I found myself in the midst of the latest skirmish on the California battlefront, the heated struggle over the adoption of social studies textbooks. With an innovative framework for history-social science education (and some 12% of the textbook market), California has dared publishers to take risks. One company, Houghton Mifflin, submitted books that responded creatively to the new framework. Especially noteworthy is the unprecedented amount of attention the texts give to the world's major religious traditions. Only the Houghton Mifflin social studies series was recommended for adoption by the textbook commission.

What happens when a publisher does respond to calls for better history textbooks--books that finally include adequate discussion of religion? In California an explosion of outrage has occurred; scores of interest groups have declared war on the books, demanding that history be re-written to their satisfaction.

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At the public hearing, representatives from various Muslim, Jewish, Asian, African American, and other groups lined up to condemn the portrayal of their religious or ethnic heritage and to urge rejection of the books. I sat for hours listening to speaker after speaker harangue the state board, and accuse the publisher, the authors, and the textbook commission of religious and racial bigotry. Those who spoke for the books, mostly teachers and scholars, were mocked and heckled. I left the hearing disheartened and disturbed by the absence of shared values and civil behavior in the public square of Sacramento.

My point here is not to defend the textbooks (though I happen to think they are far superior to anything we have seen before), but rather to underline the widespread alienation from public education felt in many religious and ethnic communities across the nation. Textbooks are not the real issue in California, any more than the social studies curriculum is the issue in the current, sometimes vicious debate about multicultural education in New York. The issue is the increasing tribalization of America that pits one group against another in the storm center that we call public schools.

The blood on the floor in the offices of the California State Board of Education and the casualties of the war being waged in New York, are urgent reminders that every effort at reform, all proposals for re-thinking our educational system, must take into account the fact that growing numbers of Americans of many religious and ethnic groups are losing faith in public education. Not since the 19th century "Bible wars" have so many citizens been convinced that public schools contradict their values, ignore their traditions and exclude their voices.

Living With Our Deepest Differences

The current battle for the soul of public education challenges us, as never before in our history, to re-think the relationship of religion and the public schools. The First Amendment separates Church from State, but not religion from public life. It has become a matter of some urgency that we find clarity and reach agreement about the proper role of religion in the schools. At issue is a simple, but profoundly important question: how will we live with our deepest differences? Our answer to that question may well determine the future of public education and the health of the body politic in our third century of constitutional freedom.

If we are to live with our differences, we need first to recognize that no religious consensus is possible in the United States. Attempts to recover the de facto Protestant establishment of much of our history are constitutionally and civicly wrong. That does not mean, however, that a civic consensus, or even a moral consensus cannot be reached. It remains possible to develop out of our differences a shared understanding of the role of religion in public schools and in public life. To put it another way, we can and we must reforge a public philosophy that provides a common vision for the common good in public education.

As we begin to identify the outlines of what a common vision might look like, we must acknowledge that religious differences are our deepest differences, and thus the most

difficult to negotiate. We need only note that some twenty-six of the thirty-two wars currently waged throughout the world are rooted in religious and ethnic conflicts. The solution is neither to ignore our differences by pretending that religion is merely a private matter, nor to attempt to subordinate religion in the service of a secular state. We must strive instead to affirm the civic values and responsibilities that commit us to respect differences and to include all voices in the formation of public policy.

A Return to First Principles

What are the civic values that govern the proper role of religion in public life? The first step in formulating an answer is to take George Mason's advice and return to first principles. The fact that the United States, one of the world's most religiously diverse societies, remains one nation of many faiths is due in large measure to the principles of religious liberty, or freedom of conscience, found in the First Amendment's Religious Liberty clauses. Despite tragic chapters of nativism, anti-semitism and other forms of prejudice and discrimination, our nation has long been and is today one of the most religiously free societies in the world.

To understand the fundamental importance of religious liberty for our time, we need to recall that freedom of conscience was, from the very beginning, a cornerstone in the foundation of our experiment in liberty. It was here, in Williamsburg, Virginia, that the principles of religious liberty were first articulated by Mason, Madison, Jefferson and others as they struggled to invent a new nation. Reading their deliberations and debates we can begin to appreciate how we came to be a nation founded not on bloodlines or kinship, but on ideas and ideals.

The story of religious liberty in the United States is one of the most significant stories in human history. One brief incident will have to serve as an illustration how vital this story is for us today. In the spring of 1776, with independence in the air, members of the Virginia Convention gathered to draft a declaration of rights and a plan of government. George Mason took upon himself the task of drafting the Virginia Declaration of Rights, the forerunner of the Bill of Rights, and a milestone in democratic freedom.

It is not often remembered, however, that Mason's original draft stated: "all men should enjoy the fullest toleration in the exercise of religion." For James Madison, at age 25 the youngest member of the Convention, these words were inadequate. Madison had witnessed Baptists being jailed for preaching the Gospel in his native Orange County. He had come to believe that mere toleration of another's beliefs was insufficient recognition of what he called "the unalienable rights" of all people. Freedom of conscience, in his view, was not a concession but a right rooted in human dignity.

Madison offered an alternative to Mason's draft that stated: "all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion." Young, shy, and a poor public speaker, Madison was astute enough to ask the greatest orator of the day, Patrick Henry, to propose his change. On June 12, 1776, the Virginia Declaration of Rights with James Madison's amendment, passed unanimously.

Most of the delegates in Williamsburg were probably unaware of the significance of the change from "toleration" to "free exercise." But when the document was circulated throughout the state, the Baptists and other dissenting groups saw immediately that the Declaration of Rights opened the door to an expansion of their liberty of conscience. No longer was religious freedom dependent on the shifting moods of majorities and governments, but an inalienable right for every individual. This small change in words was a significant leap forward in meaning.

Another Madison amendment to the Virginia Declaration, one designed to end state support for clergy, failed to pass. Ten years later, however, Madison did succeed in winning passage of Jefferson's famous Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom and the principle of disestablishment triumphed. Finally, in 1791, with Madison yet again in a key role, the twin principles of religious liberty were combined in the opening words of the First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof..."[3]

These opening sixteen words of the Bill of Rights represent the boldest and most successful experiment in liberty the world has ever seen. A powerful expression of why this is the case may be found in the Williamsburg Charter, a reaffirmation and celebration of the First Amendment's Religious Liberty clauses. Signed by nearly 200 leaders of national life and presented to the nation on June 25, 1988, the occasion of the 200th anniversary of Virginia's call for a bill of rights, the Charter affirms religious liberty, or freedom of conscience, as our nation's first liberty, which undergirds all other rights and freedoms secured by the Bill of Rights. The Charter states:

> **The Religious Liberty clauses are a brilliant construct in which both No establishment and Free exercise serve the ends of religious liberty and freedom of conscience. No longer can sword, purse and sacred mantle be equated. Now the government is barred from using religion's mantle to become a confessional State, and from allowing religion to use the government's sword and purse to become a coercing Church. In this new order, the freedom of the government from religious control and the freedom of religion from government control are a double guarantee of the protection of rights. No faith is preferred or prohibited; for where there is no state-definable orthodoxy, there can be no state-punishable heresy.**[4]

Rights, Responsibilities and Respect

The civic values and virtues that flow from the twin principles of religious liberty provide the foundation for our re-consideration of the role of religion in public education. Without attempting to discuss the full implications of religious liberty for public education, allow me to indicate some of the civic values that are at the heart of any effort to reforge a public philosophy for the public schools. These values are so fundamental and enduring that the new curriculum developed by the Williamsburg Charter Foundation identifies them as the three Rs of religious liberty: rights, responsibilities and respect.[5]

* **Rights:** Religious liberty, or freedom of conscience, is a basic and inalienable right founded on the inviolable dignity of the person. In a society as religiously diverse as the United States, it is essential that all of the stakeholders in public education recognize and affirm that the rights guaranteed by the Constitution are for citizens of all faiths or none.

* **Responsibilities:** Religious liberty is not only a universal right but it depends upon a universal responsibility to respect that right for others, treating others as we ourselves desire to be treated. As Americans we must acknowledge the inseparable link between the preservation of our constitutional rights and our responsibility as citizens to defend those rights for all others. In the language of the Charter, this is "the golden rule for civic life."[6]

* **Respect:** Debate and disagreement are vital in a democracy. Yet, if we are to live with our differences, particularly our religious differences, **how** we debate, and not only **what** we debate, is critical. At the heart of good citizenship is a strong commitment to the civic values that enable people with diverse religious and philosophical perspectives to treat one another with respect and civility.

Rights, responsibilities and respect are at the core of a vision that may be called chartered pluralism. This vision, as expressed in the Williamsburg Charter, calls us to forge an agreement that both recognizes religious distinctiveness and affirms the first principles of religious liberty that provide the guidelines for civil discourse. It must be said, however, that this agreement is necessarily limited both in substance and in scope. In the words of the Charter:

> **We readily acknowledge our continuing differences. Signing this charter implies no pretense that we believe the same things or that our differences over policy proposals, legal interpretations and philosophical groundings do not ultimately matter. The truth is not even that what unites us is deeper than what divides us, for differences over belief are the deepest and least negotiated of all.**
>
> **The Charter sets forth a renewed national compact, in the sense of a solemn mutual agreement between parties, on how we view the place of religion in American life and how we should contend with each other's deepest differences in the public sphere. It is a call to a vision of public life that will allow conflict to lead to consensus, religious commitment to reinforce political civility. In this way, diversity is not a point of weakness but a source of strength.**[7]

Applied in the public square, these values may be seen as the ground rules for understanding the role of religion in public life. To again quote the Charter:

> **The Religious Liberty provisions are not "articles of faith" concerned with the substance of particular doctrines or of policy issues. They are "articles of peace" concerned with the constitutional constraints and the shared prior understanding within which the American people can engage**

their differences in a civil manner and thus provide for both religious liberty and stable public government.[3]

Finding Common Ground

How can the "articles of peace" enable us to formulate a public philosophy for public schools? In the wake of the textbook trials in Tennessee and Alabama in the mid-1980s, Oliver Thomas of the Baptist Joint Committee and I convened a meeting of representatives from leading educational and religious organizations in an effort to find common ground based on the principles of the First Amendment.

Everyone in the room, from the National Education Association to the National Association of Evangelicals was deeply concerned that ugly debates (conducted largely through direct mail fund-raising) and the reflexive recourse to the law courts were tearing apart our communities and schools. We recognized that the dominant voices in the debate have been, on one hand, the "reimposers," those who seek to impose their own religious views in the public schools, and on the other hand, the "removers," those who seek to remove all references to religion from the public square.

We all agreed that the textbook trials and the many other debates surrounding the role of religion in the schools have had a devastating impact on public education. Not only are growing numbers of people, particularly religious people, seeking alternatives to the public schools, but those who remain suffer the consequences of schools and textbooks that are afraid of controversy and unsure of how to handle diversity. How ironic it is that the public schools - the very locus of the culture wars - have become the last place where the issues of religion and public life are likely to be examined by young citizens. The virtual silence about religion, the confusion about teaching moral and civic values, and the refusal of all sides to listen to one another have left many high school graduates hopelessly unprepared to address the religious and ethnic divisions that threaten the future health and stability of our country.

As we searched for common ground, we discovered that there is, after all, much that we share as American citizens. By simply listening to one another, we found surprising agreement on the proper role of religion in the schools. It was not an easy process (reaching consensus rarely is), but after a year and a half of discussion, negotiation and compromise, we issued guidelines, "Religion in the Public School Curriculum: Questions and Answers." The principles of religious liberty and the values of rights, responsibilities and respect had produced a common vision for the common good.

This straightforward agreement makes the basic distinction between teaching about religion in public schools, which is permissible, and religious indoctrination which is prohibited by the Constitution. We make the case for the natural inclusion of religion where appropriate in the curriculum by stating:

Because religion plays a significant role in history and society, study about religion is essential to understanding both the nation and the world.

> **Omission of facts about religion can give students the false impression that the religious life of humankind is insignificant or unimportant... Study about religion is also important if students are to value religious liberty, the first freedom guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. Moreover, knowledge of the roles of religion in the past and present promotes cross-cultural understanding essential to democracy and world peace.[9]**

For the first time in our history, groups from across the religious and political spectrum spoke with one voice concerning the role of religion in the curriculum. The Christian Legal Society joined with the American Jewish Congress. The Islamic Society of North America and the National Council of Churches agreed with the National School Boards Association and the American Association of School Administrators.

We issued these first guidelines in 1988. A year later, we re-convened to tackle the problem of religious holidays in public schools. Though we were told by some that we should not even try to reach consensus about the infamous "December dilemma," we managed to produce guidelines after four months of discussion. Again, in the spirit of the First Amendment, we agreed that the approach of the public schools is academic, not devotional. Religion does have a place in the schools if care is taken to do what is constitutionally permissible and educationally sound.

More than a half million of these guidelines have already been distributed to school districts throughout the country. (And we are now near agreement on a new set of guidelines concerning the Equal Access Act.) Our work has inspired similar efforts on a local level from California to Maryland. Not a week goes by without another draft policy crossing my desk. Inspired by the principles of religious liberty and the common vision in our brochures, school districts throughout the country are beginning to develop policies and programs that finally focus on what schools can do to identify and support a proper role for religion in public education.

A Strategic Opportunity

The national trend from California to Utah to North Carolina to teach more about religion in the public schools offers a strategic opportunity for reforging a public philosophy based on the principles of religious liberty. That is why it is vitally important that we make every effort to see that study about religion is fully and fairly integrated into the curriculum. Work is urgently needed on many fronts, including state and local policies, textbooks, and teacher education.

Underlying all of these efforts, however, must be careful attention to the civic framework for study about religion in the schools. Without this framework, teaching about religion and multicultural education may only serve to divide us further. Rights, responsibilities and respect are the civic ground rules for teaching about religions and cultures just as they are the ground rules of American citizenship. When public schools teach about the many cultures and religions of our nation and the world, they must simultaneously teach the civic values that we share as American citizens. Done in this way,

teaching about religion becomes an excellent opportunity to teach citizenship, that is, to teach respect for the universal rights and mutual responsibilities, within which the deep differences of belief can be negotiated.

Because so much depends on nurturing the values of religious liberty in public education, a number of us came together recently to establish The First Liberty Institute at George Mason University. Our central aim is to promote religious liberty and civic responsibilities in education as part of the effort to reforge a public philosophy for public education. Some of our major objectives are:

* To encourage and affirm through education in public and private schools, the civic first principles which allow people of all faiths or none to live together in a pluralistic society;

* To develop and disseminate curriculum materials on religious liberty and civic responsibilities for use in public and private schools;

* To prepare teachers to teach about religion and religious liberty in the public schools in ways that are constitutionally permissible, educationally sound and culturally sensitive;

* To encourage an approach to moral education that teaches civic responsibility and respect for religious and ethnic diversity in our society.

We have already committed ourselves to substantial teacher education in support of the new curriculum, "Living With Our Deepest Differences: Religious Liberty in a Pluralistic Society," lessons on three grade levels, developed by the Williamsburg Charter Foundation and an editorial board headed by Ernest Boyer. In addition, we will soon announce several major initiatives designed to prepare a core of teacher trainers with the professional expertise to prepare teachers in local school districts to teach religious liberty and to handle controversies related to religion in the curriculum.

The task of articulating a public philosophy that respects religious distinctiveness while affirming our civic consensus, is the same task we have faced in every critical period of our nation's history. Two hundred years ago, as we first struggled to shape our national identity, President George Washington stated as well as anyone has before or since the vision of a democratic society that protects the rights of people of all faiths or none. The statement came in reply to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport, Rhode Island. The congregation had written to express their gratitude, as a people long persecuted and dispossessed, for the "invaluable rights of free citizens." Washington's reply serves as a beautiful reminder of how much is at stake as we meet the challenge of reaffirming and sustaining the American experiment in liberty in our own time. He wrote:

> **The Citizens of the United States of America have a right to applaud themselves for having given to mankind examples of an enlarged and**

liberal policy: a policy worthy of imitation. All possess alike liberty of conscience and immunities of citizenship. It is now no more that toleration is spoken of, as if it was by the indulgence of one class of people, that another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural rights. For happily the Government of the United States, which gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance, requires only that they who live under its protection should demean themselves as good citizens, in giving it on all occasions their effectual support...

May the Children of the Stock of Abraham, who dwell in this land, continue to merit and enjoy the good will of the other Inhabitants; while every one shall sit in safety under his own vine and figtree, and there shall be none to make him afraid. May the father of all mercies scatter light and not darkness in our paths, and make us all in our several vocations useful here, and in his own due time and way everlastingly happy.[10]

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1. The Williamsburg Charter Survey on Religion and Public Life (Washington, D.C.: The Williamsburg Charter Foundation, 1988).

2. Harold L. Hodgkinson, California: The State and its Educational System (Washington, D.C.: The Institute for Educational Leadership, 1985).

3. For a full account of James Madison's role in the struggle for religious liberty, see William Lee Miller, The First Liberty: Religion and the American Republic (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987).

4. "The Williamsburg Charter" in James Davison Hunter and Os Guinness, eds., Articles of Faith, Articles of Peace (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1990), 131.

5. The curriculum, Living With Our Deepest Differences: Religious Liberty in a Pluralistic Society, is being published by Learning Connections in the fall of 1990.

6. "The Williamsburg Charter," 141.

7. Ibid., 128.

8. Ibid., 133-134.

9. "Religion and the Public School Curriculum: Questions and Answers," is a brochure sponsored by seventeen educational and religious organizations. Multiple copies may be obtained from the Americans United Research Foundation, 900 Silver Spring Ave., Silver Spring, MD 20910.

10. For the full text of the Hebrew Congregation's letter to George Washington and his reply, see Charles C. Haynes, Religion in American History: What to Teach and How (Alexandria, VA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1990), 25-30.

ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS:

A REPLY TO CHARLES C. HAYNES' KEYNOTE ADDRESS

John B. Haynes
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This is a unique opportunity to interact philosophically with my brother, Prof. Charles C. Haynes, at a conference. If humility is a valuable characteristic for a debate on a sensitive issue such as the role of religion in democratic education, it would appear that I meet such a criterion test rather well since I am feeling very fortunate this afternoon to be on a panel with Charles, President of the National Council on Religion and Public Education, and Sister Lourdes Sheehan, Secretary of Education for the United States Catholic Conference. According to Dr. Sam Holton, a Past-President of the South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society, this will be the first time two brothers have appeared together on a SAPES program. Previously, we have served as guest speakers to share our common experiences gained during many visits to the country of India. Because of my active role within SAPES activities for almost twenty years, the stimulating dialogue and fellowship have been key parts of my professional development. Inviting Charles as our 1990 keynoter was exciting!

The title of his address, "Living With Our Deepest Differences: Reforging a Public Philosophy for Public Education," is indicative of Charles' perspectives and the genuine commitment toward a peaceful and practical concensus in dealing with a most timely as well as controversial problem facing public educators and leaders. I have been involved for the past thirteen years in the area of human rights, equity, and equal opportunity through service on various task forces and committees of the American Alliance for Health, Physical Education, Recreation, and Dance, and as a workshop director at conventions in the USA and in India, Japan, Indonesia, Korea. The question of rights within our democratic context of the public schools has led to the passage of such laws as the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1988, linking the concerns of women, racial minorities, the disabled, and the aged. Our topic today is most interesting since "freedom of conscience" or religious liberty represents an area of educational combat involving critical beliefs of an ultimate nature among individuals that now clearly show an incredibly diverse, pluralistic situation. We are also well aware of the dramatic events supporting the academic role of religion in history, literature, social studies, art, and other subjects for a sound approach to schooling and a fair analysis and presentation of various world faiths.

The thrust of my response to the keynote address will be to essentially support the directions suggested by Charles and his partners actively working on the national scene for a common vision and curricular guidelines and tools to promote civic and religious perspectives consistent with the Constitution and cultural awareness. They are to be commended for the willingness to demonstrate what it really takes to find paths of agreement in spite of very deep conflicts in religious tenets and values. Efforts in inservice teacher training in the form of seminars, workshops, and the vital element of curricular materials, such as primary documents, by The First Liberty Institute at George Mason University and Americans United Research Foundation have been extensive to date across the nation. Yet this is just the beginning. I will provide selected comments on Charles' framework proposed in his paper with a few references to further theoretical concerns and practical schooling factors. In summary, Charles has given us a glimpse into the "holy wars" currently being waged with the public schools at the storm center. But more importantly, we have also heard an optimistic view and a possible solution to this "strategic opportunity."

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The approach Charles takes to the problem of informing all of us about what is presently going on is both normative as well as analytical. We are given a critical overview of educational trends and issues relative to teaching about the religious heritage of our democratic nation and the awakened need to sensitize the public school pupils to the diverse beliefs held by citizens of today. He rightly asserts that this omission has been most unfortunate, due in large part to a misinterpretation of the Supreme Court rulings concerning this controversy. If this exploding interest is indeed an irreversible trend that has broken the educational silence, then we can be glad that instead of conflict and intolerance, Charles is suggesting a route of dialogue. His prescription rests on a recommended focus on concensus emerging from a common vision about the role of religion in public schools and in public life. This shared understanding must definitely recognize, affirm, and articulate basic notions such as the deep and real nature of religious contrasting views plus the founding fathers' cornerstone of freedom of conscience. The solution assumes taking the new path of concerns linked to matters of content or "what should be taught?" and to process or "how should it be done?" rather than a stance of questioning whether the academic study of religion is appropriate today.

The historical reference contained in the paper to the story of religious liberty in the United States through brief description of the events leading to the Bill of Rights and the First Amendment in particular is helpful. Clearly, such a history lesson reinforces the importance of understanding our unique heritage if we are to move ahead in reforging a public philosophy for the public schools. It is also interesting to note comments by retired Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. during the 1988 Founder's Day address at JMU on the role of James Madison as a champion of the Bill of Rights, in addition to strong leadership in the drafting of the U.S. Constitution. According to Powell, Madison pragmatically supported the inclusion of a bill of rights during the ratification process after the Convention.

A key element within Charles' arguments is The Williamsburg Charter, signed by almost two hundred national leaders on June 25, 1988, the occasion of the 200th anniversary of Virginia's call for a bill of rights. The two vital principles are the "No Establishment" clause and the"Free Exercise" clause which affirm freedom of conscience or religious liberty as our country's "first liberty". In a summary of The Williamsburg Charter's principles, because of the increase of pluralism it is recognized that "...religious liberty is a universal right joined to a universal duty to respect that right. Rights are best guarded and responsibilities best exercised when each person and each group guards for others those rights they wish guarded for themselves."[1] The "three Rs" within the new curriculum developed by the Williamsburg Charter Foundation are identified as: rights, responsibilities, and respect. This vision of "chartered pluralism" is carefully delimited in terms of substance and scope. Yet it does seem to offer great promise as a concensus.

Os Guiness, who served as the Executive Director of The Williamsburg Charter Foundation, Washington, D.C., has written an excellent essay on this theme published within a feature series of articles compiled by Charles as a guest editor in the current issue of Social Education.[2] Guiness carefully presents steps in arguing for a proposed public philosophy or common vision of the common good. He explains that consensual agreements over the place of religious liberty in public life are a vital component of the wider public philosophy, and represent an agency combined with the roles played by the courts and the Constitution. Five central reasons are cited to support the idea that religious liberty remains such an important part of the public philosophy, including the fundamental nature of freedom of conscience as a inalienable human right to be protected for all Americans as a promise of justice. Also, the religious liberty clauses of the First Amendment are America's democratic answer to the question of living with our religiously intense differences.

Another reason, Guiness states, is based upon the current understanding that "value-neutrality" in social discourse is impossible. He avoids such dualistic views as objectivity and commitment or reason and revelation dichotomies in presenting the requirements for free debate in a democratic society. The religious liberty clauses also explain the close link between free speech and the free exercise of religion in America, and "why religion in general has persisted more strongly in the United States than in any other comparable modern country."[3]

In analyzing the various factors behind the recuring conflicts over religion and public life, Guiness gives attention to such recent developments as the crisis of cultural authority, the reversal of roles in the relationship of church and state, and the current expansion of pluralism in the world, as significant modern trends. In a detailed analysis, Guiness asserts that three ideas are critically related to a sound solution: covenantalism, chartered pluralism, and religious liberty. In his essay, public philosophy refers: public affirmations shared in common with other citizens which are evident in practice, not only accessible in principle. Concluding claims build a case for diversity as a source of strength, using "articles of peace". We are cautioned about certain pitfalls inherent in resolving the controversies and in shaping such a public philosophy. Intellectual foresight, moral courage, and also sound, bi-partisan leadership are all required as necessary conditions in achieving justice. If the conflicts are not resolved, there could be such broad possible outcomes as a strong, negative reaction to religion in public life, or a hostile, split country along cultural lines of conservative or liberal forces. Another danger is the possibility of civility and pluralism becoming debased through laissez-faire freedom. However, Guiness concludes that the risks of a "chartered pluralism" are part of the story of our democratic experiment, and the spirit of the compact is also the source of "potential renewal" for each new generation.[4]

Charles provides evidence for his optimistic stance by telling us about some key developments which led to the outstanding guidelines, "Religion in the Public School Curriculum: Questions and Answers," issued in 1988, and the recent guidelines concerning the problem of religious holidays. It is of signal importance to note that more than a half million of these brochures have now been distributed within school districts nationally. Equal access guidelines are almost ready also. The statements have greatly assisted in new policies and programs formed by school and community leaders. Yes, the broad coalition represented by these guidelines would appear to be quite an historical accomplishment. Hopefully, such efforts as the new institute at George Mason University will enable both public and private schools to provide educational experiences which will promote a pluralistic, peaceful dialogue. The exciting new curriculum, "Living With Our Deepest Differences: Religious Liberty in a Pluralistic Society," and innovative approaches to in-service education by preparing a core of teacher trainers to deal with these issues, are promising reports.

One type of exercise reported in the literature to promote critical thinking and sensitive awareness of controversial issues is the technique of using color-coded "hats". Different students are to offer various perspectives corresponding to the hypothetical ways of responding. Using a white hat (objective, fact-oriented thinking), Charles' keynote address offers the latest data and an update on the views expressed by groups reacting to such trends as new texts dealing directly with topics on religious history and beliefs. A red hat (intuitive, affective thought) might be conducive to feelings of peace and hopeful dialogue in reacting to Charles' call for an open approach to moral education. A black hat (critical thinking) might reveal a few minor flaws linked to matters of interpretation about such concepts as "civic concensus" in a modern world, but the report is a valid one on several levels. Using yellow (positive elements), we see the material discussed as a ray of hope toward a positive resolution of the conflicts within such states as California and Texas. The color green (creativity and innovation) reveals a multi-facet effort on many fronts.

The color-coded blue hat (metacognitive role aimed at coordinating the other hats) shows an integrated keynote address which presents a balanced picture of where we are today. The conflicts surrounding religious liberty and democratic education can be viewed either negatively (no concensus of any kind will be possible) or in a positive way (textbook battles will produce open dialogue and reasonable agreements soon). We are reminded by Charles about how much really is at stake in meeting "...the challenge of reaffirming and sustaining the American experiement in liberty in our own time." He quotes President George Washington as an example of using an original document to gain historical perpectives on the task of developing a sensitive public concensus.

Certainly, as opposed to more lawsuits or a continued state of frustrated and alienated special interest groups, this new proposed public philosophy rests on the climate of fairness and understanding advocated by Charles and his co-workers. Such an approach would go a long way toward restoring faith in the public schools. Yes, it is ironic that public education has been silent in dealing with controversial and conflicting religious issues in the classroom, even though the schools have indeed been the very locus of the culture wars. Each curricular subject has a potential role in promoting peace and human understanding. For example, programs have been in existence within physical education offerings in certain areas which focus on conflict resolution skills,or other projects which employ movement activities to enhance race relations among inner-city kids in Boston. Health science teachers are using methods to build children's self-esteem as a way of promoting better relationships. Beyond instruction concerning the role of religion in social studies, music, and art, another curricular area is the history of sport. For example: Olympic Games involving athletic events to honor the Gods; the negative ascetic views toward physical activity in the form of games as Puritan attitudes during the colonial period; the more positive philosophy of "Muscular Christianity", late 19th century; the YMCA and YWCA world-wide programs; and the current view by some authorities of professional sport as a kind of civil religion of fanatic spectacles such as football play-offs.[5]

For many years, college students have enjoyed the opportunity to engage in inquiry concerning the comparative study of religious faiths and alternative beliefs on the campuses of public institutions of higher learning. Children enrolled in the public schools should also have a chance to study religion using an academic not a devotional approach. Natural topics within the various disciplines need serious and careful examination for a complete education. The "Philosophy for Children" movement is another type of approach to related issues as explained by SAPES colleague Mulvaney. However, in all these efforts to deal with controversial issues through critical thinking and problem-solving strategies, bureaucratic realities of schooling present obstacles. An open, caring climate and positive school environment for all are key elements in ensuring success. Teachers must also be well-trained in the content concerning religious liberty and issues, plus be sensitive to their own biases. Value-neutral instuction is not possible but there are effective strategies which should be fully utilized, such as securing primary materials so groups may speak themselves. As Charles points out, these materials and methods must be made readily available now. It is easy to be more open about one's own beliefs or to be less rigorous in the case of a lack of knowledge or insights regarding certain religious topics to be taught. By turning to the social studies area to meet the emerging interest in religion as an academic concern, pressures have been created in the face of lacking resources. The various developments shared through SAPES papers here at our meeting are exciting.

The SAPES symposium organized today to discuss the very stimulating book written by Prof. David Purpel offers another chance for interesting dialogue. His comments and the panel's reactions help to strenthen our in-depth analysis of this year's theme. The title of his work directly addresses the current crisis and offers a model for debate concerning such core democratic values as justice, equality, and freedom.[6]

David Purpel's call for meaningful reform is coupled with a prophetic vision of hope and compassion. He reminds us to consider the selfless examples of such great spiritual leaders as Jesus, Gandhi, and Martin Luther King. The "mythos" described in his book and the related rationale for significant change in education are quite relevant. Clearly, this a very personal book which reflects strong commitments, cherished values, and a vibrant plea for cultural change linked to real educational change. We can also refer to the several outstanding models cited from the firing line as support. This position seems consistent with the basic tenets of Charles' keynote address in terms of David's emphasis on a civic concensus and shared democratic values. Also, the book's framework includes the need for a creative and critical vision as essential.

The two books written by Charles for teachers are very helpful, both from the perspective of providing practical ways of integrating religious issues and questions into standard courses in history and social studies plus resources, as well as the more theoretical viewpoint of suggesting a historical frameworks and court cases.[7] Prevailing tendencies to avoid any reference to religion, such as defining Pilgrims as "people who make long trips" and simply describing Christmas in a popular text series as a "warm time for special foods", must be replaced by academic approaches to religious topics using effective methods to explain our unique heritage in America. The fact that the two major teachers' unions endorsed the guidelines is promising. It could also be argued that other areas of prejudice and discrimination, including inequities related to race, gender, age, age, disability, or lifestyle, must also be dealt with in a sensitive, responsive, and just way in the public school setting. All students should be assisted in the process of avoiding patterns of thinking, the use of stereotypical language, and behaviors and conduct that are unfair. Silence in these matters can easily be interpreted as condoning discriminatory habits of action. Further, the importance of modeling fair and equitable values must be recognized too.

As a philosophic point, the nature of what in fact constitutes "religion" and topics which have "religious" overtones could be raised. Although the courts do not want to have to define these concepts specifically, such an attempt may have to be made. If "Secular Humanism" is viewed as a kind of religious position by some, it is clear that this kind of inquiry is appropriate in order to have public dialogue. John Dewey has emphasized the intellectual side of the religious attitude, which liberates man through purposeful action to realize ideals manifested in human experience. Lip service to the idea of the common brotherhood of all men would be replaced by a realization of the democratic ideal. He stated that "We are at least all in the same boat traversing the same turbulent ocean. The potential religious significance of this fact is infinite."[8] Concerning educational values, Dewey's approach continues to be misinterpreted. His work at the Laboratory School of the University of Chicago exemplified Dewey's emphasis on the "educative process" using experiential methods. We have yet to fully implement this pragmatic approach which demands reflective, critical thinking as a joint teaching-learning process of shared, genuine problems.[9] Such a instrumentalist, empirical position would seem to be worth considering by the leaders within states like California, which now has a "minority majority" as a result of the blending of students from families of African, Asian, Latin American backgrounds with others of European heritage in the public schools.

From a more practical perspective, it is interesting to note the concerns of various special interest groups, as well as journalists, who object to such approaches as "diversity education" and "values clarification", which are construed as attempts to subordinate instruction to "political indoctrination". In this light, universities are described as having a political agenda by reinforcing orthodoxy based upon such topics as racism and sexism through "consciousness-raising." In discussing the new introductory focus on teaching about religion in the public schools, some experts are warning against the "tribalization of America" which could happen by misguided efforts.

Other authorities advocate "taking religion seriously" through sound, systematic teaching as a non-indoctrinative study of various religions. This kind of classroom instruction would also include exposure to secular ways of thinking. Given the demands of a modern era, diverse alternative world views must be examined in a fair and comprehensive way. Charles offers a theoretical foundation for a civic philosophy with respect to the issue in education today based upon religious liberty clauses of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The work by the Williamsburg Charter Foundation, as well as by such structures as the National Council on Religion and Public Education (NCRPE) for the past twenty years, will give renewed impetus to the exciting thrust toward fair discussion of issues.

In awaiting continued progress as we all work together, let us recall the words of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in a sermon delivered in February, 1968, as he spoke of how he wished to be remembered:

> **I'd like somebody to mention that day, that Martin Luther King Jr. tried to give his life serving others. I'd like for somebody to say that day, that Martin Luther King Jr. tried to love somebody. I want you to say that day, that I tried to be right on the war question. I want you to be able to say that day, that I did try to feed the hungry. And I want you to say that day, that I did try, in my life, to clothe those who were naked.**
>
> **Yes, if you want to say that I was a drum major, say that I was a drum major for justice; say that I was a drum major for peace; I was a drum major for righteousness...I won't have any money to leave behind. I won't have the fine and luxurious things of life to leave behind. But I just want to leave a committed life behind.**[10]

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1. See "The Williamsburg Charter: Summary of Principles," in Social Education (September 1990), 280.
2. This special feature section of Social Education included twelve articles related to the theme of religion in the Social Studies and American History and the 1984 Position Statement of the National Council for the Social Studies. Topics focus on the consequences of "religious illiteracy", teacher training, case studies, a proposed domestic exchange, and issues relating to teaching methods and religion.
3. Os Guiness, "Tribespeople, Idiots, or Citizens? Religious Liberty and the Reforging of the American Public Philosophy," Social Education (September 1990), 281.
4. Ibid., 286. Communitarianism and libertarianism are also rejected, 284.
5. Allen Guttman, From Ritual to Record: The Nature of Modern Sports (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978). Also, Michael Novak, The Joy of Sports: End Zones, Bases, Baskets, Balls, and the Consecration of the American Spirit (New York: Basic Books, 1976)
6. David E. Purpel, The Moral & Spiritual Crisis in Education: A Curriculum for Justice & Compassion in Education (Granby, Massachusetts: Bergin & Garvey, 1989).
7. Charles C. Haynes, Religious Freedom in America (Silver Spring, Maryland: Americans United Research Foundation, 1986) and Religion in American History: What to Teach and How (Alexandria, Virginia: Assoc. for Supervision & Curric. Devel.,1990).
8. John Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), 84.
9. John Dewey, The Sources of a Science of Education (New York: Liverright,1929).
10. See the special issue of Life on "The Dream: Then and Now,"(Spring 1988) and the article, "King: A Sampling of His Words," 26-31. Also, during a recent visit to JMU, Dr. King's daughter Yolanda supported the idea of various special interest groups working together toward the cause of equity and justice in "reaching for the dream."

The Reconciliation of Theology and Philosophy In Educational Thought: A Personal Journey

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Our day has been full of thoughtful presentations and stimulating conversations on a most important educational topic. Rather than attempt to add in an academic manner to the ideas already presented which merit our careful attention, I choose to briefly sketch out a few highlights of my personal and professional journey concerning one aspect of the issues before us at this meeting. The relationship between theological and philosophical perspectives about and in education within a democratic society has continually been a personal-professional issue that at one and the same time is intriguing, frustrating, inspiring, and elusive. Only in our personal and communal biographies can the issue reach a negotiated equilibrium of understanding to enrich and give coherence to both educational thought and practice. It surely resists facile and definitive a priori theoretical resolution. For this reason, a sharing of my personal journey may be of benefit to others who are struggling with the same issue.

I am confident that my personal biography resonates with a journey shared by many in trying to synthesize theological and philosophical interpretations. As a boy growing up in Cincinnati, Ohio, I had an unbounded confidence in a worldview which bridged no inconsistencies between faith and reason. I lived in a working-class, Catholic neighborhood and attended the parish parochial school where I learned that God made me (and others) to know, love, and serve him; and the purpose of education (whether in home, church, or school) was to help me achieve those ends. God had a loving plan for the human community; all things, including suffering and misfortune, would ultimately work toward the realization of the Divine Plan. The optimism of that worldview made tolerable even the perennial last place finish of the Cincinnati Reds! The theological worldview provided a clear, integrated, nurturing pattern of interpretation and meaning essential for a young person to make sense out of the blooming, buzzing confusion of human existence. Understandably, a theological worldview, as any worldview, has its distortions borne of human and institutional frailty which exact their toll on human well-being. I recall vividly an incident of coloring in a religion workbook as a third-grader. Pictured was St. Louis, as a young boy, kneeling in full princely regalia at the feet of his mother. The caption had Louis' mother saying, "Louis, I would rather you be dead at my feet than for you to commit the smallest venial sin." The caption had a staggering emotional impact which overwhelmed the immediate perplexity as to whether Louis' tunic should be colored green or

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gold. The instructor insensitively commented that every good mother would feel the same way. Neither faith nor reason should countenance such a heavy burden for an eight year-old.

Nonetheless, as a young adult and even today, I am most grateful for the theological vision and community which carried me strongly through the difficult times of forming the self in relation to others. During the period of young adulthood, I became increasingly convinced of the need to distinguish theological and philosophical perspectives in public life, and perhaps some aspects of private life. The needs of a democratic, pluralistic society dictated, I thought, the development of a public philosophy of education independent of any theological myth, narrative, or vision of the sacred. My graduate studies at Indiana University held out a promise of developing a framework for this project through analytic philosophy, whereby the careful analysis of critical educational concepts could provide a scaffolding for constructing a rational basis for educational inquiry, policy, and curriculum. I approached the task with enthusiasm, not denying the personal validity of religion or its indirect importance to culture, but nevertheless attempting to exclude it from the public educational forum. While at Indiana, I reread, as I frequently did, a book that had been very seminal in shaping my personal development, Josef Pieper's Leisure: The Basis of Culture. In the carefully crafted introduction, written by T.S. Eliot, I reread the section where he made his central point, "The root cause of the vagaries of modern philosophy -- and perhaps, though I was unconscious of it, the reason for my dissatisfaction with philosophy as a **profession** -- I now believe to lie in the divorce of philosophy from theology."[1] In the margin of the text I emphatically wrote "No" and an accompanying exclamation point. But even as I stroked the exclamation point, I felt uneasy about my protestation.

Throughout the early part of my professional career as a teacher of educational philosophy, I tried to be faithful to the rational, liberal project. In my philosophy of education courses, I urged my students to carefully bracket out personal religious perspectives because the need in a pluralistic society was to develop a public philosophy of educational inquiry and curriculum that was based upon rationally developed, commonly-shared premises. As my journey traversed greater distances and diversity of experiences, the thick and tall wall of separation between theological and philosophical understanding gradually weakened in the rough climate of teaching, bringing resolution to the tensions in my private life, and reflection in solitude on the sociological critique of human knowledge so widely discussed among thoughtful people in our times. For more than a decade I have taught a course on ethics and education, which was to be the cornerstone of the intellectual liberal project. Again and again, I found it **inevitable** that professionals develop or recognize religious narratives or interpretations as the basis for their professional practice and perspective on educational policy when they probe their ethical frameworks of compassion, respect for persons, fairness, etc.. Likewise, when probing with students in a classics of educational philosophy course their notions about the purpose of education in a democratic society, the nature of the educated

person, and a conceptions of a curriculum for a liberal education, I have found it inevitable that their fundamental ideas about human dignity, community, and fulfillment are grounded in an area shared with and inspired by religious perspectives, narratives, and themes.

As I continued to thoughtfully survey the terrain of my personal journey and the path of our public debates, I gradually concluded that the fostering of theological and philosophical conversation was not only inevitable but necessary. At the public square, we have tried to give coherence to educational inquiry, public policy, and the development of curricular models, without the slightest acknowledgement of the pertinence of religious ideas. Notions like competence, literacy, cultural literacy, and thin conceptions of critical reasoning and citizenship have each had their moment at the square. And we have proposed an abundance of rationally conceived models -- such as "effective school," teacher as CEO, "community based education," and the "one best system" -- to ambitiously claim resolution to the challenge of designing appropriate schools for a democratic society. These conceptions, taken individually or as a whole as the ultimate grounding of an education, suffer from malnourishment and ultimately do not give inspiration to the making of personal and communal meaning.

Over an extensive period of time, and without being aware of it, the personal wall between philosophy and theology, and likewise the walls separating science and literature from philosophy, ended in shambles. It has left me personally and professionally perplexed and fearful about the abuses which can occur when the conventional distinctions are blurred. There is a need to preserve real differences while trying to cultivate the shared areas of natural concern and support between philosophy and theology.

Much to my relief and benefit, the years of learning careful analytic analysis paid dividends. It has helped me recognize distinctions between human activities which can facilitate communication while respecting difference. I take seriously, for example, the distinction between 'extending an invitation' and 'indoctrinating'. To extend an invitation is to bring a person into an intellectual world for personal critical reflection and the creation of a personally meaningful understanding. Likewise, there is a distinction between 'reclaiming' or 'reappropriating' ideas/themes and 'incorporating' or 'adopting' them. To reappropriate or reclaim is to focus on what the ideal or theme draws us to in a significant way but does not commit us to all inappropriate or undesirable aspects of the application. David Purpel's book, <u>The Moral & Spiritual Crisis in Education</u>, is an excellent example of an invitation extended for our democratic community to reappropriate the Hebrew prophetic tradition as a narrative model for the nourishment of our educational project.[2] Purpel describes the prophetic model of critiquing and energizing a culture as a tradition for nurturing a rich conception of teaching and learning even within a democratic educational community. I agree; the "teacher as CEO" is flat and mundane by comparison.

I suspect that what has happened to me is happening to many in the larger society as a whole. As we proceed to explore ways to

revitalize a culture and its educational institutions, we know that there are not definitive rules and guidelines, nor will there be -- we must get used to living in a new cultural paradigm that respects relativity of understanding, has elements of chaos and indeterminacy, and appreciates the mutual symbiotic nourishment of theology and philosophy.

There is more than enough work to go around before then next time that SAPES meets in Williamsburg at the College of William & Mary. The much needed RSVP to the invitation to reclaim and appropriate theological themes into our philosophizing about education will come with toil and sacrifice. The risks are great; it was easier to exclude theological perspectives from the public forum of our debate and inquiry. But the risks of not doing so are even greater. Without broadening our perspectives in developing a publicly-shared vision about democratic education, we will continue to be handicapped by an intellectual house divided against itself and condemned to the arena of petty polemics. God speed us in our journey!

Epilogue: Two weeks ago, I reopened to page thirteen of Leisure: The Basis of Culture and in the margin next to T.S. Eliot's comment, I placed a single pen stroke with the same definitiveness as Lily Briscoe did on the canvas at the conclusion of Virginia Woolf's masterful To the Lighthouse. The stroke was through the word "No". And I mentally added,"Thanks, I needed that!"

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1. Josef Pieper, Leisure: The Basis of Culture (New York: New American Library, 1952), p. 13.

2. David E. Purpel, The Moral & Spiritual Crisis in Education: A Curriculum for Justice & Compassion in Education (New York: Bergin and Garvey, 1989).

WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL ...

THE TEACHING OF THE DEMOCRATIC VALUE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

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There is a growing awareness that our democracy will not long survive if society does not make a more conscious effort to teach our youth those social values which undergird our way of life. As a token jesture toward that end, children and teachers alike pause each morning before a full day of worksheets and skillpacks to recite the Pledge of Allegiance. In so doing, teachers and children alike affirm the important principle of "justice for all". While not challenging the conventional wisdom of such activities, I do want to question what we do in school to help our young people grasp the rich meaning of the concept they affirm each day and to comprehend its implications.

For concepts like "justice" to become more than mere platitudes, recited by children in their early morning stupor, educators, parents and others alike must be willing to explore their rich and varied meanings in the context of the regular school curriculum. "In order to form a more perfect union . . .,"[1] we must extend our efforts at helping young people establish some viable vision of a just society. Now would be a very opportune time, considering the recent attention given to the two hundredth anniversary of our Constitution. For in forming this document, our forefathers made a significant contribution toward defining and establishing a just society. Yet those efforts, while monumental, still leave a great deal undone. Successive generations not only have to reaffirm their commitment to "justice", but must reinterpret its meaning as well. Like our ancestors, we too must engage in that ongoing task. Considering the fragile quality of our present society, a more deliberate effort on our part seems undeniably timely. The schools may be the best place to begin, yet recent events leave me somewhat pessimistic. The schools' growing preoccupation with nurturing moral virtue in the individual student in isolation from a viable conception of a good society leaves little time or energy for consideration of matters related to social justice.

In her recent book, Democratic Education, Amy Gutmann suggests that we cannot "speak meaningfully about a good education without knowing what a just society and a virtuous person are."[2] The relationship between these three elements which Socrates examined with the Sophists in the Protagoras is one that Gutmann feels is still worth exploring. She would have us accept Plato's argument that public education is a necessary vehicle for "establishing a harmony between individual virtue and social justice."[3] The issue is of critical import, considering the current attention given to moral education. Much of the current activity is focused on the need to develop individual virtues in young people in areas related to many of the social problems our society faces, e.g., drugs and teen-aged pregnancy. But such efforts are centered in what is good for the individual in isolation from

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any consideration of what is good for our society. But as Gutmann observes, "there is no necessary conflict between what is good for us and what is good for society--provided our society is just."[4] I feel as she does that children cannot realize the good life for themselves without contributing in some way to the social good which, for me, includes a just society. If she is correct, then a shift in our educational focus is in order. It is time to give more serious attention in our schools to the democratic value of social justice.

Recently, the American Federation of Teachers, in cooperation with the Educational Excellence Network and Freedom House, published a statement of principles and guidelines for teaching democratic values in the schools. The document reveals much about the state of social justice as a topic for consideration in the curriculum of civic education. The authors, sponsors and signatories to *Education for Democracy* intended the document as a useful guide for educators who want to "strengthen the schools' resolve to consciously impart to students the ideals and values on which our free society rests."[5] While acknowledging that our culture heritage is diverse, the authors insist that our political heritage is singular. It is "the vision of a common life in liberty, justice and equality as expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution two centuries ago."[6] The important point for our purposes is the authors' commitment to justice as a democratic principle along with their willingness to identify those educational strategies which ought to guide formal instruction in the democratic value of justice. Their initiative represents the beginnings of the kind of deliberate effort I believe is necessary and so long overdue. For that reason alone, the document warrants closer examination.

Several items in this brief publication are noteworthy. One is the claim that history is the central element in the study of democratic values such as justice. For the authors, "history alone affords the perspective that students need to compare themselves realistically with others . . . and to think critically . . . ."[7] Part of thinking critically, one could assume, is for students to be able to judge the meaning and value of things for themselves, including the ability to determine the meaning and value of the democratic principle of justice. For the authors of this monograph, the study of history (including geography) is the foundation of any critical examination of problems and choices we face in our contemporary world. But how does the study of history accomplish this? One way, they believe, is by learning about non-democratic regimes. For them, such knowledge will reveal the pervasive injustice that has infected these societies over time. Presumably, youngsters have some built-in injustice detector, fully developed, which allows them to see injustice when it appears. The anticipated result from the study of such regimes is young people who have grown in their appreciation of our democratic society and who have learned to value and defend it. In some mysterious way, the study of what has transpired in our culture and in others is supposed to reveal those values which are the heart of a democratic society and cause the student to affirm them as well. No small order for a subject matter typically taught as a lifeless collection of serial facts.

Even more surprising is that values, such as justice, appear to the authors of *Education for Democracy* to be so deeply embedded in historical context that they cannot and should not be removed for any conceptional examination. At least that appears to be their argument. To pull such concepts as "justice" out of their historical narrative for critical examination, "not only confuses students but it is likely to distort the truth of the human

condition."[8] In fact, all other subjects in the social sciences should maintain an historical flavor so as to give them life, drama and significance.

Having argued for the primacy of historical study in the teaching of democratic values such as justice, the authors of *Education For Democracy* surprisingly shift ground near the end of their report to acknowledge the need to study democratic values from non-historical perspectives. Those added perspectives appear limited to economics, psychology, anthropology, and political science though brief mention is made of the humanities, "particularly . . . literature, ideas, and biography".[9] A clue as to what they mean by "ideas" can be found in their claim that "values and moral integrity are better discovered by students in their reading of history, of literature, of philosophy, and of biography."[10] Could it be that the authors are equating "ideas" with philosophy, in this instance moral philosophy? While history is deemed primary, reluctant recognition appears to be given to the non-historical study of the democratic ideas or ideals. That reluctance seems to be based on an underlying fear that any independent examination of our forefather's interpretation of democratic values would be harmful to the young mind. "To pull 'case studies' out of historical narrative, as so many social studies programs do, not only confuses students but is likely to distort the truth of the human condition."[11]

The authors do recognize that students will be making moral choices, choices between right and wrong as well as between competing rights. While history can certainly give a "context" for the moral judgments these young people will have to make, it certainly cannot provide the necessary justification for their moral action. Granted, history can give them a better perspective on what their choices should be. It does give them a sense of how others have interpreted and applied those values which are fundamental to their choices. But history by itself cannot aid them in determining the rightness of other's actions. It cannot, for example, help them determine whether our ancestor's concept of justice was adequate for yesterday's problems or applicable to today's dilemmas. To determine that, alternative meanings must be explored, assumptions questioned and justifications constructed. Moral values undergirding our democratic society must be explored in ways that reveal their sensibility or foolishness. It is a critical activity which should be undertaken with students at various grade levels and with varying degrees of sophistication. It is the task of moral philosophy.

The authors of *Education and Democracy* affirm that "the quest for worth and meaning" is an indispensable aspect of democratic citizenship and that all citizens, regardless of age, must continually refine their conceptions of the good life. What is shocking is their claim that teaching can have no direct effect on this process. For them, "values are not taught."[12] They are simply encountered in school and life. The educator's responsibility is merely to present his own judgment of "the best that has been thought and said and created from the ancient to the most recent."[13] Then in some unexplainable way this encounter is supposed to shape the student's conception of the good life. Teachers are urged to exercise their judgment on behalf of the students but are not to cultivate that judgment directly in students. Presumably, that is because they believe that this kind of judgment cannot be taught to students. How teachers themselves gain the special kind of knowledge which allows them to pick and choose for students remains a mystery.

The authors of *Education and Democracy* claim that the essence of democracy is choice. If true, it would seem reasonable for teachers to be charged with the responsibility of assisting young people in gaining the kind of critical understanding necessary for them to make wise moral choices in the context of a viable concept of social justice. That kind of understanding comes not through indoctrination which the authors describe as belief induced by irrational means. But neither does it come from the study of geography which, the authors argue, confronts students "with the hard realities that shape so many political, economic and social decisions."[14] By itself, geography contains little potential for stimulating serious conversation about the relationship between the "hard realities" which individuals and society face and matters of social justice. In fact, the "hard realities" we are sometimes made aware of through the study of geography, are frequently used as excuses for not confronting questions of moral principle. They are used as excuses for the unjust treatment of individuals or groups within our society and in the world-at-large.

So what hope is there for strengthening the teaching of justice as a fundamental democratic value and a central concept in understanding the meaning of citizenship in American life? For those concerned educators, the hope resides in a revitalized civic education. But if American government textbooks are any indication of the present content of civic education courses, those hopes are quickly dashed. For these books are devoid of even the most elementary discussion of justice, including any examination of its meaning or application to our social and political lives. Some believe that this deplorable condition can be rectified with the introduction of something called Law-related education.

In 1980, Furlong and Arbetman claimed that a renaissance in civic education was at hand, one that would foster "social responsibility, personal obligation for the public good, and effective participation in the social order."[15] They saw Law-related education as helping students understand the laws that define the social order and assisting them in clarifying what is adequate or inadequate about these laws. In the description of their program it is not surprising to find that the authors fail to acknowledge that students cannot make judgments about the adequacy of laws in a vacuum. There must be some guiding principles by which to determine adequacy. An understanding of and commitment to social justice would appear fundamental to the task. It is disappointing to observe that these authors, along with the vast majority of law-related education advocates, approach the concept of justice in such a very limited way.

One reason for my concern is that the major effort to introduce "justice" into the curriculum has been generated by the Law-Related Education Office of the U.S. Department of Education which up until recently filtered money to the American Bar Association and their Special Committee on Youth Education. With that support, they publish the magazine, Update on Law-Related Education, the primary voice for law-related education. Recently this Committee issued four handbooks on great Constitutional themes, including one on Justice, all sponsored by a grant from the Department of Education. That handbook contains articles and teaching strategies reprinted from the Bar's magazine. The handbook thus gives a good picture of the orientation toward the teaching of "justice" shared by our Federal Government and the conservative American Bar Association.

It was not surprising to find that the lead article in the handbook began with a discussion of "Due Process: What is It? But it was a shock to discover the assumption contained in a note to teachers that

> The concept of due process assumes, to a certain extent,that a genuinely fair procedure, with a result based solely on the evidence adduced through that procedure, will achieve justice.[16]

That assumption would not have been so unsettling if the author, Patricia McGuire of Georgetown's School of Law, had been making a sharp distinction between procedural due process and a substantive notion of social justice. But when she refers to students gaining "facility with thinking and speaking about 'due process' as meaning 'fundamental fairness' or 'fair procedures,' "one can only worry about the future of "justice" as a substantive concept in our continuing dialogue about the nature and meaning of a democratic society. Equating fundamental fairness with procedural due process, as she does, does disservice to our search for a viable notion of a related democratic concept, the "general welfare".

Other good examples of this limited treatment of social justice can be found in the movement's publication, Update on Law-Related Education. For example, in an article entitled "Great Constitutional Ideas: Justice, Equality, and Property," Isidore Starr acknowledges those references to justice made in both the Constitution and Declaration of Independence. But like others in the Law-related education movement, she argues that a satisfactory operational definition of social justice can be found in the Constitution, specifically in the Bill of Rights.

> It is, however, in the Bill of Rights that the nature and scope of the idea of justice are set forth in detail. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments speak directly to the ideas of criminal justice by reference to the principles of due process of law.[17]

Starr, an acknowledged leader in the law education field, unfortunately seeks to limit the examination of justice to matters of procedure and retribution. She finds it reasonable to believe that the framers of our Constitution simply took the "abstract" notion of justice and converted it into a matter of due process. That quick conversion saves Starr and others in her movement from having to undertake any serious examination of the substantive principle. Approaching the issue from her legalistic perspective, Starr appears preoccupied more with the means of human action that with its ends. That preoccupation results in her attending to issues such as whether the adversarial system is the best guarantee of procedural justice or whether plea bargaining supplants the due process model. It leads her to assert such questionable claims as our adversial system "is our way of seeking the truth in the forum of justice."[18] But what reason is there to believe that our forefathers sought such a limited interpretation of social justice?

Because her concept of justice as due process is so circumscribed, Starr has difficulty linking the concept to her other two great Constitutional ideas, viz., equality and property.

It is only with the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment that she thinks the issue of equality has taken on a "constitutional dimension." It is difficult to understand how she could fail to see any connection between justice and equal treatment. Even when she recognizes its constitutional aspects, she quickly converts it into the legal notion of equal protection of the law.

Perhaps the weakness of Starr's concept of justice is best seen in her discussion of her third great constitutional idea, viz., property. She uses the Bill of Rights, along with the Declaration of Independence, to link the pursuit of happiness with the ownership of property. She argues that John Locke's influence on colonial leaders shaped their rationale for government, which was the preservation of property. For her, property is "basic to the dignity and integrity of the individual as well as to the viability of a democratic republic."[19] For her property is closely associated with the end of man, viz., his happiness. Property is not even considered in the context of distributive justice. Not once in her examination of property as a great constitutional idea does she encourage any discussion by teachers or young people of the just distribution of property. Instead, she focuses on such things as the impairment of contracts, the granting of rights to authors and inventors, the right to bear arms, and the prohibition of unreasonable searches. She would have us celebrate the contributions of property to our greatness as a world power but not have us consider the unjust use of property in ways that may exploit the dispossessed of the world.

A more promising approach to the study of social justice and the general welfare can be found in the secondary level text, Constitution for the United States of America, prepared by the Center for Civic Education and sponsored by the Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution. Granted, neither concept receives much attention. Nor is it surprising that "justice" cannot even be found in the Glossary of Major Terms and Concepts or that the Index includes such terms as procedural due process, social contract, and laissez faire. To its credit, however, the brief references which the document makes to "justice" and the "common welfare" are very suggestive. In discussing who should decide what is a fair law, the authors acknowledge a problem that is rich in possibilities:

> The problem is that what one person thinks is reasonable and fair may be considered unreasonable and unfair by another person. Opinions on such matters often depend, at least in part, upon a person's knowledge and experience and upon the person's economic, social and political views.[20]

But what knowledge, experience or principles are important to discourage a relativistic interpretation of justice? The matter is simply not discussed nor are students encouraged to pursue it further. Students or teachers are not provided with any clues as to how political, social or economic views shape one's sense of fairness. Nor do the authors clarify their assumption that limitations should be placed upon life, liberty and property only to protect the common welfare or their later, more extreme position that the goal of democratic government is the achievement of the common welfare. But what is the common welfare and

how can it be protected? Their response comes in the form of several provocative questions worthy of serious consideration by students and teachers alike:

> Is the common welfare the "greatest happiness of the greatest number of people"? If so, what does that mean?
>
> Is the common welfare what is good for 50 percent of the population?
>
> Is the common welfare the goals that all people in the nation share? If so, how do we find out what those goals are?[21]

I believe that discussion about the meaning of justice as a moral standard needs to be elevated to a more central position in our social and educational lives. Justice is, as Rawls claims, "the first virtue of social institutions."[22] But in our schools the concept stands in danger of either being ignored or severely limited to a consideration of procedural justice. If the richness of possible meanings is not explored in the many public forums, including our schools the concept stands in danger of being considered empty of meaning. Such an examination, however, may have an explosive impact, for it could open up for reconsideration the meaning of the general welfare or common good. Any discussion of distributive justice will necessarily involve consideration of what each person is due in relation to the common good. That will inevitably cause controversy, reflecting the conflicts that characterize our social life. Present human suffering will have to be studied and the political and social structures that contribute to those conditions and distributions will have to be examined.

A program in school could begin with an examination of what has been called the formal principle of distributive justice, viz., that equals should be treated as equals and unequals unequally. It would probe differences and similarities among people and explore which are relevant to the issue at hand. It could examine the roles that impartiality, consistency and proportionality play in shaping the concept of justice.
Extending beyond the formal principle, teachers and students could probe the contributions that need, ability, effort, productivity, public utility and supply and demand make in shaping our decisions about the just distribution of society's goods. Obviously, when to take these into account in determining social justice is controversial. As Allen Buchanan and Deborah Mathieu note:

> One cannot ascertain which properties must be taken into account for the application of justice without assuming a certain scale of values, a determination of what is important and what is not. Different views of what the fundamental burdens and benefits of life are, how they are to be weighed, and which ones can be dealt with by social arrangements will lead to different conceptions of distributive justice. And different views of what human rights must be taken into account--including a conception of which are fundamental and which are secondary--will lead to different conceptions of justice.[23]

The mature student could only profit from an exposure to different concepts of justice that would emerge for it would force an examination of the good society, a giant step beyond anything found in our present social studies and government classes.

I believe that it is critical for our survival as a democratic society to shift attention away from the individualistic, self-centered institutional values of freedom and the right to maximize one's property toward those values associated with the common welfare and social justice. By that I certainly do not mean that we should devalue the power of a person to act according to his own purposes. But as Marcus Raskin notes, freedom has become a prisoner of the productive process.[24] He would agree with Kenneth Strike that "liberal freedom has resulted in a lonely and individuated self, united to others only by agreements struck for the sake of self interests."[25] The problem with that, as Strike notes, is that justice becomes nothing more than the "rules according to which individuals compete with one another to realize their own freely chosen ends."[26] But justice must become more than Hobbes' rules that keep the war of all, against all, a civilized struggle.
Raskin's concept of the "common good" incorporates a concern for both the general welfare and social justice. He believes that we all have an instinct for the common good, which he refers to as the "caring for the Other."[27] It is developed incompletely and to different degrees within all of us through our social and natural environment. We all have a kind of sixth sense which allows us to "learn to feel our commonness with others in their vulnerability and humanity; and our own."[28] But that sixth sense can only be fully developed when "there is a collective willingness within a society and government to cherish this capacity and not abuse it by institutions and knowledge which operate purposely to frame the unsuspecting."[29]

Dialogue and conversation are necessary ingredients toward generating a common sense of the good. But nothing positive will come of that unless we can affirm in common "that there is a natural capacity within people for trust and empathy"[30] which needs to be cultivated. Awareness and recognition of the human Other naturally leads to emphatic justice. Not the kind of Kantian justice which is external to people's feelings, but a capacity within us filled with hope, love and empathy.

Empathic justice extends far beyond the limited notion of due process. It is, in Raskin's words, the "gift of sharing one's humanity with another."[31] We need to find ways to stimulate this sixth sense of empathetic justice and caring in our rising generation. Unless we can find some means of activating this empathic sensibility, we are doomed to celebrating the basest form of individualism and selfishness as our primary democratic principles. As long as our schools are afraid to introduce into the curriculum any substantive discussion of social justice, preferring instead to raise the free enterprise principle and the mechanisms which protect it to a political ideal, there is little hope for the democratic ideal of the general welfare.

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1. The Constitution of the United States.
2. Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), 22.
3. Ibid., 23.
4. Ibid.

5. American Federation of Teachers, Education for Democracy (Washington, D.C.: American Federation of Teachers), 1.

6. Ibid., 7.

7. Ibid., 17.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., 20.

10. Ibid., 18.

11. Ibid., 17.

12. Ibid., 18.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., 20.

15. Mary S. Furlong and Lee Arbetman, "Learning About Law," Educational Leadership (October, 1980); 41.

16. American Bar Association Special Committee on Youth Education for Citizenship, Justice: Constitutional Update, 4.

17. Isidore Starr, "Great Constitutional Ideas: Justice, Equality, and Property," Update on Law-related Education (Spring 1987): 3.

18. Ibid., 5.

19. Ibid., 6.

20. Center for Civic Education, Constitution for the United States of American (Calabasas, Ca.: Center for Civic Education, 1987). 102

21. Ibid., 126.

22. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 3.

23. Allan Buchanan and Deborah Mathiew, "Philosophy and Justice" in Ronald Cohen's Justice: Views from the Social Sciences (New York: Plenum Press, 1986), 20-21.

24. Marcus G. Raskin, The Common Good (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), 29.

25. Kenneth A. Strike, "Foreword" in David C. Bricker's, Classroom Life as Civic Education (New York: Teachers' College Press, 1989), xviii.

26. Ibid.

27. Raskin, The Common Good, 31.

28. Ibid., 33.

29. Ibid., 35.

30. Ibid., 45.

31. Ibid., 327.

"IF WISHES WERE HORSES, THEN BEGGARS WOULD RIDE"

A RESPONSE TO WARREN STRANDBERG

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Strandberg's paper was a frustrating one for me. Not because the paper addresses a trivial issue - social justice in the schools is surely not trivial; nor because the paper is poorly written - it is not; nor because the paper is devoid of substantive and interesting points - it contains them. Rather my frustration in constructing a response to this paper occurred because the issues related to social justice and schooling seem to me to be so complex and far-ranging that I was never sure if my questions and concerns about Strandberg's points and arguments were not simply the result of space constraints he faced. Thus the title of my response. I will present some "wishes" that occurred to me in reading and thinking about Strandberg's paper. I hope that by responding to Strandberg in this way I have not done a grave injustice to his paper. I certainly would like to be able to ride with Strandberg toward greater social justice in American schools.

Before turning to my wishes, let me briefly outline the general line of thought in, and structure of his paper. When Strandberg begins (actually with the very title of his paper) with the phrase "with liberty and justice for all" from the Pledge of Allegiance, I assume he is reminding us that in the United States today we will find most people are for "liberty and justice." Problems arise when we begin to ask what people mean by social justice (and freedom) and the connections between social justice and education. Important questions and significant disagreements also seem to arise when we examine the relations between the two concepts of social justice and freedom. Strandberg's paper is concerned primarily with issues of social justice and education, but at the end of his paper he does discuss briefly one interpretation of the relations between freedom and social justice.(One of my wishes concerns this discussion).

Strandberg examines, but criticizes for different reasons, two conceptions of, and approaches to justice and schooling: 1) a recent document, Education For Democracy and 2) Law-related education. A third approach with which he has more sympathy is found in a secondary level text, Constitution for the United States of America. Even this text is found wanting though, it seems primarily because it does not follow through on some suggestive points concerning "justice" and "common welfare." Strandberg ends his paper by calling on schools and teachers to engage students in discussions of "distributive justice" and to cultivate what he calls "empathic justice."

I find myself in general agreement with Strandberg's criticisms of the Law-related approaches to justice which he describes. Just as I am convinced that what makes a society democratic involves more than formal voting procedures for ensuring majoritarian rule, I find Strandberg's reasoning sound when criticizing Law-related approaches that equate procedural due process with social justice. He also appears to me to be right in claiming that property rights must be discussed within a context concerned with distributive justice. As Strike pointed out in his recent book, Liberal Justice and the Marxist

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Critique of Education, our own democratic society already is one in which "... to some extent, property acquired in market transactions can be socially appropriated in order to satisfy broader considerations of justice."[1] On to my wishes now.

When Strandberg criticizes Education for Democracy for seemingly advancing the claim that concepts like "justice" cannot be removed from the historical context in which they are embedded, I wish that he would have connected this claim with one made earlier in this document. In criticizing a test item on an exam designed by the National Assessment of Educational Progress, the authors of this document state, "Around the world, people and governments do apply different meanings to the word "freedom." Some states that deny freedom of religion, speech, and conscience nevertheless define themselves as free. But we need not accept their Orwellian self-definitions as if words had no meaning."[2] With respect to the concept of "freedom" it seems to me that authors of Education for Democracy are implicitly committed to exactly what Strandberg wants; that is, a determination of conceptual adequacy in which "alternative meanings must be explored, assumptions questioned and justifications constructed." In light of what is said about rejecting "Orwellian self-definitions" I am not sure what to make of this document's assertion that pulling "concepts out of historical narrative...not only confuses students but is likely to distort the truth of the human condition."[3]

When Strandberg is shocked by Education for Democracy's claim that "values are not 'taught', they are encountered in school and life," I wish he had discussed in what sense he believes empathic justice can be "taught." He tells us that schools must "stimulate this sixth sense of empathetic justice ... find some means of activating this empathic sensibility." (emphasis added) Are we being told here that "empathic justice" can be "taught?" I think not, at least not in the same sense that mathematical theorems are taught.

In advocating that schools cultivate empathic justice I wonder if Strandberg is taking a position on justice similar to that found in recent books by Amy Gutmann and Kenneth Strike. While both of these authors find much to praise in the ideal of a principled commitment to values such as justice, both raise questions about schools' ability to get students to achieve this ideal. Gutmann states that "Schools that help develop the cooperative moral sentiments - empathy, trust, benevolence, and fairness - contribute a great deal to democratic education."[4] Using bigotry as one example to illustrate her point, Gutmann suggests that "Children first become the kind of people who are repelled by bigotry, and then they feel the force of the reasons for their repulsion."[5] Concluding a discussion of how people acquire a sense of justice Strike says that "These comments indicate that people do not acquire a sense of justice so much because they are persuaded by argument, but because they experience its contribution to their lives."[6] In what sense are "trust and empathy" taught to students? Is Strandberg perhaps arguing that acquiring empathic justice is, in some sense, a necessary precondition to accepting a principled commitment to social justice as distributive justice? I wish that he had told us more about the relationship between empathic justice and social justice as distributive justice.

I wish that Strandberg had developed the direction in which he would move to answer his question: "But what knowledge or experience is important to discourage a relativistic interpretation of justice?" The question and its

answer are especially important since a little further on in the paper Strandberg refers to the benefit that students could gain from "an exposure to different conceptions of justice." Admittedly there may be no necessary conflict between these two points, but I wish Strandberg had discussed what, if anything, distinguishes alternative conceptions of justice that are worthy of serious dialogue and consideration from relativistic interpretations that should be discouraged. Is there a single, "correct" conception of justice compatible with multiple and diverse, but morally defensible life plans? Or is Strandberg arguing that we accept multiple, but equally defensible conceptions of justice?

I wish that Strandberg had looked in the direction of the teachers who will be participants in this serious examination of justice and the good society. Sirotnik, a recent voice among many, paints a dismal and depressing picture of teacher education programs. The programs he describes are not ones in which prospective teachers are educated in such a way that they could help students benefit from such discussions.[7] I would draw your attention to a curious statement in Gutmann's Democratic Education. At the beginning of her chapter "The Purposes of Higher Education," she states that "Higher education cannot succeed unless lower education does."[8] Yet, lower education can only succeed if we are successful in fostering within prospective (and current) teachers the "thoughtfulness" necessary to lead the serious rational dialogue advocated by both Strandberg and Gutmann.[9] Of course, we also will need to structure schools and teachers' working conditions in ways that encourage and support such conversations.

Finally, I wish that Strandberg had discussed further his thoughts on the alleged antagonism between "liberty" and "justice." Strandberg clearly sees an interpretation of freedom closely tied to a capitalistic economy, and concerned primarily with protecting property rights as conflicting with the sense of justice he wants schools to pursue. Although explored only briefly in the paper, I think this line of criticism is valid. However, while Strandberg quotes Strike in support of his criticism of this conception of freedom, I think it would be fair to say that in his most recent book Strike is arguing that a sense of "...autonomy must be morally central to the concept of justice as fairness."[10] In Strandberg's moral universe what sense of "liberty" will be compatible with "justice for all?"

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1. Kenneth A. Strike, Liberal Justice and the Marxist Critique of Education (New York: Routledge, 1989), 114.
2. American Federation of Teachers, Educational Excellence Network and Freedom House, Education for Democracy (Washington, D.C.: American Federation of Teachers), 11.
3. Ibid., 17.
4. Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), 61.
5. Ibid., 43.
6. Strike, Liberal Justice, 44.
7. Kenneth A. Sirotnik, "On the Eroding Foundations of Teacher Education," Phi Delta Kappan (May, 1990): 710-716.
8. Gutmann, Democratic Education, 172.
9. For arguments concerning "thoughtfulness" in schools see Francis Schrag, Thinking in School and Society (New York: Routledge, 1988).
10. Strike, Liberal Justice, 36.

THOMAS JEFFERSON ON "HUMAN INTERPOSITION," FREEDOM OF RELIGION, AND INQUIRY: PROBLEMS AND PARADOXES

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The preamble of Jefferson's A Bill For Establishing Religious Freedom introduced into the Virginia Assembly in 1779 concludes:

> It is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order; and finally, that truth is great and will prevail if left to herself; that she is the proper and sufficient antagonist to error, and has nothing to fear from the conflict unless by human interposition disarmed of her natural weapons, free argument and debate; errors ceasing to be dangerous when it is permitted freely to contradict them.

The above wording remained unchanged when the bill eventually passed the Virginia Assembly in 1786. Jefferson connects two important ideas in this passage neither of which necessarily refers to religion, although the two are readily related to it. First, Jefferson would forbid the civil government to interpose itself upon the natural right of individuals to formulate, hold and express whatever principles and opinions they will as long as they are not translated into threatening or dangerous action. For convenience let us call this idea, "the standard for civil interposition." Jefferson refers to this standard on many occasions; perhaps the most striking for our purposes is the following from his Notes on Virginia:

> The rights of conscience we never submitted, we could not. We are answerable for them to our God. The legitimate powers of government extended to such acts only as are injurious to others. But it does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty Gods, or no God. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.[1]

Clearly this standard is intended to apply as much to the process of religious inquiry as the conclusions that are the product of it. Jefferson is here trying to draw a sharp legal distinction between belief and action; the state cannot interpose itself upon individuals' right to inquire into, hold and express their personal opinion unless said individuals' external physical activity violates law. As David Little notes, Jefferson's standard is not especially novel. The Christian tradition differentiates between the two tables of the Decalogue or ten commandments. The first four refer to religious duties owed directly to God, the "things of the spirit" governed by the "law of the spirit," while the final six refer to the moral sphere, "things of the body" governed by the "law of the sword."[2] The rights of conscience are not only beyond civil interposition, but beyond all forms of "human interposition" since, as we will see, such natural rights are derived only from God. We are uncertain about the clarity and sharpness of Jefferson's legal distinction as well as other distinctions that we will discuss.

The second idea we will call "eliminative convergent commonsense epistemological pluralism" for reasons that will be made clearer later. Basically this idea contends that the conflict of intellectual, moral, religious, and presumably, aesthetic principles and opinions will eventually converge to the one true belief as error is eliminated. All that is required is that the inquiry of autonomous rational agents remain uncoerced and unconstrained. We could also call this position "convergent realism." Jefferson restates the idea repeatedly; as when he wrote, "truth will do well enough if left to shift for herself...she has no need of force to procure entrance into the minds of men, error indeed has often prevailed by the assistance of power or force."[3] Elsewhere he declares, "Reason and experiment have been indulged, and error has fled before them. Only error needs the support of government. Truth can stand by itself."[4] Said simply, error will be eliminated and truth obtained if only reason remains free of all "human interposition" in order to engage in experimental inquiry.

The standard for civil interposition is a particular and particularly important stricture against "human interposition" in the process of inquiry that rests upon the epistemological idea of convergent realism. Besides civil

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institutions, religious institutions and their representatives could, on Jefferson's account, also be a source of human interposition upon free inquiry. Separating institutionalized religion from the institutions of the state sharply reduced the powers of interposition on the part of the representatives of both; that is, as Jefferson states in the **Virginia Bill For Establishing Religious Freedom**, "legislators and rulers, civil as well as ecclesiastical, who, being themselves but fallible and uninspired men, have assumed dominion over the faith of others...." Provided such statements we should not be surprised when later in the bill Jefferson asserts, "that to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of opinion and to restrain the profession or propagation of principles on supposition of their ill tendency is a dangerous fallacy...." Nor should we be surprised when he says elsewhere, "Are we to have a censor whose imprimatur shall say what books may be sold, and what we may buy? And who is thus to dogmatize religious opinions for our citizens? Is a priest to be our inquisitor...?"[5] Presumably a similar admonition should extend to censors of all kinds of texts. Jefferson for his part sought personally to separate religion from morals, in part because he felt that institutionalized religion provided its representatives with unwarranted power over reason.[6] This third idea of forbidding "human interposition" upon which, as we will see later, the second idea of "eliminative convergent commonsense epistemological pluralism" depends, and of which "the standard for civil interposition" is an important special case, is drawn too sharply and simply and is full of irony and paradox as we will see.

Anyone who understands Jefferson's ideas regarding the standard for civil interposition (along with the more general idea forbidding human interposition altogether) and convergent commonsense epistemological pluralism, as well as their connections, can only experience shock and consternation at the contents of the following communication from Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell concerning the selection of text-books by the trustees of the University of Virginia. Generally Jefferson does not believe that such selection is the task of the trustees, however, he declares:

> ...there is one branch in which we are the best judges, in which heresies may be taught, of so interesting a character to our own State and to the United States, as to make it a duty in us to lay down the principles which are to be taught. It is that of government. Mr. Gilmer being withdrawn, we know not who his successor may be. He may be a Richmond lawyer, or one of that school of quondam federalism, now consolidation. It is our duty to guard against such principles being disseminated among our youth, and the diffusion of that poison, by a previous prescription of the texts to be followed in their discourses. I therefore enclose you a resolution...I wish it kept to ourselves, because I have always found that the less such things are spoken beforehand, the less obstruction is contrived to be thrown in their way. I have communicated it to Mr. Madison.[7]

In commenting on this passage Leonard Levy concludes that when Jefferson "spoke of the law school of the University of Virginia.... He was seeking to proscribe the teaching of ideas antithetical to his own views of the federal system. The school was not to teach both Federalist and Republican views...it was to indoctrinate loyalty to Republicanism."[8] The phase "human interposition" would be a nice way of describing the foregoing passage from Jefferson filled as it is with dogma, indoctrination and coercion spiced with conspiracy. It seems as if Jefferson has contradicted in practice his highest ideals of principle. It is not entirely clear to us that such is the case, although we are not sure. It is possible that Jefferson is simply caught in a pair of paradoxes that are sure to arise in a liberal democracy. The first we will designate "the paradox of indoctrination in a democracy; "the second we will call "a paradox of freedom." The former is a special case of the latter which in turn is merely one of many such paradoxes.

Indoctrination has been defined as "causing a person to hold a belief which they are unable to justify on rational grounds."[9] Rationality in turn may be defined in terms of the ability to evaluate evidence and adjudicate reasons.[10] It is, of course, difficult to evaluate evidence and adjudicate reasons that are deliberately withheld or distorted. Critical thinking is crucial to a democracy for precisely the kind of reasons Jefferson provides. Yet, ironically, Jefferson seems to be invoking doctrinaire interposition in just the kind of way he earlier decried. How can he do this with honesty and integrity? There is an answer, we think, but it is paradoxical and paradoxes are something that Jefferson's sharp distinctions are incapable of dealing with easily.

Most philosophers of education feel that indoctrination is inevitable. If someone's enabling beliefs, i.e., those foundational beliefs that enable an agent to evaluate evidence and judge the veracity of other beliefs, do not include the belief that reasons are relevant then the only way we can teach rational thought is through indoctrination. We must indoctrinate in order that the student not be subject to future indoctrination, a paradox. This paradox is usually dissolved by saying that such indoctrination "may be sanctioned only in order that beliefs adopted may later be redeemed by reasons."[11] Something like this paradox and dissolution may be what confronted Jefferson in his concern to secure both liberal democratic education and rational inquiry in the law school at the University of Virginia.

Jefferson once wrote a friend affirming:

> I am not a federalist, because I never submitted the whole system of my opinions to the creed of any party of men, in religion, in philosophy, in politics or in anything else, where I was capable of thinking for myself. Such an addiction, is the last degradation of a free and moral agent. If I could not go to heaven but with a party, I would not go there at all.[12]

The paradox here could, given Jefferson's opinion of federalism, take the form of the sagacious statement that "there is a thought that stops thought and only that should be stopped." So stated the pedagogical paradox becomes a paradox of freedom. For Jefferson, to be a free rational, moral and religious agent meant that one must be a completely detached autonomous agent; for instance, he once said, "I am a sect by myself."[13] Yet free agents must be constrained, for freedom without constraint becomes capriciousness -- a paradox. Jefferson finds this constraint in autonomous rational and moral sensibility detached entirely from some sustaining community. Still, Jefferson, as an influential representative of the University of Virginia community, that is, as a founding father and a member of its Board of Visitors, exercises constraint and coercion on the curriculum of the institution and, thereby, upon the minds of its matriculants.

It seems to us that the relation between the free autonomous self and the constraints of society is a complex one full of paradoxes, ironies and reversals of meaning. Unfortunately, we do not feel that Jefferson himself appreciated the kinds of tensions generated by the paradoxes of freedom, including religious freedom. Instead he relied on an almost blind faith in Enlightenment rationality, a number of dangerously oversimplified distinctions and, finally, he seriously overlooked the importance of concrete community in appropriately situating and constraining freedom. The result is that Jefferson caught himself in a contradiction and left future generations to try to work out the tensions that arise from the paradoxes of freedom of religious inquiry in a liberal democracy. In what follows we will examine Jefferson's faith in Enlightenment, some of his oversimplified distinctions arising therefrom and his failure to appreciate the constraining role of community and its implications for free religious inquiry.

Jefferson's Enlightenment Deism, with its novel concept of deity, provides the core of his naturalistic, rationalistic, and, most importantly, empiricist view of theological, religious, moral, and scientific inquiry. Jefferson's thinking was no doubt influenced by that of John Locke, especially Locke's A Letter on Toleration and The Reasonableness of Christianity, from both of which he took extensive notes.[14] We also detect traces of possible indirect influence from Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke.[15] While never popular in England, Bolingbroke's brand of Deism with its anti-Platonic rejection of St. Paul and his successors enjoyed a significant following among the French Encyclopaediast. We find the same anti-Paulean and anti-Platonic sentiments in Jefferson accompanied by the strong materialism characteristic of Diderot and d' Alembert -- for instance, when he wrote to C. Thompson, "I am a real Christian, that is to say, a disciple of the doctrines of Jesus, very different from the Platonists, who call me infidel and themselves Christians...."[16] Jefferson rejects mysticism in favor of materialism; he wrote to W. Short, "It is not to be understood that I am with him [Jesus] in all his doctrines. I am a Materialist. he takes the side of Spiritualism...."[17] In another letter to Short, Jefferson states: "That Jesus did not mean to impose himself on as the son of God, physically speaking, I have been convinced by the writings of men more learned than myself...."[18] We think the "more learned" here must be the French Encyclopaediasts. This is because in England the Cambridge Platonists directly influenced Locke, Newton, Bentley, Samuel Clarke and the other English originators of Deism. It is from them that the general notion that Reason alone can obtain knowledge of deity and that revelation and revealed truth must ultimately be judged upon the tribunal of Reason, the position that we now commonly call natural theology or natural religion. Jefferson respects rationalism but seems to prefer Reid and the Common Sense school of Scottish empiricism and its French concomitants. For example, he wrote:

> I hold (without appeal to revelation) that when we take a view of the universe, in its parts, general or particular, it is impossible for the human mind not to perceive and feel a conviction of design, consummate skill, and indefinite power in every atom of its composition.... We see, too, evident proofs of the necessity of a superintending power, to maintain the universe in its course and order.[19]

It is Jefferson's rejection of Platonism, mysticism and revelation, as he understood them, that led him to reject conventional theology altogether in favor of empirical natural science.

Reason is necessary, in empirical natural science, to recognize, elaborate and conclude correctly from the evidence revealed by the senses, but only a modicum of rationality is required. This was especially so in the case of empirical natural morality. Jefferson felt that humankind was

> ...endowed with a sense of right and wrong merely relative to this. This sense is as much a part of his nature, as the sense of hearing, seeing, feeling; it is the true foundation of morality.... The moral sense is as much a part of man as his leg or arm.... This sense is submitted, indeed, in some degree, to the guidance of reason; but it is a small stock indeed which is required for this.[20]

Jefferson calls on "the care of the Creator in making the moral principle so much a part of our constitution that no errors of reasoning or of speculation might lead us astray from its observation in practice."[21] Morality being so crucial to our social nature, if not our salvation, a moral sense independent of empirical sense (and sensation) was, on Jefferson's insights, necessary.

Jefferson carefully separated morality from theology and religion. As we have already seen, Jefferson disdained theology. Indeed, Jefferson was instrumental in having theology removed from the College of William and Mary when he was governor of Virginia, and tried to keep it out of the curriculum at the University of Virginia.[22] Again a strange stance for one so commited to free and open inquiry and pluralism of opinion.

Jefferson literally cut out religion when he used scissors and paste to construct The Philosophy of Jesus and The Life and Morals of Jesus (sometimes called the "Jefferson Bible") where he cut out all mystery, reference to Jesus's deity or miracles, leaving only what he thought to be the moral core of the text.[23] Jefferson sought to personally separate religion from morals, in part because he felt that institutionalized religion provided its representatives with unwarranted power over reason. In a letter to John Adams, Jefferson wrote that his was an effort to free the "pure principles" of Jesus from the "artificial vestments in which they have been muffled by priests, who have travestied them into various forms as instruments of riches and power to themselves."[24] Finally, if religion were required for morality, then "whence arises the morality of the Atheist?"[25] The answer for Jefferson was that "the Creator in making the moral principle so much a part of our constitution as that no errors of reasoning or of speculation might lead us astray from its observance in practice."[26]

For Jefferson, the "uncertain combinations of the head" unconstrained by our moral sense leads to the errors and excesses of theology just as reason unconstrained by sense experience, leads to the nonsense of speculative metaphysics.[27] Jefferson's Common Sense Scottish Empiricism emphasized experience over reason, the concrete over the abstract, experimentalism over theory. So, too, did the natural philosophy (science) of the Encyclopaediast. Both influences combined can account for Jefferson's conclusion that, "once we quit the basis of sensation, all is in the wind."[28] For Jefferson, God or Nature (for the Deist there is very little if any difference) places Reason within each individual. As long as reason is coerced only by moral and empirical sensation, its inquiries will always arrive at the correct moral and intellectual conclusion. We can see this kind of thinking being expressed in the beginning of Jefferson's 1779 version of "The Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom:"

> Well aware that the opinions and belief of men depend not on their own will, but follow involuntarily the evidence proposed to their minds; that Almighty God hath created the mind free, and manifested his supreme will that free it shall remain by making it altogether unsusceptible of restraint; that all attempts to influence it by temporal punishments, or burthens, or by civil incapacitation, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the holy author of our religion, who being lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either, as was in his Almighty power to do, but to extend it by its influence on reason alone....[29]

Ideally, the only appropriate, read "natural," coercion upon the individual is the force of evidence "proposed to their minds" by nature. All other coercions are uncalled for and will likely lead only to error. The coercions of "human interposition" should only occur when minds inappropriately coerced by evidence proposed to its reason act out of order and to the detriment of the commonwealth.

We are, according to Jefferson, endowed by our Creator, or at least by nature, with certain unalienable natural rights because we are endowed with certain natural powers. Difficulties arise, though, when we ask how do we know that we have these endowments or whence we have them. Jefferson tends to provide conclusions without clues as to the process, or even the premises, that lead to them. He does, though, provide a detailed outline for religious inquiry in a letter to his nephew Peter Carr. Let us take a closer look at Jefferson's instructions for prosecuting this inquiry.

Jefferson starts by insisting:

> In the first place, divest yourself of all bias in favor of novelty and singularity of opinion. Indulge them in any other subject rather than that of religion. It is too important, and the consequences of error may be

> too serious. On the other hand, shake off all the fears and servile prejudices, under which weak minds are servilely crouched. Fix reason firmly in her seat, and call to her tribunal every fact, every opinion. Question with boldness even the existence of a God....[30]

We begin by noting that Jefferson clearly considered religion a matter of free natural inquiry relying on reason as the final arbitor for evidence. Elsewhere, in Query 17 of his Notes on Virginia, Jefferson affirmed: "Reason and free inquiry are the only effectual agents against error. Give a loose to them, they will support the true religion by bringing every false one to their tribunal, to the test of their investigation. They are the natural enemies of error, and of error only. Had not the Roman government permitted free inquiry, Christianity could never been introduced." Coercion, i.e., "human interposition," except for the natural coercion and interposition of evidence upon moral sentiment and sentiment upon reason, could contribute only to error. We should not be surprised then, when Jefferson continues later in Query 17 to question.

> What has been the effect of coercion? To make one half the world fools, and the other half hypocrites. To support roguery and error all over the earth. Let us reflect that it is inhabited by a thousand millions of people. That these profess probably a thousand different systems of religion. That ours is but one of that thousand. That if there be but one right, and ours that one, we should wish to see the 999 wandering sects gathered into the fold of truth. But against such a majority we cannot effect this by force. Reason and persuasion are the only practicable instruments. To make way for these free inquiry must be indulged.

This passage requires several comments that lead quickly to several paradoxes. Jefferson is confident that uncoerced reason will follow the course of common sense and eliminate the plurality of false opinions and, if the true opinion is among those with which we began, it will converge to the one epistemologically correct position (or set of related positions). This view is, of course, what we earlier called "eliminative convergent commonsense epistemological pluralism" or, more comfortably, "convergent realism." Provided this epistemology it is very difficult to comprehend the kind of constraint upon curriculum that Jefferson calls for on occasion.

Next we note religious inquiry is taken as the most serious of all inquiries -- that is, the one that we can least afford to indulge our prejudices in. Yet we wonder, is not Jefferson here indulging his prejudices? What about reason itself? Could it be called into question? Why should reason judge God, instead of God reason? Whence Jefferson's faith in rationality? What evidence does he have for it? Before what tribunal has it been judged? From where the revelation that reason is privileged over revelation? It is a paradox made only more perplexing by the following remarks later in the same letter to his nephew: "In fine, I repeat, you must lay aside all prejudice on both sides [God exists or does not exist], and neither believe nor reject anything, because any other persons, or description of persons, have rejected or believed it. Your own reason is the only oracle given you by heaven, and you are answerable, not for the rightness, but uprightness of the decision." Answerable to whom, for what? Which heaven? Certainly not that of God -- including, of course, the Christian God. That would beg the question. Platonic heaven is also ruled out. What heaven? Once again, whence does the "oracle" of reason derive? Common sense notions of "self-evidence" do not suffice here. We can understand a concrete community of like-minded citizens declaring, "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their creator with inherent and unalienable rights" and we can understand that community concluding "that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed...." Among men, among women, among us, We hold these truths, perhaps not self-evident, perhaps grounded only upon the warrant of workability among us who make up this society here and now. That may turn out to be the highest tribunal to which we may turn with complete confidence and without begging the question. We will return to this theme in our conclusion.

Jefferson has floundered upon the oldest and most profound of epistemological paradoxes, the Meno paradox, so-called for the Platonic dialogue in which it was first propounded. The paradox, briefly stated, says, "a man cannot try to disover either what he knows or what he does not know. He would not seek what he knows, for since he knows it there is not need of the inquiry, nor what he does not know, for in that case he does not even know what he is to look for."[31] The general solution to this paradox turns on the appreciation that all inquiry requires some presuppositions, some prejudgements, some prejudices in order to recognize and identify the objects of inquiry. Prejudices enable us to carry out inquiry. It is not prejudices per se that are of concern; it is disabling prejudices uncritically held. The kind of prejudice Jefferson seems prepared to induce into the minds of the students at the University of Virginia. Being inevitable, the question is, where do they come from, and what were Jefferson's? Jefferson cannot call upon any of the solutions to the Meno paradox in the Platonic tradition from St. Paul and St. Augustine to the Cambridge Platonist. As an empiricist, he is not permitted an appeal to the innate ideas of Descartes, Leibnitz or Spinoza. Furthermore, had not Locke already shown that innate ideas gave "the authority to be the dictator of principles" to unscrupulous rulers?[32] Jefferson's response is, of course, his faith that certain

truths are self-evident. This is in the empiricist tradition of Aristotle, Aquinas and, of course, Locke. Aquinas found the existence of God (and thereby the origin of reason) self-evident. Aquinas wrote: "those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known."[33] Locke thought self-evident "such kinds of truths the mind perceives at first sight of the ideas together, by bare intuition; without the intervention of any other idea...."[34] When, however, these criteria are applied to the faculty of intuition, reason or God itself, assertions of self-evidence could be said by some to beg the question. Certainly this is the situation for Jefferson since clearly he is willing to allow doubt and inquiry into the nature and existence of God and he seems to indicate that that is the most important kind of inquiry. If so, then surely he would permit inquiry into the nature and existence of reason and self-evidence also. It is interesting to note that Jefferson's total rejection of Platonism and revelation leaves him in a more awkward position in his appeals to self-evidence than Locke and certainly Aquinas. Finally, we note that the critiques of Berkeley and especially Hume devastated Lockean epistemology.[35] It was Hume who, by Kant's own acknowledgement, awoke him from his "dogmatic slumbers." When he awoke, he developed the arguments generally acknowledged to have devastated the ideas of self-evidence and natural religion thereby devastating Deism.[36] Contemporary liberal democracy need not and perhaps cannot rest on the faulty epistemology and metaphysics provided it by its founders. The very least that we may conclude is that Jefferson's epistemological opinions are but one of a plurality and that they may not prevail.

Exactly how Jefferson would have dealt with the dilemmas arising out of inquiry into the origins of our natural endowment had he recognized them we cannot say. We are confident that his reliance upon what is self-evident to Reason and common sense is not clear. Once again, we ask, self-evident to whom? We will suggest an answer to this question in our conclusion.

The issues raised above are not merely epistemological. We think that not only did Jefferson's overly simplified epistemology lead him to draw false separations that disguised a number of paradoxes of education, freedom and inquiry, but that it also caused him to fail to recognize a number of tensions in the relation between civil religion and moral belief.

David Little, relying on Rousseau's The Social Contract, identifies three tensions between civil religion and moral belief that Jefferson failed to recognize.[37] First, there is the "tension between religious beliefs and civic responsibility."[38] Little remarks that "religious beliefs do under some conditions guide actions, and that religiously guided actions do not necessarily conform to the requirements of civic responsibility."[39] Little goes on to remark that "Rousseau recognized that, because of this potential conflict hard choices would have to be made."[40] Second, Little identifies "the tension between moral beliefs and civil responsibility."[41] Rousseau, according to Little, recognizes "an irresolvable... conflict between the claims of civic unity and those of personal moral conscience."[42] Third, there is "the tension between religious and moral beliefs."[43] Although he disagrees with Rousseau's own resolutions to these tensions, he does feel that Rousseau has identified crucial "stress points."[44] Finally, Little thinks that Jefferson "attempts to wish away the tensions by means of what I shall call, with restraint, hasty reasoning."[45] Jefferson's hasty reasoning, arising out of excessive faith in common sense, self-evidence, and several oversimplified distinctions, allows him to avoid not only the "stress points" in issues of civil religion and moral belief, but, as we have seen, epistemology as well. It also allows him to avoid the hard choices. This separation between belief and action is expressed in the legal distinction we called "the standard for civil interposition."

The most central oversimplification is the assumed separation between belief and action. Little calls attention to this separation, but then misses a magnificient opportunity when he accepts Danial Boorstin's labeling of Jefferson as being of a "pragmatic frame of mind."[46] Ironically, Jefferson's belief/action dualism is not very compatible with the American philosophical tradition called pragmatism. A better word for Little and Boorstin would have been "practicalism."

Charles Sanders Peirce provided the following "pragmatic maxim" of meaning: "In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception [e.g., a belief] one should consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity from the truth of that conception; and the sum of these consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception."[47] For Peirce beliefs were dispositions to act and their meaning could only be found in action. Jefferson seems to restrict belief to relatively meaningless or at least sufficiently innocuous places. From a pragmatic perspective, Jefferson's belief/action separation is fundamental to a whole host of what Dewey would have called "untenable dualisms" including the mind/body, inner/outer, knower/known, subject/object, and value/fact distinctions. To these we might well add the faith/reason distinction.

Jefferson's belief/action dualism allows him to evade Little's first tension by simply saying: "Our civil rights have no dependence on our religious opinions, more than [on] our opinions in physics or geometry."[48] For those who hold them, religious opinions often include obligations for certain actions that are difficult to reconcile. What

to render Caesar and what to render God, and when, is a complex problem frought with paradoxes and ironies whose resolutions are far from self-evident to reason. Said differently, what happens when the sword of steel and the sword of the spirit cross? Concerning the second tension, Little calls attention to the following passage in a letter to Thomas Law in 1814: "We find, in fact, that the same actions are deemed virtuous in one country and vicious in another."[49] The answer to the paradox of two contrary actions both being virtuous (or vicious) is that "nature has constituted utility to mean, the standard and test of virtue. Men living in different habits and regimens, may have different utilities; the same act, therefore, may be useful, and consequently virtuous in one country which is injurious and vicious in another differently circumstanced. I sincerely, then, believe with you in the general existence of a moral instinct.[50] The inadequacy of this answer is evident when we ask, what happens when conflicting views of utility and happiness are similarly circumstanced or the same views "differently circumstanced" in the same country or even locality. What happens, for instance, when the requirements of moral conscience and the requirements of civic responsibility meet in the same place, perhaps even in the same person? Finally, as we have seen, Jefferson drew a sharp line of separation between religion and morality and an even sharper distinction between theology and morality. Jefferson is confident: "Reading, reflection and time have convinced me that the interest of society requires the observation of those moral precepts only in which all religions agree... and that we should not intermeddle with the particular dogmas in which all religions differ, and which are totally unconnected with morality."[51] It is hard to even imagine religion "totally unconnected to morality." Modern anthropology, among other things, mitigates against this thesis.

While Jefferson's carefully wrought intellectual distinctions allowed him to avoid tensions, ironies and paradoxes in theory, they failed him in concrete practice. The practice we have in mind is that of building and maintaining a real community in brick and mortar, that is, the University of Virginia. Jefferson intended the university to reflect the rational ideal image of himself its maker. The University of Virginia was, we believe, created according to Jefferson's rational blueprint for the ideal civil society on a small scale meant to inspire its students to reproduce the structure on the state and national level. Certainly it was meant to supply a non-sectarian alternative to the Anglican college of William and Mary. We suspect that Jefferson envisioned a place where he would no longer be a sect unto himself or at least a place where all others would be a sect among themselves as independent followers of the same or similar natural religion.

Jefferson was the literal as well as figurative architect of "the University." Willard C. Frank, Jr. urges: "Consider the architecture of the new university, all designed by Jefferson. The rooms of the students and the pavilions of the professors were all individual, yet all within reach of each other -- the perfect architectural embodiment of corporate humanism, the harmony of the individual and community."[52] This serene scenario dissolves as soon as we realize that such an architecture establishes a "circumstance" in which disparate dispositions to act, i.e., beliefs, collide in practical action and forced Jefferson himself to act upon the paradoxes of indoctrination, freedom, and inquiry.

Jefferson declared that instruction at the University of Virginia "will be based on the illimitable freedom of the human mind. For here we are not afraid to follow the truth wherever it may lead, nor to tolerate any error as long as reason is left free to combat it."[53] Yet once freedom is "circumstanced," i.e., constituted in a community, it not only can be but must be constrained. In the following passage we can see the paradox of indoctrination (or "inculcation") and a paradox of free liberal democracy operating simultaneously together:

> Whereas it is the duty of this board [of Visitors of the University of Virginia] to the government under which it lives, and especially to that of which this university is the immediate creation, to pay especial attention to the principles of government which shall be inculcated therein, and to provide that none shall be inculcated which are incompatible with those on which the Constitutions of this State, and of the United States were genuinely based, in the common opinion; and for this purpose it may be necessary to point out specially where these principles are to be found legitimately developed.[54]

Curiously the curriculum at Jefferson's university is committed to the "common opinion" which was considered beyond question and, we suppose, beyond error. Presumably inculcation was required to keep reason free to combat error, a paradox. So instead of a plurality of opinions, the Board of Visitors simply prescribes the appropriate texts: "it is the opinion of this Board that as to the general principles of liberty and the rights of man, in nature and in society, the doctrines of Locke in his "Essay.... The Declaration of Independence.... The book known by the title of "The Federalist".... The Resolutions of the General Assembly of Virginia in 1799 on the subject of the alien and sedition laws.... The valedictory address of President Washington...."[55] The Resolutions of 1799 drafted by Madison were a reaction to the famous Naturalization, Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 drafted, so the Federalist claimed, to prevent foreign conspiracy against the American government in the wake of the French Revolution, Napolean, and European unrest. The so-called Virginia and Kentucky resolutions represent major

statements of "states rights." Politics aside, it is hard to see Federalism as so extraordinary an opinion as to threaten to enslave reason except in the paradoxical sense discussed earlier. One would think it merely another, perhaps erroneous, opinion regarding government.

As we indicated earlier, Jefferson was successful in eliminating theology from the curriculum at William and Mary, and he tried to do the same at "the University." Jefferson saw no tensions between religious belief and civic responsibility as expressed in the curriculum of the state university. He just simply eliminated theology and religion and replaced them with his morality.

Failing to eliminate theology from the curriculum at the University of Virginia, Jefferson fought to exclude the presence of clergy. Since, for Jefferson, the only function for the clergy was moral instruction, Jefferson needed to find a defensible alternative. Dickinson Ward Adams has argued that the particular academic circle deemed competent to appreciate the four-language version of the so-called "Jefferson Bible," that is, The Life and Morals of Jesus of Nazareth, was the students and faculty at "the University." Adams asserts: "His [Jefferson's] second compilation, in four languages, would inculcate all students at the University of Virginia in the principles of morality which supported republicanism. In due course, there would spread from Charlottesville, over Virginia, and thence to the rest of the Republic, those sociable and harmonizing principles...."[56] Charles Mabee, commenting on this passage, affirms that "for Jefferson, the University of Virginia was to be a citadel of reason, in stark contrast to the corrupt, priest-ridden church."[57] Jefferson's problem was this, having radically broken with tradition and tried to construct an academic community entirely in accordance with abstract reason was without precedent. Jefferson sought to deliberately break with the past; therefore, he could not call upon the ideas, ideals, values and principles ordinarily provided by culture, community, "circumstance," and situation. Jefferson could not rely upon tradition to provide the appropriate presuppositions necessary to initiate and sustain inquiry. All that Jefferson had available was Reason. If we refuse to be mystified by the abstract noun Reason in the same way as Jefferson himself refused to be mystified by the abstract noun God, then we can see that if the priests and preachers sought to seduce us with their God, Jefferson sought to seduce us with his Reason.

We conclude with this paradox. It seems to us that rationality taken as an adverb and an adjective is to be found in the social practices and shared language of a living community. It is culture, tradition, the community, that provides the prejudices, the presuppositions, that initiates and sustains the shared inquiry that Michael Oakeshott calls "the conversation of humankind." Conservatives seek to conserve the traditions that are the continuity of this conversation. But prejudices can be disabling as well as enabling. Jefferson sought to change the conversation by relying on Reason to replace certain prejudices that he found disabling. We think Jefferson went too far and eventually wandered into a dogmatism of his own. It is interesting to note that while Jefferson corresponded extensively and was most active in his community, he had little to say about community and communication. Jefferson is much like the contemporary politician who thinks he or she can blueprint an entire culture according to preestablished rational principles from some central location while ignoring the rational understandings embodied in the concrete communities of various localities. This is a paradox, and like other paradoxes, it is full of ironies and surprising reversals of meaning. Jefferson did not appreciate the paradoxes of freedom, including free religious inquiry, and so, relying on sharp and untenable separations like the "standard for civil interposition," he left them for future generations to try and work out the tensions. We do not think that the original intentions of Jefferson or the other Deistic and Rationalistic creators of modern liberal democracy will be of much help; they simply failed to see the problems. That is all right. They had enough to do, and we thank them for doing it so well. It is our turn now to make the hard choices.

Footnotes

1. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, William Peden, Ed., Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, Query, XVII.
2. See David Little "Religion and Civil Virtue in America: Jefferson's Statue Reconsidered," in The Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, edited by Merrill D. Peterson and Robert C. Vaughan. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 245-6.
3. Cited in Bernhard Fabian, "Jefferson's Notes on Virginia: The Genesis of Query XVII, The different religions received into the State?," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 12(1955), p. 129.
4. Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, Query XVII
5. Andrew A. Lipscomb, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. XVII, letter to N. G. Dufief, p. 127. The text in question is M. deBecourts "Sur la creation du Monde, un Systeme de'Organization Primitine" that was, at the time, a matter of criminal inquiry.
6. This is made abundantly clear in the so-called "Jefferson Bible." As Charles Mabee indicates: "A careful check of those verse that are retained and omitted in L J [Jefferson's, The Life and Morals of Jesus of

Nazareth] suggests that Jefferson was not primarily consumed with demythologizing the New Testament. Rather, we might term his method one of 'declericalization'." See Charles Mabee, "Thomas Jefferson's Anti-Clerical Bible," Historical Magazine of the Protestant Episcopal Church, Vol. XLVIII, 1970 (p. 481).

7. Quoted in Gordan C. Lee, editor, Crusade Against Ignorance: Thomas Jefferson On Education. New York, Teachers College Press, 1966, pp. 133-4.
8. Leonard Levy, Jefferson and Civil Liberties: The Darker Side. Cambridge, The Bilknap Press, 1963, pp. 152-153.
9. See Paul Wagner, "Moral Education, Indoctrination, and the Principle of Minimizing Substantive Moral Error." in D.R. DeNicola, ed, Philosophy of Education 1981: Proceedings of the thirty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society , Normal, Illinois, Philosophy of Education Society, p. 192.
10. See Harvey Siegel, Synthese, 80(1), 1989, pp. 9-41.
11. T. F. Green, "Indoctrination and Beliefs," in I. A. Snook, ed, Concepts of Indoctrination, London, Routledge & Kegon Paul, 1973, pp. 44-5.
12. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. VII, p. 300.
13. Ibid. Vol. XV, p. 203.
14. See Julian P. Boyd, ed., The Papers Of Thomas Jefferson, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1950, Vol. I, pp. 544-51.
15. See The Writings of Thomas Jefferson Vol. XIV, p. 34, Vol. XV, pp. 9, 305, 306. See also, Morton White The Philosophy of the American Revolution, New York, Oxford University Press, 1978, pp. 34, 35, 273-276. Finally, see Adrienne Koch, The Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson, Chicago, Ouodrange Books, 1964, pp. 10-13 and 125.
16. Ibid., Vol. XIV, p. 385. Jefferson is here referring to his "the Philosophy of Jesus."
17. Ibid., Vol. XV, p. 244.
18. Ibid., p. 261.
19. Adrienne Koch and William Peden, The Life and Selected Writing of Thomas Jefferson, New York, Random House, 1944, pp. 706-7, italics added. Hereafter referred to as LWTJ.
20. LWTJ, pp. 430-431, italics added.
21. LWTJ, p. 636.
22. See Thomas E. Buckley, S. J., Church and State in Revolutionary Virginia, 1776-1787, Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 1977, pp. 61-3; see also The Writings of Thomas Jefferson Vol. 14, p. 200.
23. Op. cit. See also LWTJ: pp. 568-70.
24. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. VIII.
25. Ibid., Vol. XIV, p. 139.
26. Ibid.
27. LTWJ, p. 404.
28. Ibid., p. 701.
29. Italics added. Interestingly enough, the italicized words were deleted from the final version passed in 1786. Perhaps the assembly did not appreciate Jefferson's epistemology.
30. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. VI, p. 258.
31. Meno, line 80e.
32. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding New York, Dover, 1959, Book I, Chap. III, sec. 25.
33. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, First Part of the Second Part, Question XCIV, Second Article.
34. Locke, Essay, Book IV, Chap. II, sec. 1. Locke's notion of "intuitive knowledge" has not stood up very well.
35. Jefferson disliked David Hume intensely although he provides no philosophical counterarguments. See The Writing of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. XI, p. 223, "suppression of truth;" Vol. XII, p. 405, "the poison"; Vol XIV, p. 120, "Wily Sophistries;" and Vol. XVI, p. 44 "Toryism."
36. Immanuel Kant, Religion Within The Limits Of Reason Alone, see especially Book Four "Concerning Service And Pseudo-Service uner the Soverighty of the Good Principle, OR, Concerning Religion And Clericalism," New York, Harper and Row, 1960, pp. 139-190.
37. David Little, "The Origins of Perplexity: Civil Religion and Moral Belief in the Thought of Thomas Jefferson," in Russel E. Richey and Donald G. Jones (eds.) American Civil Religion, pp. 185-210.
38. Ibid., p. 186.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
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42. Ibid., p. 187.
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46. Ibid., p. 189.
47. C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss, eds., Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol. V, paragraph 9.
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51. The Works of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. XII, p. 315.
52. Willard C. Frank, Jr., "Thomas Jefferson's Religious Journey," in Religious Humanism, Vol. 20, No. 1, p. 16.
53. Quoted in David B. Tyack, ed., Turning Points in American Education History, Blaisdell Publishing Co., 1967, p. 91.
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55. Ibid.
56. Dickinson Ward Adams, Jefferson's Politics of Morality: The Purpose and Meaning of his Extracts from the Evangelists "The Life and Morals of Jesus of Nazareth,: Dissertation Brown University, 1970, p. 242. Cited in Charles Mabee, "Thomas Jefferson's Anti-Clerical Bible," p. 475.
57. Mabee, "Thomas Jefferson's Anti Clerical Bible," Historical Magazine of the Protestant Episcopal Church, Vol. XLVIII, 1979, p. 475.

Thomas Jefferson and the Dilemma of Modernity

A Response to Garrison and Hunt

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Garrison and Hunt tell us that, "It is our turn now to make the hard choices." I think they are right, but to choose properly we must know the alternatives. To clarify the alternatives I shall place them in a framework which I shall call the dilemma of modernity. First let's look at the paradoxes Jefferson's views generate, then set them within the framework of classical liberalism, and finally place classical liberalism within the framework of the dilemma of modernity.

At least five paradoxes emerge from Jefferson's thought. First, our only defense for knowledge claims is rationality yet rationality cannot defend itself. Second, to be liberal we must be illiberal. Third, to be undogmatic we must be dogmatic. Fourth, to be tolerant we must be intolerant about tolerance. Fifth, to be free we must reject the freedom to be enslaved. To understand the significance of these we can place them in the tradition of integral liberalism.

Integral liberalism, as a philosophical and political tradition originated in the thought of Hugo Grotius and John Locke, prominent seventeenth century thinkers. John Hallowell nicely summarizes the central tenets of this tradition. He says, "Integral liberalism is characterized by the following beliefs: (1) A belief in the absolute value of human personality and the spiritual equality of all individuals, (2) A belief in the autonomy of human will, (3) A belief in the essential rationality and goodness of man, (4) A belief in the existence of certain inalienable rights peculiar to individuals by virtue of their humanity..., (5) A belief that the state comes into existence by mutual consent for the sole purpose of preserving and protecting these rights, (6) A belief that the relationship between the state and individuals is a contractual one and then when the terms of the contract are violated individuals have not only the right but the responsibility to revolt and establish a new government, (7) A belief that social control is best secured by law rather than by a command..., (8) A belief that 'the government that governs least governs best'..., (9) A belief in individual freedom in all spheres of life (political, economic, social, intellectual and religious), (10) A belief in the existence of a transcendental order of truth which is accessible to man's natural reason and capable of evoking a moral response."[1] Jefferson formulated his views within the tradition of integral liberalism. And if so the paradoxes Garrison and Hunt point out are also paradoxes of liberalism itself. But why should these tenets, with which many of us resonate deep in our bones, generate such paradoxes?

To understand this we need to set liberalism within the context of modernity. For our purposes I define modernity as "the ideas, principles and patterns of interpretation of diverse kinds ranging from the philosophic to the economic on which western and central European and American society and culture, from the 16th through the 20th centuries increasingly found itself to be based."[2] These principles, ideas, and patterns of interpretation include skepticism,

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Christianity of the Reformation, and the kind of rationality that manifests itself primarily in science and mathematics. In the Reformation we see the affirmation of the dignity and religious freedom of the individual. Also in the early 17th century we find a supreme statement of skepticism as a methodological principle in Descartes' First Meditation. We also see the mathematical articulation of the physical universe in the thought of Newton. The collective impact of these was widespread. But they were formative for the thought of Locke and Grotius.

When the principles of integral liberalism were first articulated they were seen by some as an attack on a firmly entrenched establishment and by others as a continuation of the English parliamentary system. But at least they were a philosophical foundation for the demand of tolerance for view points other than that of the religious and political establishment. Thus, we must pay our homage to the priesthood of the believer, skepticism, and scientific rationality for the gains we presently know in Western society, particularly freedom.

Yet these three traditions of thought are themselves not part of the program of integral liberalism. They were traditions that allowed the development of the liberal tradition. In recent times these traditions have been focused on modernity itself and are eroding its cultural and intellectual bedrock. Cahoone, the author of The Dilemma of Modernity, points out, "A combination of social change and intellectual attacks is undermining the patterns of interpreting the world which have made those social changes and intellectual movements possible. Modernity hurdles forward, but we have less and less understanding of, and belief in, its nature and direction."[3] To sharpen this point Cahoone calls our attention to a dilemma. He says, "The interpretive categories that have shepherded modernity's achievements have succeeded so well that they have shattered the interpretive context that was essential to early modernity. The result is that in the 20th century modernity has suffered a *de-contextualization* of its basic interpretive categories."[4] The principles on which modernity rests and which were so successful in challenging the establishment that denied human freedom are now destroying the very context on which modernity rests. For example, we are faced with the paradox of believing in rationality but not having any way of justifying rationality itself. The dilemma we face is how to hold to the gains of liberalism and yet reject (modify) the very basis on which those gains rest? This, as I see it, is a major cultural problem.

What does all of this have to do with the modern university? The dilemma for western culture is also the dilemma for the modern university. It too rests on principles first articulated in the seventeenth century.[5] The gains of the modern university have been enormous. Yet in the midst of great success the modern university faces the same paradoxes we find in the thought of Jefferson. We must teach our students our disciplines but that knowledge rests on a view of rationality that cannot be defended by rationality itself. We believe in the principles of liberalism but in defense of those principles we must be illiberal. We must be dogmatic about being undogmatic. We must be intolerant about being tolerant. And we must espouse freedom even to the degree that it enslaves us to the demands of each person. We must let every flower bloom. We believe in rationality, the liberal spirit, being undogmatic and tolerant, and freedom. But how can we hold to those gains and yet avoid the paradoxes generated by the intellectual traditions on which those gains ultimately rest?

We can do so by allowing a plant to flourish and bring forth fruit a plant that has been struggling under the drought generated by the traditions of

skepticism, scientific rationality, and possibly the Reformation's emphasis on soul competency before God. That little plant has two shoots: (1) the person's recognition that her life is richer than integral liberalism allows (the problem of who persons are) and, (2) the desire of the person to understand the world as a whole and how she fits in (the problem of place). Regarding our place, under the influence of skepticism and scientific rationality we have lost confidence in gaining any view of the whole, in metaphysics. We are no better off regarding the nature of persons. Both skepticism and scientific rationality highlight a particular view of reason and claim that to be the only trustworthy dimension of the soul. The rest of the person has been banished to the background and marked variously "unimportant," "dangerous," and "misleading." What is in this background? Creative imagination, myth, story, art, music, history, and religious life. To allow our "backgrounds" to develop and grow and to learn to trust them is not to give up rationality. Rather to do so is to accept the person's richness and to allow her to flourish. If we can learn to trust religious understanding, narrative, history, and the creative imagination we will be in a position to develop some holistic understanding of the world and universe around us and our place in it. If that occurs we can replace the agenda 16th and 17th century thinkers followed in their struggles and create our own agenda as the 20th century closes and 21st arrives. Our struggles are not those of people three hundred years ago.

Now back to Garrison and Hunt's paper. I suggest that the choices are not among the alternatives posed by the paradoxes generated by modernity. Our choices are found in recognizing the dilemma of modernity. How can the university hold to the gains of liberalism and yet not fall prey to the forces that generated both modernity and liberalism? I suggest it can do so by addressing at least two central questions. First, do we continue to hold to the view of persons as originally outlined in the seventeenth century or do we enrich our understanding by allowing the "background" to come forward and claim its place? If we choose the latter option we may gain a better understanding of who we are. And second, do we continue to hold to the view that knowledge is defined by scientific rationality (rational, objective, and value free) or do we recognize a richer view that includes narrative, story, art, music, and history? If we take the second option we may be in a position to understand our place in the scheme of things, to develop an adequate metaphysics. There are no doubt other options that structure our choices, but these seem to me to be the central ones.

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1 John H. Hallowell, Main Currents in Modern Political Thought (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965), pp. 110-111.

2 Lawrence E. Cahoone, The Dilemma of Modernity, Philosophy, Culture, and Anti-Culture (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1988), p. 1.

3 Cahoone, The Dilemma of Modernity, p. xii.

4 Ibid., p. xv.

5 Wilshire says that Whitehead believed that the modern university was formed on principles formulated in the seventeenth century. See Bruce Wilshire, The Moral Collapse of the University, Professionalism, Purity, and Alienation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), p. xx.

SECTS EDUCATION IN A DEMOCRACY IS LIKE SEX EDUCATION IN A DEMOCRACY

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I

A topic of enduring contention about education in the United States is religion. For some people religious education should be strictly private. For others it should be public. And for still others some aspects of it should be public while others should be strictly private. I hope to help resolve this dispute, and I propose to do so by determining whether any or all aspects of religious education should be public in a democratic political society.

My procedure for making this determination is to compare and contrast those major aspects of sex education which should be public in a democracy with the chief characteristics of religious education in such a society. I do not select this procedure because sex education in the United States is free of dispute. I choose the procedure, rather, for two other reasons. First, there are striking similarities between sex and religion. There is scientific knowledge about both sex and religion. They both involve opinion, or lore or doctrine. There are valuations of them both. Both of them contain practices. And both of them involve typifying feelings.

Second, I have a better understanding of sex education than I do of religious education. This reason might prompt several objections in addition to the charge that the reason is more than a bit presumptuous. One is that a person's position on religious education should guide him or her to an understanding of sex education and not the other way around. In response to this objection I must note that an inquirer has to begin wherever he or she is; and I, a nonbeliever with a teenage Episcopalian offspring, happen to be at sex education, not religious education. Also, I wish to remind you that the Metaphysical Poets, following Plato, held that the divine can be glimpsed in the carnal. Another objection is that using one's position on sex education as a guide for establishing a position on religious education will prejudice one's inquiry into the matter. To this I must mention that one's position on sex education does not necessarily lead to any specific position on religious education. While it is true that people who support public sex education often oppose public religious education and that people who support public religious education frequently oppose public sex education, it is logically conceivable that a person who supports public sex education would back public religious education and that a person who opposes public sex

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education would be against public religious education too. The last objection is that, because my view of sex education might be false, it might lead to an unsound conclusion on religious education. While I must yield to the objection, I do not think that doing so is fatal. Even though my position on sex education has not been verified, it seems to be commonsensical. If it is, it well might lead to a commonsensical view of religious education.

II

Before dealing directly with public sex education in a democracy, I need to clarify several key terms in our discussion, viz., religion, democracy, and education.

Religion. The traditional conception of the matter is that religion contains doctrine (including a belief in a divinity), practices, and institutional arrangements. This conception, it seems to me, is overly narrow. More specifically, it does not allow that there might be religion centered around, not belief in a god, not a ritual, and not an institution, but simply a quality of experience, e.g., a feeling of awe or reverence brought on by a perception of the harmony of the universe. This is religion that allows atheists and agnostics to be religious; it is religion that a secularist humanist would be proud to take home to his mother. I propose, then, to employ the term "religion" to refer to both the traditional and nontraditional notions. A restriction of our conception of religion to the traditional one fails to take into account that conceptions do change, and the normal idea of religion has changed. It must be remembered that John Dewey's A Common Faith was published more than a half century ago.

Democracy. In its modern sense a democratic state is a political society that involves the general distribution of the right to vote and hold governmental office. Any political society fitting this description is usually called a "democracy," and none not matching the description is normally referred to by the term. Implicit in this conception of democracy is the point that the members of such a society act voluntarily. First, any right entails the two marks of voluntary agency: freedom and knowledge. To have a right is to be free to act or not to act upon that right, and to have a right is to know what it is and what actions follow from it in what circumstances. It is further implicit in the concept of democracy that a democratic state has a public good which, as it is usually formulated, consists of the conditions of voluntary agency, including health, social order, protection from foreign threat, education, economic prosperity, and free inquiry.

Education. It is often recognized that education has different senses. For the social scientist education is enculturation or socialization. For many people it is simply schooling. And for most academics it is a comprehensive understanding based upon the intellectual disciplines. Whether or not any of these meanings is derivative from any of the others will

not be determined here. Suffice it to say that for the purpose of our discussion the social science sense is primary. That is, when one is talking about public education in a democratic state, one is referring to the enculturation and socialization of people into that society's way of life. Enculturation and socialization into a democratic way of life may or may not go on in school; they may or may not involve the academic's view of education. In the present-day United States, of course, much of public education takes place in public schools; and only some of it is oriented to the intellectual disciplines. At any rate, I shall intend both sex education and religious education in this discussion to be enculturation and socialization in a way of life relevant to democratic political society.

III

Justification. Plainly, there is a good reason for having public sex education in a democracy. Sex is a part of human life, and the members of a democratic society should learn about sex so that they might freely and wittingly engage in it without creating social problems that eventually undermine voluntary agency. Uninformed sexual activity is likely to create social problems. Teenage pregnancy places a burden of child and health care upon society; it tends to lend to single-parent families and economic dependency; and it tends to encourage habits and attitudes in involved offspring that leads to teenage pregnancy among the latter. Promiscuous sexual activity, one hardly needs reminding, creates conditions for epidemics of venereal disease. But society is not the only loser from involuntary sexual activity. The person who engages in it also suffers. Even if that person feels grown up or has a feeling of accomplishment in having a baby or feels thoroughly satisfied in sleeping around, he or she is likely to have insuperable difficulties in his or her development as a free agent. Becoming a parent at an early age tends to arrest the development of oneself. Attention focuses on parenting rather than the possible knowledge, skills, dispositions, and appreciations that are available for growth in action. And besides endangering one's health, promiscuity concentrates upon the pleasures of the flesh rather than the life of the mind and character. Sex education is necessary in the democratic state, accordingly, to help prevent certain social problems and to foster development of the society's members as voluntary agents.

Content. There are several elements that might constitute the content of sex education. They are scientific knowledge about sex, common lore about sex, values about sex, sexual practices, and sexual feelings. In this nation's public schools sex education involves almost exclusively the first three elements, leaving instruction in practices and feelings mainly to the parent, the minister, the student's peers, the mass media, the social worker, and, at least for the upscale victims of carnal disappointment, the sexual therapist. As far as I know, no public sex education contains instruction in sexual feelings; and the only one that provides instruction in sexual practices reserves that instruction

for students said to be "sexually at risk." To be sure, scientific knowledge about sex is positively important for voluntary agency. Also, common lore is important for it providing that the lore does not conflict with scientific knowledge and providing that it furnishes some insight into sex, e.g., respect for persons and love. The values that should be included in public sex education in a democracy are those consistent with the features of voluntary agency, e.g., knowledge, freedom, purposefulness, success in action, equality, nurturing, and caring.

While all students in public education should learn about sexual practices and feelings if other institutions do not furnish or are ineffectual in providing instruction about them, it is not clear that all students in public education should be instructed in sexual practices and feelings. There are cautions aside from the possibility, as suggested by the sex education scene in Monty Python and the Meaning of Life, that required instruction in such practices and feelings might kill off sex for most students in the way that public school instruction in mathematics and creative writing has killed off those subjects for most students. For one thing, sexual practices and feelings are so integral to the sexual act itself that instruction in them might tend to lead to the act or, if not that, to such emotional excitement that the student becomes distracted. For another thing, it might be that most students will not need instruction in sexual practices and feelings; it might be that they will be able to benefit mightily from just knowledge and lore about such practices and feelings.

Teaching: The teaching employed in public sex education in a democracy should be basically the same as that employed for teaching any other subject-matter in such a society. That is, the teaching should respect the students as voluntary agents, occurrent or prospective. If the teaching aims at establishing beliefs in students, it should be primarily dialogical, encouraging questioning on the part of students, containing open-mindedness on the part of teachers, proceeding through justification, and aiming at belief understood by students. If the teaching cannot be dialogical because of the immaturity of students or for some other good educational reason, then it may be somewhat dogmatic, allowing but not encouraging questioning and aiming at belief that may or may not be understood by students. But if beliefs about sex are to be dogmatic matters at some point in a student's life, they must become dialogical matters whenever the student is ready to understand them. What has been said about the teaching of beliefs also holds for the teaching of skills. Skill teaching should take the form principally of rational training, where the point is the establishment of skills that are understood by students. But even when conditioning is educationally suitable (usually because rational training is educationally inappropriate), the conditioning should not be conceived as wholly sufficient. Students who learn skills by conditioning eventually ought to be taught to understand the skills.

IV

Having described the major aspects of sex education in a democratic state, I now want to show the guidance they provide for a conception of public religious education in such a society.

Justification. Like sex, religion too is a part of human life; and the members of a democratic society should learn about religion so that they will be prepared to engage in it freely and knowingly. If uninformed sex in a democracy is likely to generate problems for the society and problems for personal development in such a society, religion uninformed in the ways of democracy is likely to engender similar problems. Just a quick reflection on human history is sufficient to indicate the sorts of social problems that can be expected: religious intolerance; racial, cultural, and sexual discrimination; unfounded feelings of superiority; restrictions on inquiry; censorship; rejection of scientific knowledge and its applications, e.g., to public health; and social disunity.

Several of the obstalces to development as a voluntary agent that are associated with religion of an antidemocratic quality readily come to mind. An excessive reliance upon authority undercuts growth in the powers of inquiry, theoretical, practical, and aesthetic. A feeling of fatalism tends to discourage both freedom and inquiry in action. And a feeling of righteousness deters one from recognizing and appreciating that other voluntary agents are equal to oneself in their right to action. A democratic state, accordingly, needs a religious education for its members that will prevent certain sorts of social problems and that also will aim at the development of the individual as a voluntary agent.

Content. Just as the content of sex education might consist of scientific knowledge, common opinion, values, practices, and feelings, so that of religious education might contain the same sorts of elements. Hardly anyone needs to be reminded that astronomy, biology, psychology, anthropology, sociology, economics, history, and other sciences have produced an abundance of information about the feelings, practices, doctrines, social functions, economic importance, and historical changes of religion. Such information surely has its place in reducing religious conflict and in facilitating the individual's development as a voluntary agent. Religious opinion, including doctrine, and religious values are problematic, however. As a matter of empirical fact, some doctrine and values are conducive to social problems and interfere with personal development as a voluntary agent. Beliefs and values about salvation, sexual reproduction, and false religions have often led to exclusivity, overpopulation, and animosities. They also have frequently made it difficult for adherents to develop belief in and appreciation of the self-control that is central to voluntary action. At any rate, any religious opinion and values that should be a part of public religious education should be consistent with the tenets of democratic society.

There are at least two reasons for leaving public education relevant to religious practices and feelings to the field of scientific knowledge and opinion. First, such practices and feelings generally are sectarian. A religious practice is a special way of engaging in religious experiences; it is prescribed by an individual's religious opinion if not by a church's doctrine. Moreover, a religious experience is often associated with religious practices and doctrine; and if it is not, it is so subjective that it might not be pedagogically possible to give instruction in it. Second, religious institutions are usually effective in providing instruction in their respective practices; and the institutions' members come to have religious feelings by engaging in the practices.

Teaching. Religious education historically is notorious for bad teaching. The usual complaint is that the teaching of religion, which principally has consisted of indoctrination and conditioning, has not aimed at understadning on the part of students. As normally conceived, indoctrination is the imparting of beliefs of whose truth the teacher is unshakably convinced and which the teacher will not permit to be successfully challenged by students. And conditioning, as suggested in earlier discussion, is the shaping of behavior by the administration of rewards and punishments. Seemingly, the ultimate justification for a heavy reliance upon indoctrination and conditioning in religious education has been that the end of true belief and practice, which are supposed to be supremely and immeasurably valuable, justifies the means. Regardless, the public teaching of religion in a democracy must include indoctrination and conditioning only as last resorts. As pointed out in our discussion of sex education, dialogue and training are pedagogical ways that especially foster the student's development as a voluntary agent. For this reason they are the principal ways for teaching in public religious education in a democracy. When dialogue and training are not workable for educational reasons, they may be replaced by a somewhat dogmatic method (whereby the teacher not only permits challenges by students but is prepared to change his or her mind on the basis of evidence) and by conditioning as long as each is employed with the idea that the student eventually will be taught to understand whatever he has been taught by that method.

V

In sum, I have argued that there is justification for public religious education in the democratic state and have put forth some guidelines for the content and teaching of such education. But it is difficult to leave off a discussion of public religious education in democracy without saying something about private religious education in such a society. Is private religious education to be sectarian? If so, by what justification and guidelines?

That private religious education may be sectarian is apparent. A religious group in a democracy may impart doctrine that is not

acceptable to other members of the society, and it may instill values, practices, and feelings not acceptable to others. The ultimate justification for this position is that because a democracy is basically committed to voluntary agency, it must permit its members to teach whatever they want to as such agents. This does not mean, however, that a sect may teach whatever it wants to without limit. Two restraints are obvious. First, it cannot teach doctrine contrary to scientific knowledge except on the condition that it has good reasons for its doctrine in this regard. Second, it cannot teach practices contrary to the principles of voluntary agency, e.g., slavery, cannibalism, torture, and rape. And third, it cannot employ pedagogical methods, such as brainwashing, that run completely counter to voluntary agency.

Indoctrination, which is often employed in sectarian religious education, is problematic here. Earlier, it was held that indoctrination in public religious education in a democracy may be employed only when it eventually will be supplemented by teaching for understanding. Sectarian religious education, it must be said, is not notorious for using indoctrination in this fashion. Regardless, indoctrination, even when practiced in the private sector, is wrong when it does not issue into understanding. This does not necessarily mean, however, that a democratic society must stamp out indoctrination in private religious education. There might be good reasons sufficient for <u>permitting</u> the indoctrination to take place. For instance, the indoctrination might pose no threat to anyone outside the given sect or sects. Elimination of the indoctrination might result in a greater evil than any caused by its existence. And the enforcement of a policy of no indoctrination might involve procedural wrongs that are unacceptable. In sum, permitting the indoctrination might be right for the reason that forbidding it might be a greater wrong.

In a democracy, then, even sectarian education is like private sex education. Private sex is bound by the principle of consenting adults and so is private religion. Sectarian education, accordingly, must view its charges as prospective consenting adults, that is, as prospective voluntary agents. There is a negative way to make the point. Voluntary agency is the nature of human beings. Insofar as it is wrong for private sex education to violate voluntary agency, it is wrong for it to commit crimes against nature. By parity of reason, it is wrong for sectarian education to commit crimes against nature. Nevertheless, crimes against nature are matters of degree. So, just as a democracy might be right, under certain conditions, in permitting some inflexible indoctrination in private sex education, it might be right, under certain conditions, in permitting such indoctrination in sectarian education.

SECTS V. SEX EDUCATION: A REPLY TO HESLEP

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Professor Robert Heslep has written a most interesting paper, one that poses a rather novel comparison of "sects" (or religious) education with sex education. His seriousness of purpose is evident, and while the title of his paper displays a sense of humor about these weighty topics, he makes some observations that help us think about both topics from a new angle. Heslep shows us some striking similarities between sex and religion, and he wants to show that a careful comparison of the two topics may provide a basis for overcoming some persistent educational difficulties. It should be noted, however, that there is at least one juncture at which the comparison may not hold. Public religious education, particularly religious education in public schools, does differ from public sex education in at least one substantial way: religious freedom is Constitutionally protected, while sexual freedom is not.

I find little with which to disagree in Heslep's paper. My major criticism, if such it may be called, is that he does not take his analysis far enough. In contemporary society, we usually think of sex in two ways: in the hedonistic sense of sensual and erotic pleasure, or in the "scientific" sense of biology and physiology. But, sex is also significant for its connections with creation and origin. Heslep recognizes this by his comparison of sex with religion, but his analysis concentrates on rational voluntary agency and witting behavior. I want to push the claim that there is more to the issue than rational knowledge alone. Sex and religion are similar because they also deal with the mystery of creation and origin: Who made us? or How are we made? are among the enduring questions of history, ranging from prehistoric fertility cults, to religious stories of creation, to the archaeological dig, to the contemporary child's query of a parent. Of course, we must not reject rationality, voluntary agency, or witting behavior; rather, we must recognize that the educational dilemmas surrounding religious and sex education include significantly more than rational knowledge.

This consideration helps lead to my central question: Can either religious education or sex education be viewed in a strictly commonsensical way? Put another way, perhaps the question would be better phrased as Can <u>public</u> religious education and <u>public</u> sex education be successfully conducted without some "uncommon" common sense? For example, religion <u>does</u> involve strong beliefs, devout allegiance to creeds, and

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complicated theological doctrines. The problem is complex; indeed, the lack of common agreement is where the rub is, and our task as educational philosophers is to help construct the intellectual tools and explanations that will help develop some uncommon or new understandings that may become more common. This, I take it, is precisely what Heslep is trying to do, but I believe there are elements in his approach that may present stumbling blocks.

A basic difficulty lies in his definition of religion, because it seems to skirt the complexity issue with an apparent adoption of a "secular humanist" view, but this view is one of the major points of contention today. It seems we have entered a period in which religious beliefs are hardening from Tennessee to the Middle East. Let us suppose that we can all agree that, biologically speaking, sex makes babies, but can we agree that religion is, as Heslep maintains, "simply a quality of experience, e.g., a feeling of awe or reverence brought on by a perception of the harmony of the universe"? Clearly, this view frightens many religious people. Would Roman Catholics, for example, agree that sexual behavior is only biological? By the same token, suppose that Southern Baptists would agree that religion involves awe or reverence of "the harmony of the universe." Would they agree that this is all it is? The answer to both question is, of course, an obvious "No!"

Heslep states that the traditional definition of religion "fails to take into account that conceptions do change, and the normal idea of religion has changed." Of course conceptions of religion have changed and they will continue to do so, but they may not change in the direction he points. Clearly, it may be argued that if we truly want to promote a common sense view of religion that affects public policy today, Godless religion simply won't do at this time. I believe that we must come up with a view that does not reject out-of-hand those who want to exercise their belief in creeds, theologies, or divinities, even though this exercise must be restricted within the bounds of public education (particularly in public schools).

Heslep defines democracy in terms of voluntary agency based on freedom and knowledge. He states, "Uninformed sexual activity is likely to create social problems," and he cautions that voluntary agency may be undermined. Can a case also be made that it is not only uninformed sexual activity that is at fault, but also unrestricted sexual activity? Being informed is simply not enough. As Dewey cautioned us, we must not forget the place of habit, because to be effective in human conduct, ideas and knowledge must shape conduct on some regular basis. For example, we know that some people do not use contraceptives, not because they are ignorant about them or because of religious objections, but because they refuse (or choose not) to use them, or they are not terribly concerned that the consequences will affect them. They know better, but the knowledge does not become a vital factor in their conduct; thus, knowledge alone fails. Can we not make a case that a system of informed beliefs that helps restrict and control sexual behavior can also be religiously informed, even by a not-always-rational, divinity-based theology? Perhaps the central question is How can we bridge the gap between traditional and non-traditional religion to help us develop both informed and

better controlled (or restricted) sexual behavior? After all, using either contraceptives or abstinence is a form of restricted sexual behavior. What will help us know that we should use sexual restraint and actually use it, too?

What Heslep is driving toward is rational sex and religion which promote witting behavior and voluntary agency, a position with which most of us would agree. But is the sects-sex comparison only about rationality? For example, commitment could be highlighted. Commitment to others called "love" (including the erotic, the romantic, and the religious versions of the term) is not always and only rational. We know that these kinds of commitment can be out and out irrational. In addition, what about the non-rational aspects of religion and sex, such as the aesthetic and the emotional aspects? Religion and sex have served as the well springs of literature, poetry, and art throughout history. Heslep states that we do not have to provide instruction in sexual (and religious) practices and feelings, and that most will benefit from knowledge and lore about these things. I agree, but I also maintain that we may help learners experience vicariously through educational activities in art, literature, poetry, historical experience, and purposeful dialogue in order for them to learn some important things about human sexual and religious experience on both non-rational and rational bases. If accomplished with purpose and skill, this kind of education would be truly liberal, and it would rise above treating sex as mere biological plumbing and sensual technique, or religion as mere true or false ideologies.

In another vein, sex education has survival value regarding epidemics, overpopulation, famine, and other potential disasters that may come from uninformed and unrestricted sexual behavior. Religious education also has survival value when it promotes taking personal responsibility, living together peacefully, recognition of external factors and forces outside personal volition, and giving allegiance to codes of behavior that promote both individual and social well-being. According to Heslep, "The values that should be included in public sex education in a democracy are those consistent with the features of voluntary agency, e. g., knowledge, freedom, purposefulness, success in action, equality, nurturing, and caring." But is it all purely voluntary? Don't we need to recognize some compulsions and restrictions (social, religious, etc.) to control sexual behavior? After all, the sex drive itself is a form of compulsion, a non-rational form of biological behavior control that ensures that the human race reproduces itself, while at the same time it threatens to overwhelm us with excess population; hence we need both compulsion and rationality. Heslep also states that "members of a democratic society should learn about religion so that they will be prepared to engage in it freely and knowingly." He makes some excellent points here, but he seems to overlook certain non-rational aspects of the problem. He says: "A democratic state, accordingly, needs a religious education for its members that will prevent certain sorts of social problems and that also will aim at the development of the individual as a voluntary agent." Most of us would not disagree with this, but many religious persons would say that their divinity-based beliefs

help inform both voluntary agency and group life and, we may add, there are non-rational aspects to practically any divinity-based view.

In short, I submit that we do need some non-rational controls, but this needs explaining. If we consider education at the socialization and enculturation level, we must admit that much of it occurs in a non-rational way. For example, English is my mother tongue, but I did not rationally choose it; rather, it was given to me (or I inherited it). Should we not also promote--ever so carefully!--primary enculturation into moral and ethical values, many if not most of which undergird the great religions of the world, that cultivate responsible personal and social conduct that, in turn, undergird civilized democratic life? Heslep recognizes the possibility of indoctrination, but how he views this indoctrination is not clear. I believe a reasoned argument can be made for some non-rational learning that is, in the primary sense, more important than rational voluntary agency (which is, after all, derived from reflective or secondary experience).

In closing, let me once again emphasize the value of Heslep's paper. I hope my remarks are taken as an attempt to complement his remarks rather than to detract. He is right to compare "sects" with "sex" because we need to broaden the field of inquiry. He is right in opposing brainwashing and in opposing indoctrination when it does not result in understanding, even as he also states that there may be good reasons for permitting some indoctrination to take place. Of course, his concern with rationality is very important: when we educate and when we discuss the issues involved, we want these things to be reasonable and we want understanding to ensue. My main point is that when we talk about education at the general level of enculturation and socialization, we must more fully recognize the impact of the non-rational. A great deal of enculturation is neither rational nor voluntary: it simply happens, and its merits depend to a large extent on the goodness of the culture that contains and sustains it. The question then becomes, How do we form the kind of public and private life that enables human life to proceed in the most beneficial and least harmful ways? I believe Heslep helps us take a step forward in answering that crucial question.

THE MORAL AND SPIRITUAL CRISIS IN EDUCATION: A RESPONSE

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The book is a voice crying in the wilderness. The author in prophetic fashion declares a crisis exists in education. The culture has failed. Thus far, our educational professionals have proved to be incompetent in building educational programs which could provide a new vision leading to cultural renewal. The task of transforming our basic cultural institutions and belief systems lies in the hands of those educators who become true believers.

Recent educational reformers are false prophets who through the delusion of seeking excellence have only added weight to the yokes about our necks as we intensify our efforts to do more of the same trivial things which have come to characterize education in modern times. A new order is needed, for the crisis lies not in failing to do well what we are doing, but lies in doing the wrong things. The crisis is moral and spiritual.

Mainstream America is confused and frustrated and follows the lead of the high and mighty in doing evil. The paradoxes and conflicts which mark our culture can be removed through education as educators generate new myths which allow us to find meaning and purpose in life and to live in harmony with our neighbor. The call is not back to the old ways in which we walked before the humanists invaded the halls of learning but to new ways yet to be created. Educators must set sail in faith to build new models and theories for our educational enterprise. All people everywhere yearn for such a program and can be led to set aside differences of belief in order to enter the new kingdom.

How can this be so? The new beginning awaits the rising up of a generation of prophets who have a sacred commitment to religious language with which to attack the shallow, materialistic culture which dominates our lives and to creating myths which lead to a culture where everyone can dwell in peace, each under his own fig tree. We will recognize the coming of the new order when grading systems in schools

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are abolished, all curriculum planning focuses upon the horrors of our times, and teachers ask questions rather than give answers.

The above summary is an attempt to depict the tone and style of the book, not to caricature the content. The book is a polemical tract, not a philosophical treatise. Professor Purpel's chief contribution to educational discourse is his attempt to formulate a religious and moral framework for educational reform. I welcome the reintroduction of religion to educational debate but hold reservations regarding Professor Purpel's approach. I will express these reservations, seek to set this book within the context of educational discourse, and make a concluding proposal.

First, I will state my reservations regarding the author's use of the prophetic tradition. Purpel attempts to utilize the prophetic tradition without adopting the beliefs which created that tradition. He wants to employ the language of religion without turning to the myths of creation, meaning, and redemption found in the orthodox versions of religion. He is using the

> religious in reference to ideas, principles, and tenets that have to do with our relations with forces beyond the known world. Religious questions are concerned with our relations with the cosmos and with the unknown or unknowable. Religions serve to explain fundamental questions or origin, meaning, and ultimately to generate human responses to their formulations[1]

I agree with Robert Heslep, who reviewed the book in Educational Studies, that this is a vague conception.[2] What are "forces" and what is the "known world?" Elsewhere Purpel identifies "very deeply felt forces" as being called God in the Bible. Since it is evident he is referring to the prophetic tradition in the Old and New Testaments, some comments about that tradition as contrasted with Purpel's use of it are in order. My comments are limited to reacting to his use of the tradition rather than to creating a definitive statement of that tradition.

In criticism of politicians who have seized upon school prayer as an issue, the author stresses that the spiritual search is not to be reified by a ritualistic affirmation of a particular and narrow religion (p. 54). In this context Purpel is arguing for open, critical, intellectual inquiry and against arrogance and the compartmentalization of religion. While I do not disagree with his concern, the point must be made that the prophets did not oppose the reification by ritual of a particular and narrow religion. In fact, their chief concern was to make ritual undefiled by impure acts.

They preached for compassion and justice in order to purify religious practices of a particular sort, not to set them aside as meaningless.

Not only does Purpel seek to separate the spiritual search from ritual but he attempts to separate faith from belief (p. 59). Faith is identified as a posture, a "faithing," a kind of seeking. In context, Purpel is arguing against the emphasis on facts in education and for a search for higher truth, higher meaning, or wisdom. Certainly faith and belief need to be distinguished. Paul Tillich in his book Dynamics of Faith clearly distinguishes the two, but Tillich as a Christian theologian was equally concerned that we not neglect historical events.[3] Faith was not unrelated to belief. What one believed about Jesus Christ was related to living a life of faith. The prophets also did not call for faith as a process but for faith (trust) in the integrity and trustworthiness of God, a God who revealed himself in acts which could be known and celebrated. I'm not sure that we can appropriate the search for higher meaning found in the prophetic tradition without regard for the particular religious beliefs which undergirded this search.

Purpel's major concern in calling upon the prophetic tradition is to appropriate the images and language of that tradition so that our schools may be energized with images and languages that have force and meaning (p. 77). He confesses that he is not speaking as a theologian but as an educator examining the possibilities that theological language might have for this effort. It is optional, he declares, whether or not educators participate in theological debate on the existence of God, origin of the universe, and so on. What educators must do is to attempt to sacralize the educational process, "to imbue it with a spirit of what is of ultimate significance and meaning" (p. 78). Is it optional whether or not educators participate in theological debate if that debate is about the very concerns which have created our crisis? If truth knows no disciplinary boundaries, why would educators stop at the threshold of what is called religious studies?

In a section titled "The Prophetic Tradition" (p. 80), Purpel writes of the prophets' awareness of a divine imperative and, following Heschel's interpretation, writes of their utilization of the society's own highest goals and deepest values to judge and to call for transformation. He recognizes that the biblical prophets "must be considered in the context of a particular history of a particular people in particular times" (p. 81). What he wants educators to do, however, is to take the form but not the substance of the prophetic message. Ironically, his two examples are Gandhi and King, both of whom grounded their reform movements on theological bases though of different religions.

Purpel argues for a prophetic voice which calls for humanity to accept its responsibility "to create a life of meaning for all and has a cosmology in which God is also free from entanglements with the establishment" (p. 84). In the biblical tradition God created the establishment, first Israel and then the Christian church. The prophets spoke to a well-defined community believed to be created by God and whose continued existence and well being depended upon obedience to God and upon God's grace when obedience was not forthcoming. The prophet's message was not generated by imagination but by revelation. The crux of the matter is whether or not the prophets' message can be utilized without the underlying theological assumptions regarding who the prophets are and for whom they speak. If so, then do we need myths at all? Certainly the teachings of all wise men and women deserve consideration as we seek to reform our culture through education. But Purpel in his insistence that we borrow the myths and language of religion obviously intends more than paying attention to the words of wise persons. He wants a revolution, a cultural upheaval and transformation. I believe he is correct in seeing the prophetic traditions as a means to this end. But can that tradition survive the cutting of its theological roots? The answer of liberal educational philosophers from John Dewey until now has been "yes." The evidence for the failure of this cut flower approach can be found in the crisis in schooling which prompted this book.

If I have reservations regarding the author's use of the prophetic tradition, where do I place the message of the book in the context of educational discourse? Squarely within the tradition of Progressive Reconstructionism.[4] The title of chapter one poses a question as to whether the current crisis in education is a result of professional [educational] incompetence or cultural failure. Our culture is failing us, Purpel writes, for threats to "cherished notions of life, including life itself" abound in the form of war, starvation, totalitarianism, and ecological disaster (p. 1). This book, Purpel claims, is a response to this crisis. Thus far, professional educators have seemed incompetent to address the crisis. Educators, he maintains, are responsible for the state of the culture "as it relates to their specific responsibility for the quality of the 'educational program'" (p. 2). The fundamental assumption of the author is that educational discourse "must focus on the urgent task of transforming many of our basic cultural institutions and belief systems" (p. 3). While he does not define education or educators, the implication throughout the book is that the term education is limited to schooling and educator refers to those related professionally to the schooling enterprise. One cannot but recall George Counts' classic address, "Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order?" in 1932

to the National Education Association at another time when the culture was in crisis. We recall also that the result was nil. Kinship to the Reconstructionist mode of thought emerges again in chapter seven where Purpel argues that all curriculum planning should focus on the "horrors of our time" and that pedagogy should focus on questions and not on answers. The type curriculum he proposes was elaborated at great length by Theodore Brameld in Education for the Emerging Age (1961).[5]

Association of Professor Purpel's book with the work of Counts and Brameld is to suggest that his proposal suffers the same defect as Reconstructionism generally. That defect is the assumption that schools, the institutionalized means of education in modern societies, can single-handedly, and this is his implication, reform the culture of the society which creates and directs them. A broader conception of education, such as that followed by Lawrence Cremin in his monumental historical studies, "as the deliberate, systematic, and sustained effort to transmit or evoke knowledge, attitudes, values, skills, and sensibilities" allows us to maintain a more realistic perception of what schools as only one educating effort can do to shape the culture.[6] I do not believe this criticism necessarily negates Professor Purpel's purpose which is to call for a rediscovery of moral and religious values in our efforts to reform schooling. But since I have questioned his employment of the prophetic tradition due to his reluctance to accept the substance as well as the form of that tradition, I conclude with a modest proposal as to how that tradition might become a part of schooling.

Schooling will continue to be structured by a curriculum based upon the liberal arts and organized into academic disciplines. The time has come for religious studies to be included again in that curriculum. I am not referring to teaching about religion. I am proposing that the substance of the religious be addressed in the same fashion as the substance of any other academic subject. One example which illustrates the effort to discover and teach this substance is found in the work of John B. Wilson and Samuel M. Natale, Education in Religious Understanding.[7] If the images and language of religion are necessary for a reform of our culture, then let us find ways to include them in our educational programs. This may not seem adequate to initiate the revolution Purpel wants, but it is something professional educators can do and it just might move us in the direction he desires.

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1. David E. Purpel, The Moral and Spiritual Crisis in Education (Granby, Massachusetts: Bergin and Garvey Publishers, Inc., 1989), 66. Additional references to this book will be noted only by page numbers set in the text of the paper.
2. Robert D. Heslep, "Essay Review: The Philosophical Dialogue on Ethics and Education," Educational Studies 20(Fall 1989)3:233.
3. Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957).
4. Sixteen graduate students in the Master Teacher Fellows Program at WFU each wrote a criticism of The Moral and Spiritual Crisis in Education. Several noted this point in their papers. For this and other shared insights, I am grateful.
5. Theodore Brameld, Education for the Emerging Age (New York: Harper and Row, 1961). This is a revised edition of Ends and Means in Education published in 1950.
6. Lawrence A. Cremin, American Education: The Colonial Experience (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), xiii.
7. John B. Wilson and Samuel M. Natale, Education in Religious Understanding (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1987).

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7. John B. Wilson and Samuel M. Natale, Education in Religious Understanding (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1987).

THE SUPREME COURT, FUNDAMENTALIST LOGIC, AND THE TERM "RELIGION"

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Introduction

During the past three decades, civil libertarians have applied the principle of church/state separation in ways that caught many Americans by surprise and infuriated our more conservative religious population. With the impetus provided most directly by organizations such as Madelyn Murray O'Hair's American Atheist Society and the American Humanist Association, and with the legal expertise provided by the American Civil Liberties Union, secularists have been able to build Jefferson's famous 'wall of separation' higher than most Americans thought possible. The most obvious examples of this extension of separation have related to the public schools. In that context the prohibition of school prayer in 1962 spawned the greatest reaction, but a spoken prayer is not the only religious activity so restricted. By court decision, it is also illegal to have a moment of silence in place of the spoken prayer, to have Bible readings at school, to post the Ten Commandments in a classroom, to distribute Bibles to school children, to require the teaching of creationism alongside evolutionary theory, and until the June 1990 Westside High (Omaha, Nebraska) decision upholding the Equal Access Act to meet as a religious club on campus during noninstructional hours. Indeed, in 1986 a Georgia student and his father filed suit to prohibit prayer before football games, an institution which in the Bible Belt is almost as sacred as the

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Sunday Morning Worship. The suit was successful, and by the fall of 1989 pre-game prayers had all but disappeared, even in the South.[1]

Secularists and humanists are often astonished and appalled at the violent fundamentalist reaction to these restrictions, but it really should come as no surprise. Conservative Christians all over the country feel that the courts have been unfair to their faith, especially in light of the fact that the Supreme Court itself has defined secular humanism as a religion. Given this definition, many American Christians and virtually all of our strong evangelical leaders see the courts as imposing a particular religion, namely atheism or secularism, in the name of religious neutrality; and they see the Christian faith in a state of siege. It is no wonder that the Moral Majority and its satellite organizations were founded, and that there was a backlash in the form of political action in support of conservative candidates, lawsuits directed against local school boards, efforts to censor textbooks, and the endless attempts to push through a school prayer amendment in congress. Fundamentalists want to regain ground which in their view has been unfairly taken from them.

Though conservative protest at this point is certainly understandable, often it is not worked out on a solid foundation. The argument that our present policy is unfair usually rests on two mistakes, one committed by the court's understanding of religion and the other by fundamentalists' understanding of logic

and education. The mistakes complement each other. I will focus on the court's problem, then show how it has been exploited by conservative churches.

The Term 'Religion'

The court's understanding of secular humanism as a religion rests on a conflation of the terms 'religion' and 'world-view', as the crucial court statement from the Torcaso case (1961) itself shows. Justice Hugo Black, delivering the majority opinion of the court that belief in God as a test for public office is unconstitutional, distinguished religions based on belief in God and "those religions founded on different beliefs," arguing that the state cannot aid either. Unfortunately, in a footnote which has plagued the court since, he spelled out the content of these "different beliefs:"

> Among religions in this country which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism (italics mine), and others.[2]

The court is here assuming that religion is a basic orientation to life, any set of beliefs that are foundational for one's philosophical perspective. On this view, not only are Christianity, Islam, Judaism, etc., religions, but also views such as Marxism, humanism, existentialism, and positivism would need to be included.

The court understanding is very close to that of the great twentieth-century liberal theologian Paul Tillich, who defined religion in a variety of works as the human "ultimate concern." In fact, the Tillich-connection is made explicit in the Seeger case in 1965 in which conscientious objector status was granted on the basis of a broad understanding of religion. In this case, statutory exemption from military service was accorded to three men, none of whom appealed to religion in the traditional American sense of belief in God and participation in a church.[3] In his opinion for the unanimous court, Justice Tom Clark wrote of a broadened view of religious training and belief at work in the modern religious community and in the decision, and stated what has come to be known as the 'parallel test':

> The test might be stated in these words: A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition.[4]

As evidence of the expanded concept of religion in modern religious scholarship, Justice Clark cited the work of Tillich, quoting specifically a passage from the latter's The Shaking of the Foundations in which Tillich speaks of God as "the source of your being, of your ultimate concern, of what you take seriously without any reservation" (italics the court's), even if to believe in God in this way "you must forget everything traditional that you learned about God."[5]

In his article, "The Problem of a Constitutional Definition of Religion," Milton Konvitz, Professor Emeritus in the Cornell University Law School, comments on the understanding of religion presupposed by the parallel test of Seeger, "This, of course, is no definition of religion."[6] And he points out that in 1970, in Welsh v. United States, the meaning of 'religious training and belief' is "diluted further." Speaking for the court, Justice Black interpreted Seeger to include "moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong" so long as "these beliefs be held with the strength of traditional religion" as a basis for exemption.[7] Even though Welsh explicitly denied that his views were "religious," he still qualified on the basis that he might not be aware of the broader meaning of 'religion'.[8] What this amounts to, according to Konvitz, is that "whatever is perceived as performing the function of religion in the life of a person is that person's religion."[9] Konvitz shows in addition that in subsequent decisions and in congressional legislation pertaining to exemption there appear to be other, more narrowly construed views of religion at work, leaving us a present with the constitutional definition of religion "largely unresolved."[10]

In his Christian Century article, "Tillich in an Alice-in-Wonderland World" (June 3-10, 1987), James McBride complains that the court misused Tillich in these references. McBride sees clearly that the broader understanding of religion which includes secular humanism sets the stage for fundamentalist challenges in the schools. By virtue of the court's reasoning, he points out,

"all normative claims. . .are ipso facto religious in nature."[11] But the court erred, he maintains, in reporting Tillich's definition, leaving out a crucial part of the concept. According to McBride, in Tillich the "essential characteristic of religion is belief in transcendence which eclipses the form and content of the empirically observable world" (520). Since secular humanism as defined by all parties to the debate, and most notably as characterized more recently by Judge W. Brevard Hand in the 1987 Alabama textbook decision (Smith v. School Commissioners), specifically denies a transcendent or spiritual dimension, it should not be counted as a religion (520).

McBride's position is right in part and wrong in part. I certainly agree that secular humanism should not be thought of as a religion, and that to do so is to generate fundamentalist challenges. In contrast to McBride, however, I suspect that the court has picked up on a definition of religion actually present in various segments of the academic community, including some of the writings of Tillich, albeit a definition too broad to be functional.

This point can be seen especially in reference to Tillich himself. There certainly is in his work a concern for the transcendental. His basic descriptions of God as 'Ground of Being', 'the Unconditional', the 'Absolute', the 'Power of Being', etc., show this, as does his insistence that all religious symbols have a "transcendent level which goes beyond (italics Tillich's) the empirical reality we encounter,"[12] and

his explicit claim that a secular society can avoid emptiness only if there is still the memory and substance of the religious symbols which originally inspired it.[13] Nonetheless, there is to be found in Tillich exactly what Justice Clark was looking for. Tillich's definition of faith or religion as 'ultimate concern' seems to allow that anything can be religious even as he himself describes the implications. Consider: Faith as ultimate concern, he says, might be biblical faith, or it might be any number of other things, such as concern for success in terms of economic power or social standing. As he said of success,

> It is the god of many people in the highly competitive Western culture and it does what every ultimate concern must do: it demands unconditional surrender to its laws. . . ."[14]

Or again, Tillich speaks in a variety of places about "quasi-religions," usually in the form of a political ideology like socialism or communism, which demand the same intensity of commitment as traditional religions.[15] And in Theology of Culture, he defines the metaphor "depth" in religious experience as "that which is ultimate, infinite, unconditional in man's spiritual life," and suggests that religion in the "largest sense" is ultimate concern, a concern "manifest in all (italics mine) creative functions of the human spirit."[16] Even explicit rejection of religion in the name of morality, cognition, or aesthetics, is itself, he says, rejection of religion "in the name of religion."[17] The rejections of our time, including secular humanism, thus may ultimately fail to bring fulfillment

to the human spirit, but surely they should count as religions according to these examples of Tillich's vocabulary.

Tillich states the distinction for which we are searching with crystal clarity in Ultimate Concern. Here he differentiates religion "in the narrower sense" which denotes an organized church, clergy, etc., and "in the larger sense" which is at issue in his idea of ultimate concern. "In the light of the larger concept," he explains, "we can understand that ultimate concern is also present in that which we usually call the secular or profane" (5). And later in the same work he refers to "the secular religions" (34ff).

In his work, Religious Symbols and God, philosopher William Rowe calls attention to Tillich's efforts to show the psychological and subjective parallel between commitments to the sacred and the secular. In doing so, he notes, Tillich "makes us aware of fundamental similarities that our ordinary use of language may conceal."[18] Tillich's distinction, he points out, has to do with "the place that the symbol occupies in the psychic life of the individual or group" (139); to say that an object is religious is to say that it is "the focus of a particular attitude," that is, ultimate concern. Then, of course, "Whenever there is ultimate concern--directed at no matter what--religion is present" (140).

Enough has been said to show that the broader understanding of religion is at work in many of Tillich's writings, and that the court's appeal to it is not altogether bogus. Indeed, the

larger concept appears to be present in the thought of many other giants of the modern academic world. In his influential psychology of religion, for instance, Erich Fromm says, "I understand by religion any system of thought and action shared by a group which gives the individual a frame of orientation and an object of devotion." [19] And Milton Yinger in his classic work in the sociology of religion, Religion, Society, and the Individual, acknowledges the Tillichian reference to ultimate concern in his own definition, "Religion, then, can be defined as a system of beliefs and practices by means of which a group of people struggles with these ultimate problems of human life."[20]

Although these and numerous other examples of scholarly definitions which could be adduced support the broader concept of religion and focus as McBride says in the article noted above on the "way" in which such a belief is held, and though there is thus ample academic support for the court's broadened understanding, I believe that the idea of religion to which the court appealed was misleading in that it fails to demarcate religious beliefs from any others. And I submit that the failure is due specifically to the absence of any objectivity, or reference to content, a limitation that Tillich sought to avoid in other descriptions by his concern for the transcendent.

Especially noteworthy in this regard , and diametrically opposed to the court's broadened interpretation are the definitions of religion in the Oxford English Dictionary. The two most prominent connotative definitions say that religion is:

> Action or conduct indicating a belief in, reverence for, and desire to please, a divine ruling power; the exercise or practice of rites or observances implying this.[21]

Or, that it is:

> Recognition on the part of man of some higher unseen power as having control of his destiny, and as being entitled to obedience, reverence, and worship; the general mental and moral attitude resulting from this belief, with reference to its effect upon the individual or the community; personal or general acceptance of this feeling as a standard of spiritual and practical life.[22]

These definitions are more functional because they pick up the objective reference to the transcendent as a "divine ruling power" or a "higher unseen power" and they denote the ritual expression which has traditionally accompanied such belief. Indeed, in the longer definition, even the subjective attitudes and responses are directly tied to the objective reference. One has an attitude "resulting from this belief," or adopts "this feeling" as a basis for his or her personal life. In regard to a broader definition, the OED mentions only a "religion of nature" as "the worship of nature in place of a more formal system of religious belief."[23]

In summary of this objection: As the court has used the term 'religion', every philosophy of life is a religion and it becomes, therefore, logically impossible to distinguish religion from nonreligion. The word 'religion' no longer does any work.

It does not set off beliefs about God or the gods from other beliefs. And it fails to distinguish the practices of worship and ritual from other practices. Logically, the definition is weak because it is too broad, including everything that is most important to anyone, and thereby excluding nothing as a possible object of legal challenge as an 'establishment' of religion.

The supreme irony in such a linguistic recommendation is that it does not allow those such as atheists and secular humanists who by express statement hate religion to be irreligious. Atheists consciously and expressly deny that God exists and secular humanists say without qualification that a nonreligious and thus secular society is morally preferable to one that is religious. But the court's broad definition says in effect that these positions are really religious, too. It is just that their specific religious beliefs differ from those of such mainline religions as Christianity. In my view, we should at least accord those who do not wish to be identified with religion in any way the dignity of their chosen position. Atheists are mostly atheists, not theists who are momentarily confused. And secular humanists are by all means secular humanists, not religionists in disguise. The court's definition is too weak, and the scholarly tradition that supports it is inadequately conceived.

If the word 'religion' is to do any work, it must include reference to a transcendental power. The latter may be the God of monotheism, the gods and goddesses of polytheism, the holy

spiritual power of pantheism, or even the spirit forces of animistic religion.

Whatever its nature, religious beliefs and practices are designed to express the nature of the transcendent and put adherents into contact with it. On this score, not just any ultimate concern is religious, and secular humanism is most assuredly not a religion since it explicitly denies the transcendent. Thus, it does not follow that if the public schools are teaching such a view that they are really teaching religion and hence violating separation of church and state for that reason.

Several kinds of objections might be generated in respect to this linguistic recommendation. The most immediate is that the Court will violate the establishment clause even by attempting to define religion. Such an objection presupposes that religious division in American society is so strong and the numbers and varieties of sects so great that any definition tendered would in effect prefer some beliefs and discredit others as candidates for whatever tax breaks or other public benefits are to be accorded to religious institutions.

In response, it is true that a definition would discredit certain "religious" sects, but that constitutes no establishment unless there is good reason to think of them as religions in the first place. It may be unfair for religious and not secular institutions to receive tax breaks, and it seems rather obvious that this longstanding practice prefers religion over nonreligion

in terms of tax law, but that is a different issue. The issue in our case is whether the Court would be unfair in deciding that particular institutions are religious and thus qualify for whatever advantages or restrictions apply to such institutions, or not. And that decision cannot be made without a working understanding of the term 'religion'.

It should also be pointed out that the Court itself obviously does not consider efforts to establish a definition to violate the establishment clause since the cases reviewed herein show considerable Court interest in that very project. Neither a narrow nor a broad definition of religion would be appropriate if provision of a definition itself was inappropriate.

And it should also be pointed out that the Court has to work with crucial and sometimes technical definitions of other terms which similarly reflect deep rifts in American thought. Thus in euthanasia cases the issue is explicitly how death should be defined and in abortion cases the definition of life has been at the heart of the legal debate as both Roe and Webster indicate.

It may also be that an appeal to a transcendental power as a necessary ingredient in the definition of religion is objectionable, given that 'transcendent' is at least as difficult to define as 'religion' and that there have been endless variations on the theme in philosophic history. The word may be used to refer, for instance, not only to the supernatural as it is used in this paper, but also the existence of consciousness, of other minds, of the physical world itself, or even the

inspiration for magnificent artistic creations, depending on the relevant philosophical school.

Again in response, the sense required for a useful definition of religion in the legal context, as well as the historical American political context, should be obvious. Church/state issues have often been at the center of public debate, and lately they have been particularly focused on the public school classroom. The reason why religious neutrality has been such a vital concern in educational circles is because religious belief opens the possibility of divine revelation, and with the latter the existence of a reality inaccessible to ordinary methods of rational and empirical inquiry. Moreover, the spiritual power so introduced may impinge on the natural order, causing changes which are also inaccessible to scientific and historical scrutiny. And a source of authority which cannot be challenged by the established processes of critical thinking may be put into place. In all of these senses, an advocacy of religious belief in the classroom, no matter how valuable it may be to one's personal life, no matter how successful it may be in broadening one's sense of reality and providing holistic explanatory schemes, and no matter how appropriate it may be in a private school with a religious orientation, introduces a scheme of revelational authority for belief that is inappropriate for public education. Communication of such truths with government support would discriminate against children and youth who do not hold the relevant religious beliefs. Moreover, the authority

appeal has particularly damaging implications in the classroom since it often serves to undercut the study of history, literature, and science, a point at issue most obviously in the question whether creationism should be taught in the public schools.

It is specifically the sense of a supernatural power inaccessible to ordinary means of inquiry, but a power which acts upon nature and history and to which loyalty and obedience are owed, that I wish to build into the idea of transcendence as the definitive mark of religion. And I submit that it is advocacy of a religious tradition of transcendental authority which creates the basis for complaints of discrimination and which may in addition disrupt the learning environment. And it is religion in the same sense, therefore, which should not be established by the government and in regard to which the government and all its institutions should be neutral.

Last of all, it might be objected that the religion/spiritual transcendence link has the unfortunate political consequence of making it illegal to teach the Christian faith in schools but perfectly legal to teach naturalism, secular humanism, or atheism, a pernicious outcome indeed.

This objection overlooks the evolving Supreme Court understanding of the establishment clause. One aspect of the 'Lemon test,' employed as a whole by the Court first in Lemon v. Kurtman (1971), is that the "primary effect" of a statute or practice "neither advances nor inhibits religion."[24] It is

easily arguable that teaching any one of the views noted above would have as a primary effect the inhibition of Christian belief, and thus be inconsistent with religious neutrality. Thus, as teaching the Christian faith would violate the constitution by allowing a government establishment of religion, teaching any of the forms of naturalism indicated here, including secular humanism, would violate the constitution as well, but not because some religion other than Christianity is thereby established. It would be a violation because such views specifically deny the transcendent, and thus fail to preserve neutrality toward religion.

Fundamentalist Logic

On the other side, the fundamentalist complaint about injustice itself makes a basic error in logic by confusing neutrality with disavowal. The argument is that because religion is seldom mentioned and religious practices are deliberately restricted, religion is being attacked by the courts and schools. For at least two reasons, nothing could be further from the truth.

First, polls have consistently shown that almost everyone in the United States believes in God,[25] over 90% identify themselves with the Judeo-Christian tradition,[26] approximately 70% claim to be members of a church or synagogue, approximately 40% attend services in a typical week, and 56% say religion is "very important" in their lives,[27] statistics which have remained essentially the same for at least the past twenty years.[28]

Further, a life-style that is totally 'Christian' is much more in evidence today than three decades ago due to the rapid growth of the charismatic movement and the resurgence of fundamentalist religion. Given these facts, it is just as likely that students in the public schools will be exploited by coaches, teachers, and even other students who are seeking converts as it is that they should be affected by neutrality toward religion. Moreover, individual teachers, local schools, and sometimes entire school systems circumvent court-imposed restrictions by encouraging religious activity. Fundamentalists always put themselves in the position of the persecuted minority. What they do not realize is that the court found it necessary to put these restrictions in place to protect the minority which does not have Christian beliefs.

Second, neutrality is simply not the same as disavowal, and to insist that it is shows the black and white thinking which plagues fundamentalist rhetoric from beginning to end. In this regard, conservative Christians and various political leaders have misused a very informative study by Paul Vitz, Professor of Psychology at New York University. Vitz showed the lack of attention given to the religious heritage of America in standard social science texts used in public schools,[29] a development with disturbing implications indeed, and one deserving of attention by textbook publishers and school systems around the country. But fundamentalists mistakenly take the absence of reference to

religion, and more directly to the Christian faith, as tantamount to an endorsement of a rival religion, namely secular humanism.

In fact, it is not an endorsement of religion at all, and certainly not a disavowal of the Christian faith. By fundamentalist logic, one is either endorsing the truth of God's word or denying it. There is no neutral position, no middle ground. Hence, any text, for that matter any publication whatever, which does not expressly assert the required religious dogma can be denounced as asserting the rival secular humanism, even if it has absolutely no religious content. It is this same kind of thinking which leads fundamentalists to characterize theologians or philosophers who think of themselves as Christian humanists as really secular humanists because they do not accept the absolute authority of the Bible. To paraphrase a biblical statement, fundamentalist logic says, "He who is not with me is against me" (Matt. 12:30, RSV). They forget the mystery arising from the parallel assertion remembered by Christ's disciples, "He that is not against us is for us" (Mark 10:40, RSV). The logic is black and white; there is no in-between. And their arguments typically commit the false dichotomy fallacy in logic.

This either/or approach may be seen even more directly in almost any popular selection of fundamentalist literature. A glaring example may be found in the recent book, Like Lambs to the Slaughter (1989), by Johanna Michaelsen,[30] a best-seller on the 'Christian' booklist and a work which catches my attention because one of my own articles is discussed in it. The title

depicts the innocent children of Bible-believing Christians being led to destruction basically in public schools and through New Age philosophy, the most contemporary variant of secular humanism. The author seems especially concerned to warn conservative Christian parents of the evil of certain parapsychological fads such as "transpersonal psychology" which have found a home in a few experimental public school programs around the country. In the 300+ pages she lops together countless examples of exotic experiences, techniques, and beliefs, including yoga, numerology, ESP, spirit guides, mantras, witchcraft, mediums, magic, psychic healing, crystal power, Ouija boards, ghosts, satanism, and dungeons and dragons, putting them all under the category of "New Age" as the most recent satanic deception of American society. Behind this sinister plot and apparently still the chief tool of the devil is the "humanist conspiracy" (title of chapter 2). And educational projects such as values clarification classes, the teaching of evolutionary theory in the public schools, and the work of the Jesus Seminar representing scholarship from graduate schools of religion and theological seminaries, are thrown in as well. En route to her conclusion Ms. Michaelsen manages to condemn not only all those who practice any identifiable forms of eastern religious mysticism but also those members of mainline denominations such as United Methodists, Presbyterians, and Episcopalians who no longer take the Bible literally. There appears, in fact, to be no end to the guises of evil in her dualistic scheme. Even those

delightful TV and movie personalities, the Smurfs, come in for condemnation because of their fairy tale appeal to supernatural powers and occasional use of the pentegram symbol as a basis for invocation of the spirits.

At the end of chapter 10 ("Truth under Siege"), the author includes reference to my article, "Teaching Students Who Already Know the Truth" (published in 1986 in the NEA Journal and again in 1987 in the Cultic Studies Journal, a publication of the American Family Foundation). She has already categorized the NEA as basically evil because of its political agenda, which includes such inappropriate educational interests as nuclear disarmament (22). She finds my article objectionable because I discuss the role fundamentalism plays in preventing critical thinking. Like countless other college and university professors, I object to any religious approach which prevents students from hearing criticism of their biblical views and treats such criticism as a symptom of evil. That approach overlooks two centuries of very serious biblical scholarship and in the language of philosophy, as I pointed out in the article, constitutes an immunization procedure. I present moves that a critical thinker would make in response to rhetoric from the apologetics of fundamentalism. I want to force conservative Christians as well as all of my other students, and especially those with a strong secularist world-view, to defend their claims, not just state them and assume that their political machinery will make them true.

Ms. Michaelsen's reaction to the article is predictable, however. Though there is nothing in it to indicate such commitments, the article is put into the category of secular humanism and New Age philosophy simply because it advocates critical thinking about religion.

This fallacy is apparent as well in fundamentalist challenges to biology texts containing evolutionary theory. The latter should be understood as a scientific account of human origins endorsed by almost all scientists in the fields of inquiry relevant to it,[31] and a theory which is religiously neutral. To teach such a theory in middle and high school biology classes is simply to report the present state of scientific knowledge. In and of itself, evolutionary theory is irrelevant to religion, since it may be incorporated into either a theistic or an atheistic world-view. In point of fact, a 1982 Gallup Poll showed that the vast majority of Americans who accept the theory are proponents of a kind of directed, or theistic evolution.[32] It is only their religious presupposition of biblical inerrancy and thus the literal truth of Genesis 1 which causes fundamentalists to think of evolution as a bias against faith.

It is certainly true that evolutionary theory contradicts the religious belief in biblical inerrancy. Thus it may be arguable that the teaching of such inhibits a particular version of the Christian faith, or perhaps even that the right of 'Christian' children to religious freedom is somehow violated by

forcing them to learn material that denies one of their religious beliefs. But the constant fundamentalist refrain that by teaching evolution schools are in fact teaching secular humanism is not defensible.

The assumption in such a move is that the denial of a religious claim is itself a religious statement, but that, of course, is not always the case. The statement 'Christ is the Son of God,' is a religious denial of the Muslim assertion, 'Christ was a prophet but not the Son of God.' But the assertion, 'The Bible is not inerrant because evolutionary theory is true,' is not a religious denial. No religious doctrine is affirmed in it; rather, a religious doctrine is denied on the basis of fact as reported by science. Similarly, if a religious organization taught that the earth has four corners, or that it is the center of the universe, or that there are seven and only seven astronomical bodies in orbit around the earth, all of which are false theories that have been held on the authority of religion, its doctrine would also be undercut by the data of contemporary astronomy. But in showing the factual denial of these religious assumptions, teachers would not be inculcating a rival religion.

It is difficult to see also how exposure to material in a science text might be construed as a denial of religious liberty. But it is not so difficult to see how the teaching of evolution could be thought of as an inhibition of fundamentalist faith. Is it permissible, then, to argue as I have above, that secular humanism cannot be taught in school even though it is not a

religion because it inhibits belief in the transcendent, and then allow that evolution should be taught even though it obviously inhibits fundamentalist religion?

I submit that it is appropriate to make a distinction in these cases. On one side, to deny secular humanism a place in the classroom is to rule out a theory which is philosophical in nature and cannot be decided by factual evidence. And further, if allowed, it would inhibit a religious belief which also cannot be decided by factual evidence. On the other side, to deny evolution a place in the classroom is to rule out a theory which leaves open the question of a transcendental dimension. And the arguments used in support of evolution are based in scientific fact, not philosophical speculation. And further, what it inhibits is a belief in creationism or biblical inerrancy, both of which are factually false.

As the Court continues to apply the Lemon test, it will become increasingly important to make a distinction along the lines suggested by the preceding examples. If the purpose of an educational system is to communicate knowledge, and given a plurality of factually exotic religious beliefs in America, to avoid a system held hostage by religion the Court will need to allow for inhibition of religion based on factual knowledge. But an inhibition based on a rival religious establishment or philosophical argument should not be permitted. To become an educated person has historically involved the stripping away of superstition. The American educational system is in danger of

compromising that ideal on behalf of the many religions our free exercise clause has generated.

Conclusion

On the basis of these considerations, it becomes more obvious what is happening in regard to fundamentalist challenges in the classroom. Paralleling the court's failure to employ a functional definition of religion is an error in logic on behalf of conservative Christians with pernicious consequences. The court allows for anything to count as religion, and the dualistic mindset of fundamentalist thought says that any religion but the true biblical faith is part of a satanic plot to deceive the faithful. In their view, therefore, contemporary America pits the evil religion of secular humanism against the righteous faith of biblical Christianity, with the spiritual warfare taking place primarily on the battlefield of the public schools. And the Supreme Court of the United States has unwittingly supported this conception.[33]

Notes

1. Douglas County (Georgia) High School senior and band member Doug Jager filed suit in 1986 to prohibit prayer before football games on the grounds that it violates separation of church and state. In 1988 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals barred pregame prayer at the school, agreeing that the first amendment is violated since public money would be used to promote religion. In May 1989 the Supreme Court let the ruling stand. See "Throwing God for a Loss," Time 134 (September 18, 1989):34.

2. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 495 (1961), fn. 10.

3. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).

4. Ibid., at 166.

5. Paul Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), 57; quoted in the court opinion.

6. Milton Konvitz, "The Problem of a Constitutional Definition of Religion," in Religion and the State, ed. James E. Wood, Jr. (Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 1985), 154.

7. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 339 (1970).

8. Konvitz, "Constitutional Definition of Religion," 155.

9. Ibid., 156.

10. Ibid., 160.

11. James McBride, "Tillich in an Alice-in-Wonderland World," Christian Century 104 (June 3-10, 1987):519.

12. Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, ed. Robert Kimball (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), 61.

13. D. Mackenzie Brown, Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 31-36.

14. Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), 3.

15. See his references in Ultimate Concern, 4-5, 31-36.

16. Tillich, Theology of Culture, 8-9.

17. Ibid.

18. William L. Rowe, Religious Symbols and God (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 23.

19. Erich Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 21.

20. Milton Yinger, Religion, Society and the Individual (New York: Macmillan, 1957), 9.

21. Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. "religion."

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 612-13 (1971).

25. Richard John Neuhaus uses the figure 94% as a generalization based on his reading of various polls ("What the Fundamentalists Want," Commentary 79 (May 1985):43.

26. Ibid.; also, A. James Reichley, Religion in American Public Life (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1985), 2, 360.

27. George Gallup, Jr., The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1985 (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 1986), 121. It should be noted that church records, however, show actual

religious affiliation to be around 60%. The source for this statistic is the AP article, "Churches Holding Membership Level," Rome (Ga.) News-Tribune (August 19, 1988), B-6. The AP article summarizes data from the 1988 Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches, compiled by the National Council of Churches (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1988).

28. Gallup Poll, 1985, 121.

29. Paul C. Vitz, "Religion and Traditional Values in Public Schools Textbooks: An Empirical Study," The Public Interest 84 (Summer 1986): 79-90.

30. Johanna Michaelsen, Like Lambs to the Slaughter (Eugene, Oregon: Harvest House Publishers, 1989).

31. In its report of the Supreme Court's rejection of a Louisiana law requiring that creationism be taught alongside evolution, Newsweek used the estimate that of 480,000 U.S. scientists in fields relevant to evolutionary theory, only approximately 700 are creationists ("Keeping God Out of the Classroom," June 29, 1987, p. 23).

32. The Gallup Poll: 1982, p. 208. According to the 1982 poll, 47% of Americans believe in evolutionary theory, and 38% believe that God has "guided this process," implying that approximately four of five evolutionists in America are theistic evolutionists.

33. This essay is an expanded version of a paper by the same title read at the annual meeting of the South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society in September 1990 (Williamsburg,

Va.). Helpful criticisms were offered by several conference participants, especially by Bruce Beezer, Professor of Education at North Carolina State University, and Charles Tandy, doctoral candidate in education at the University of Missouri-Columbia.

INTRODUCTION TO THE METHODOLOGY OF PARAPHRONESIS, WITH EXAMPLE:

RELIGION AND EDUCATION IN POSTMODERN AMERICA:

THE MCKENZIE PARADIGM AND BEYOND

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In order to think more clearly, we sometimes develop new methodologies of philosophical analysis. Upon reading David E. McKenzie's paper ("The Supreme Court, Fundamentalist Logic, And The Term 'Religion'"), a question arose as to the methodology I would use in composing a critical and constructive response.[1] According to Jean-Francois Lyotard, the postmodern condition is one of "incredulity toward metanarratives"; there is no meta-paradigm or meta-language by which to judge between conflicting paradigms or different language games.[2]

Based on inspiration from reading Jean-Francois Lyotard and Hans-Georg Gadamer, I have here settled on a kind of philosophical dialectic I call paraphronesis.[3] In part one of the present paper I present McKenzie's argument as a kind of paradigm or language game. In part two I present an alternative language game or paradigm. In parts three and four, I attempt to draw out practical implications of each paradigm. Finally, in part five, I offer my own evaluative reflections on the two language games and their implications.

I have chosen two specific paradigms (including McKenzie's) for dialogue, but another two might have been chosen. The number of paradigms or language games possible is perhaps limited only by the imagination; the number actually examined in a given paper is of course limited by space-time constraints. Paradigm (theory) may inform practice (action) -- but it is also important to note that practice may inform paradigm. Paraphronesis is not a one-way street but a multifaceted dialectic; it is more like an ongoing musical composition than a conclusive logical proof.

I. PARADIGM ONE: THE MCKENZIE LANGUAGE GAME

McKenzie argues that the American judiciary system has in recent decades broadened its meaning of the word "religion" to the point of making the term nonfunctional. A proper definition should be neither too broad nor too narrow. The old definition which identified religion with "God" was too narrow, and the new definition which identifies religion with "world-view" is too general. McKenzie chooses an intermediate meaning by identifying religion with "the transcendent" -- that is, with McKenzie's own definition of the term "transcendent." McKenzie's definition allows one to be religious without having to believe in God; it

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also allows one to take atheist O'Hair at her word when she claims that atheism is not a religion. (Indeed, she sees religion as evil.) Moreover, McKenzie's definition seems to diffuse the argument of those religious fundamentalists who are convinced that our public schools teach the religion of secular humanism. (For McKenzie, secularism is not a religion.) McKenzie further argues that (some) fundamentalists do not allow in their reasoning the concept of neutrality: if you are not for us (the good), then you are against us (and are therefore evil). McKenzie points out that one can indeed logically divide the world into p and non-p, but that in such case anti-p is a subset of, rather than identical with, non-p. From the above McKenzie concludes that his meaning of the term "religion," along with his disproof of so-called "fundamentalist logic," permits the possibility of a school system which is indeed religiously neutral.

II. PARADIGM TWO: AN ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE GAME

Let us assume that McKenzie knows his logic: 1) A definition should be accurate, neither too broad nor too narrow; and, 2) Non-p and anti-p are not logically identical. Note, however, that the truth of these two propositions is simply of a formal or abstract kind. It may be that McKenzie's definition of religion is too narrow. For example, I would evaluate Edgar Brightman's definition of religion as more broad than McKenzie's. If McKenzie would disagree with me in this evaluation, perhaps we can nevertheless agree that Brightman's definition is not so broad that it "allows for anything to count as religion." Be this as it may, the point is that conceivably it is possible to define religion very broadly, more broadly than McKenzie does, but yet not so broadly as to allow "anything to count as religion." If the language of the court is, let us say, sometimes ambiguous, its practical results are perhaps consistent with a "Brightman" kind of definition of "religion." If a word can have broad meaning, then perhaps it can be defined broadly. Perhaps McKenzie's definition of religion is overly precise or too narrow for maximal justice or optimal goodness in the real world.

McKenzie correctly reminds us that as an abstract argument -- "If you are not for us (the good), then you are against us (and are therefore evil)" -- forgets the theoretical possibility of neutrality. On the other hand, it may be that many of those who are offering the argument are actually attempting to make a practical, not a logical, distinction. If one wishes to make progress toward the good, then stopping along the way and calling oneself neutral is not morally permissible. Considerations of this kind and others, suggest that in the real world there can be no such thing as religious neutrality.[4]

III. IMPLICATIONS OF PARADIGM ONE

According to McKenzie, Christianity and Hinduism are religions, but atheism and secular humanism are not. Accordingly,

the teaching of Christianity in our public schools is prohibited by the principle of separation of church and state, but the teaching of atheism to our children is not thus prohibited. As McKenzie puts it: "secular humanism is most assuredly not a religion since it explicitly denies the transcendent. And thus it does not follow that if the public schools are teaching such a view that they are really teaching religion and hence violating separation of church and state." By such manner as this, our schools, then, would become religiously neutral.

According to the McKenzie paradigm, some who have been found by the court to be legitimate conscientious objectors would be judged illegitimate, since the basis of their conscientious objection was not religious in nature. Likewise, an organization of atheists which some might call religious and therefore entitled to certain tax breaks and other legal privileges, would not be entitled to such privileges according to McKenzie.

IV. IMPLICATIONS OF PARADIGM TWO

According to paradigm two, Christianity and Hinduism are religions, as may be atheism and secular humanism. Under this paradigm, to be a Christian one must not only claim to be a Christian but must be sincere in this claim; to be an atheist, one must not only claim to be an atheist but must be sincere in this claim. Brightman's "concern," "devotion," and "conduct" might be used in judging a claim of sincerity. An atheist, for example, might believe in the power of human reason -- hence "devotion towards a power or powers believed to originate, increase, and conserve" values regarded as supreme. Accordingly, a Christian who insincerely claims to be religious, is judged irreligious -- and an atheist who sincerely claims to be anti-religious, is judged religious. According to this paradigm, the teaching of Christianity in our public schools is prohibited by the principle of separation of church and state, as is the teaching of atheism.

According to this paradigm, separation of church and state (not religious neutrality) is the principle to be followed. Paradigm two would take seriously a wider range of conscientious objector cases than would paradigm one. Likewise, under paradigm two (but not under paradigm one), an organization of atheists might be judged religious and therefore entitled to all privileges due religious organizations under the law.

V. ANTI-CONCLUSION

I entitle this part of the presentation "anti-conclusion" simply because it would be presumptuous to draw a firm conclusion after exploring, in a cursory fashion, only two paradigms out of an indefinitely large number. I offer, then, only tentative conclusions or paraphronesical reflections at

this point in the ongoing dialogue. For reasons not here explored beyond the previous analysis, I find or "feel" that paradigm two is more plausible and just than paradigm one.

While both paradigms would, I believe, accept the distinction between teaching of religion and teaching about religion, the meaning of religion varies depending on the paradigm. Accordingly, it may be that paradigm two prohibits teaching of science, in favor of teaching about science. Ditto for the teaching of Americanism, one-worldism, and so on. If we continue to follow this train of thought further, then perhaps we uncover the enlightenment spirit I'll call critical toleration. Since paradigm two supports the principle of church-state separation, but not, in practice, the concept of religious neutrality, this perhaps allows the public school system to have a spirit of critical toleration as part of its "religious" (?) or philosophical base. Just as today it is sometimes said that America's "public religion" is secular humanism, in previous days the term used was Unitarianism. To the extent this observation may be correct, paradigm two agrees while disagreeing. Paradigm two does not support the concept of religious neutrality, yet it prohibits the teaching of Unitarianism and of secular humanism.

One final note. If compulsory public education is not to be totalitarian, then its role must be of limited scope. The separation of church and state is a kind of practical solution in an imperfect world, a world too often prone to intolerance, authoritarianism, and mistrust. In this context it seems crucial that public education be neither Christian nor anti-Christian, neither atheist nor anti-atheist. The public education of America's children is a kind of compulsory and partial education. Accordingly, self-education, informal education, non-compulsory education, religious instruction, and lifelong learning, rather than compulsory public education, must provide the bulk of America's educational experiment. Nevertheless, a crucial key to the learning society may be whether our system of public education succeeds or fails in leading its children, of every cultural and economic background, to experience intellectual pleasure and the genesis of self-education and lifelong learning. Perhaps, then, we shall yet become a society of learning communities composed of curious, critical, tolerant inquirers after the good, the true, the beautiful.

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1. I am grateful for the comments of Christopher J. Lucas on an earlier version of the present paper.

2. Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), xxiv.

3. Ibid., 60-67; and Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York, NY: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1985), 274-305.

4. See, for example, note three above. (According to Lyotard, page 65: "There is no reason to think that it would be possible to determine metaprescriptives common to all.")

THE PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICAN YOUTH REGARDING THEIR OWN AND FOREIGN RELIGIONS AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS

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The present investigation focuses upon religious and political myths and symbols and the role they play in creating and maintaining tolerance or pluralism. It was hoped that by examining the views of American children and youth, social studies educators might gain insight into the myths that are being perpetuated through our national culture and educational institutions. For although we often view the younger generation as creating certain changes, it is often the case that mere symbols are changing but the mythical themes they represent endure. Also, by distinguishing their more tolerant views of foreign peoples from their jingoistic and ethnocentric ones, we may understand which myths and symbols are potentially destructive and which ones are life-supporting.

What follows is a fledgling attempt to inquire into the international perceptions of American youth by utilizing a symbol-producing strategy. Jung's theory of symbol formation opened a treasure of possibilities for exploration, yet, aside from art and dream interpretation, his theory has not been applied to a variety of symbol-producing contexts. The importance of studying symbolic configurations is underscored by Jung in the following passage:

> When we attempt to understand symbols, we are not only confronted with the symbol itself, but we are brought up against the wholeness of the symbol-producing individual.[1]

Part of this search for individual perceptions of the modern world requires a recognition of the cultural myths that have been created and maintained for centuries. To further complicate matters, philosophers and anthropologists cannot agree on the relationship between individual and collective perceptions. For example, Jung cautions that dependence upon institutional and collective ideologies can be an impediment to the well-being of individuals. "The further we move away from the individual toward abstract ideas" about humankind,...the more consciousness will be influenced by prejudice and fantasy.[2] Dubos, by contrast, views the development of collective symbols as a positive means to distinguish and unite human beings. Yet, he feels that even more powerful than the urge for unity are the forces for differentiation. For him, "the phrase 'a god within' symbolizes...the force that creates private worlds out of the universal stuff of the cosmos and thus enables life to express itself in countless individualities."[3]

Please bear in mind that the following technique employed in the interviews with children was entirely foreign to them. It might be characterized as an open-ended technique that encourages the formation of an international gestalt. Our difficulty in recognizing these more abstract ways in which the young integrate their views of the world may be intensified by the peculiarities of the Occidental culture. Hall suggests that Western men and women are dominated by a linear system of thought and logic that has been with them since Socrates.[4] This mode of thinking encourages dichotomization, exclusion of the middle, and compartmentalization, thus leading to a denial of the part of the self that integrates experience.

In the interviews that follow you will see many abstract themes that are embedded in cultures throughout the world. The following questions reflect the timeless nature of human concerns. Questions such as: Do status levels imply levels of superiority and inferiority? Is religion a way to legitimize killing? Does hero worship bring about mass movements characterized by blind obedience to authority figures? Is mass destruction inevitable? The issues involved seem general enough to be applied to any culture, but the ramifications of these questions within one's own culture become difficult to examine when the set of symbols comprising one's world view are taken for granted. Through the art of living we embrace many myths that are not always brought to our consciousness. It is when the myths have been made explicit, however, that the assumptions underlying one's own symbol system are called to the fore.[5]

The results of the interviews will be presented through two approaches. First, a cultural profile of the eighteen children and youth will be described. Second, the case study of a thirteen-year old girl will be shared as a means of providing more depth to the process of integrating a view of the world that encompasses both religious and political

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myths and symbols. After discussing the relationship between the individual and the hope for a pluralistic world, implications for the social studies curriculum will be presented.

Collective Views of Other Nations

The symbol-producing context for the present inquiry was created by asking eighteen children and youth to individually select 20 nations, including the United States. The students ranged in age from nine to eighteen years, all middle class and Caucasian. Next, they were asked to make a spatial arrangement with the labeled discs, explaining the relationships among the discs and the meaning of the overall arrangement. The students were then asked to make a second arrangement to show how they would like to envision the relationships of the nations, again discussing the significance of their arrangements. Several students (19%) said they did not know why they arranged them in the way they did. However, most (81%) provided an organizing theme to their arrangement in agreement with Jung's theory of symbols as a means through which individuals make sense out of their experiences, a means through which they could tie together or conceptualize certain perceptions they had.

Arrangements among the young revealed not only their individual attempts to develop a coherent world view, but also recurring images under the influence of a national culture. This overlay becomes apparent when we examine the patterns that emerged from the children's discussions. An examination of the most frequently named nations yields obvious associations: our neighbors (Canada and Mexico), Western European influence (Italy, France, Great Britain, Spain), and nations that have dominated international scenes recently or historically (West Germany, Russia, Israel, Egypt, Iran, China, and Japan).

The presence of national images was also evidenced in a similar study in which adults were asked to complete the same symbol-producing tasks.[6] Both the participants in the adult study and the children and youth in this study most frequently named the same 14 nations. That is to say, between the two groups of respondents, the following 14, excluding the United States, were among the top 15 most frequently named nations: France, Russia, China, Mexico, Great Britain, Japan, Canada, West Germany, India, Italy, Brazil, Egypt, Iran, Israel and Spain. The adult descriptions also coincided with the previously mentioned themes, i.e., geographic neighbors, Western European influence, and nations that receive a great deal of attention by the media. Another way to understand better the nations salient in our views of the international community is to look at those that were not recognized by the children. Again when compared to the adults interviewed, some interesting parallels emerge: of the 78 nations not named by the adults, 64 (85%) were also not named by the children and youth. An examination of those not named suggests that island nations, small nations, communist nations, and African nations receive minimal attention within our national culture. Meanwhile, our collective images may be preoccupied with bigness, power, and attempts to remain distant from rivals such as communist nations.[7]

Analyzing these collective stereotypes within and among national images is crucial to a better understanding of our world community. Once we can establish certain national patterns, we have a basis from which to study the wide range of individual patterns within these shared stereotypes. While these individual perceptions make up the collective patterns, it is important to remember the latter's influences upon the former. As Dubos observed, our collective images are always complicated and often distorted by a universal tendency to symbolize experiences. He maintains that we respond to these symbolic distortions as if they were reality.[8]

When asked to describe their future arrangements, depicting how they would like to see relationships among nations, the children and youth revealed optimistic expectations, for the most part. Half the students expressed hopes for improving the economic conditions in poor countries and ameliorating the conflicting relationships among nations. Those who had some knowledge about the effects of nuclear war, however, expressed more cynical and pessimistic views. For example, one youth made a symbolic arrangement depicting an inevitable nuclear holocaust. Overall, the children's future images reflected a concern about international war and poverty. Nevertheless, their general optimism suggests that they have not given up hope for improving world affairs.

Escalona maintains that children's perception of adults and their social institutions as either weak or not involved with broader issues, such as the threat of nuclear extinction, poverty, or the loss of rain forests, has an effect upon their developing sense of self. In her speech given at a meeting of The Physicians for Social Responsibility, she said:

> ...[When] society conveys to children a picture of passive and evasive withdrawal, of fear of and belligerence toward other nations, and of not even trying to combat a host of evils both large and small--to that extent the effects of the nuclear peril upon us also affects the development of children. The adult response to ultimate danger is, to growing children, also the ultimate test of the trustworthiness of adult society.[9]

In summarizing the collective patterns derived from discussions with children and adults, we learn that cultural context plays a powerful role in defining images which the individual integrates into a view of the world. The recurring themes reflected our national culture that seems to emphasize attempts to become and maintain a powerful position among other nations. The discussions with children, coupled with other related studies, support the notion that collective or national images do indeed exist. Our concern is to examine the nature of these national images to identify those that are potentially destructive, as well as conducive, to humanitarian ends, for, to reiterate the words of Jung, these collective images or archetypes can create myths that lead the whole nation into a certain outlook and course of action.

Individual Myths and Symbols

Against the backdrop of the previously discussed collective images, we will now turn to the essence of the individual. Despite the collective images that may characterize a whole nation, the individual member selects only those that might fit with his or her world views. Dubos surmises that throughout history individuals have been trying to discover some universal basis for matter and for life, hence, the formation of collective images and their maintenance through the process of socialization.[10] Yet, he feels that the individual quest for meaning in the formation of an identity mobilizes the forces for differentiation. While the assumptions from which collective images are derived usually remain stable over a long period of time, they are not unchangeable and, hence, are open to considered choice. If we choose to rely on collective rhetoric without the consideration of internal or psychological implications, the significance of individuals could become slighted or obliterated.

While discussing their association with other countries, the children and youth expressed varying degrees of accepting and jingoistic views of other peoples. Some of the mythical associations relayed by the children were freedom, communism, war, peace, equality, class/caste, and more generally, an in-group/out-group orientation. In certain cases their individual views reinforced or confirmed some of the collective images. In others, the dominant national myths were not adopted, or clearly rejected. The valuative process demonstrates the human striving for differentiation. That is, while the children's international perceptions could not be formed without a national culture, it cannot be assumed that each child blindly and blithely reproduces the collective myths and symbols.

The perceptions of Janet, the fictitious name of a 13-year old girl living in Virginia, will be examined as an example of the selective way in which the individual develops a view of the world. Janet's images of the international community were detailed and vivid. Even though the details were occasionally somewhat confused or "factually" incorrect, it is still possible to examine how she is creating a private world out of the "universal stuff" of the cosmos. While specific labels, dates, and the like may readily change to fit the situation, the myths themselves seem to be far more stable across times and places.

Universal Themes. Janet's account of the origins of Buddhism shows several myths in historical and contemporary societies:

> China is where the Buddhist religion was started in A.D., or was it B.C., by Mohammed and he was a preacher of the gods, I think, or a preacher of god, and he spread it to other lands. He was called the wise one or the Buddha. They all looked up to Mohammed as a god. And Mohammed was born with a lot of riches. He was real rich and in those days...you stayed with the rich all your life. You couldn't talk to the poor..[or]...middle classes. They thought that was a good way...He got tired of this after awhile so he escaped from his castle and said that he was going to find the teaching of life. So he went off and acted like a peddlar. He was taught what the real, true meaning of life is. I can't remember what it was, but it said in the book. He died in 580 and he was born in 450. He spread the religion, but after he died there was a holy war to spread this religion; it was between China and Japan. It wasn't like killing, it was sort of killing to take over so that they would teach right--the religion. [Killing but not killing?] Well, in some parts there were killings and massacres, really killing, killing because they wanted the religion to get

> across. But in some parts they just wanted control; they were having peace treaties, not peace treaties, but whatever they called them back then.[11]

From Janet's descriptions we can first see the way historical accounts often take on legendary qualities, showing how the personal meaning is not felt by the person now telling the "story." Hearing the "tales" hundreds of years after their creation may make them seem unreal to us but, in most cases, the stories are tied to some actual events. For the Chinese and Japanese during the fifth century, the rendition would probably not have "story-like" qualities, rather what we now call a legend was their way of life.

Several myths may be identified in the story, whose universal qualities are not confined to a given time period. One is the status myth that describes class or caste distinctions. The term class is commonly used in our culture to identify the styles of life of people based mostly on economic levels, while the word, caste, comes to mind when we think of countries like India. Although we tend to think of caste as a more rigid way of separating groups of people than class, the process of making distinctions is probably very similar in practice. So, regardless of the particular way in which varied status levels are designated, we may say that status myths and symbols emerge among all cultures as a way to make distinctions and explain differences among individuals.

There are, among the various status myths, those that describe individuals who choose to change their original status. The life in question of Buddha is an example wherein he chose to lead a "good" life by renouncing a life in pursuit of material wealth or power. Interestingly, our culture does not seem to acclaim such individuals as heroes. Instead, it boasts of the Horatio Alger tradition, claiming that, irrespective of the economic conditions into which one may be born, every individual in the United States has the opportunity to rise to a higher class. Here the emphasis is upon upward mobility, suggesting that the higher one goes on the economic ladder, the higher is one's status level.

Another theme found in Janet's account of the Buddhist religion is the myth that rationalizes killing for the dissemination of the so-called better life--a contradiction that has continued to characterize many wars. The words used by Janet to describe the holy wars reveal the way in which killing others can take on a tone of acceptance or legitimation, killing, but not killing: "It wasn't like killing, it was sort of killing to take over so that they would teach right--the religion." The process of dehumanizing the "enemy" takes many forms, one of which is described by Hoffer. One needs to achieve some kind of detachment or "make-believe in order to face death unflinchingly....It is one of the main tasks of a real leader to mask the grim reality of dying and killing by evoking in his followers the illusion that they are participating in a grandiose spectacle, a solemn or lighthearted dramatic performance."[12] Attaching negative qualities to differences among peoples is another way to polarize and dehumanize.

Religious affiliation. Contemporary religious affiliation in the affairs of nations received minor attention. One exception was an eleven year-old who paired Israel and Poland.

> They are both very similar; both are Catholic and go to church a lot. Poland has the pope and Israel, well, Jesus was born there. That is why I paired them. They are small and they are both Christian. I think that they get along good because they are both small and go to church a lot.[13]

The children's inattention to the influence of organized religions is perhaps a reflection of what Purpel refers to as "the moral and spiritual crisis in education."[14] With the help of the 1987 ASCD report entitled, "Religion in the Curriculum" and the recent issue of Social Education, edited by Charles Haynes, educators have become better informed about the blind spot regarding religion in the curriculum.[15] According to Haynes, the question for social studies teachers is shifting from, "Should I teach about religion? to What should I teach about religion, and how should I do it?"[16] While these questions certainly encourage the schools to do something about the absence of religion, it is necessary to add several important questions to this inquiry: How does a teacher teach about religion while separating the teaching of religion? According to Fromm, it is possible to differentiate between religiousness and religion if one attempts to separate the existential quest of the individual from the history of organized religions.

> I have said that man is asked a question by the very fact of his existence, and that this is a question raised by the contradiction within himself--that of being in nature and at the same time of transcending nature by the fact that he is life aware of itself. Any man who listens to this question posed to him, and who makes it a matter of "ultimate concern" to answer this question, and to answer it as a whole man and not only by thoughts, is a "religious" man; and all systems that try to give, teach, and transmit such answers are

> "religions." On the other hand, any man--and any culture--that tries to be deaf to the existential question is irreligious.[17]

Fromm goes on to say that twentieth century humankind (not just the curriculum) is deaf to the question of existence and that we "evade the question by concern with property, prestige, power, production, fun, and, ultimately, by trying to forget that we--that I-- exist."[18] According to Fromm, regardless of how much one believes in religious ideas, if the individual is deaf to the existential question, "What is the essence of my purposeful being?", he or she is marking time. "He thinks of God, instead of experiencing being God."[19] Before discussing the implications of these underlying cultural conditions for teaching and learning, it is important to identify ways in which political orientations, like religious beliefs, can polarize individuals.

Polarization and jingoism. Our tendency to compartmentalize images of others and their lifestyles leads to more rigid interpretations of acceptable or unacceptable ways of life. In fact, the emphasis upon certain polarizations is a technique that can reinforce intolerance and jingoism. An example of this can be found in the children's myths of communism and freedom. Technically, these are not "true" polarizations. Freedom is not the converse or opposite of communism. However, throughout the children's discussions freedom was used to describe a form of government that was contrasted with communism. Generally, communism was paired with "bad" qualities such as oppression and Nazi Germany. The United States was characterized as a free and "good" nation.

In Janet's next passage we will see additional mythical themes that attribute negative qualities to and intensify differences among peoples.

> Then I go to USSR. It is communist; I think it is. I heard it is communist and they have very strict, harsh rules. There is a hard-ruling government. And Germany, I put right diagonally under USSR, because Germany and USSR are both communist countries so I thought they were together. During the war they had the Nazi party and in wartime, Germany wanted to rule all of Europe and Asia and also Germany. Hitler, he was one of the main leaders, he rose up hatred against the Jews. A lot of Jews were sent to concentration camps. And in concentration camps you usually die because they have like skillets where they torture them. It is really awful. We saw a couple of movies on that this summer. There is a part of Germany, I am not sure which, one part is more modern than the other. And one part is the bad part, it has walls, the Berlin Wall. East Berlin? West Berlin? East Berlin divides East Germany and West Germany. East Germany is very rich. It is a very modern type land and you always want to go there if you are a tourist. But you don't want to go to West Berlin. You have to have certain passports to go to West Berlin. West Berlin is real awful, I mean there is like guards. It is a real dreary place. They live in the past. They don't live in the present. In Germany they were guarded because they were communist. And I think in East Germany they are republic. And the U.K. is a republic. They had different ways and they didn't want people coming in because they would figure that you were a spy or something. So it is very hard to get into West Berlin. [When you say republic, what does that mean to you?] Republic is when you are learning your free government, freedom of a way to vote. Republic is more open, more discussed. You have the freedom to do things that you can't do when you are a communist. Communists--you don't have the freedom to vote and don't have the freedom of speech like you do if you are a republican.[20]

We can see from Janet's passage that the United States, Great Britain and other "republican" nations are characterized as free and good. People who live in communist countries are presumably politically oppressed, and do bad things. Through this process of attributing alien qualities to people, and isolating them or keeping them at a distance, many groups have historically committed mass executions and destruction. Hoffer cautions that jingoistic sentiments, such as the myths revealed by the children in this study, are potentially dangerous: "Actually, it is the unification set in motion by these enthusiasms, rather than the manipulations of a scheming leadership, that transmutes noble impulses into a reality of hatred and violence."[21]

War and peace. War and peace appeared to be the most sensitive topics to the children and youth. War was often seen as a scourge of the past and present, and peace an ideal for the future. As seen for Janet, war was associated with the spread of Buddhism in China and Japan, with Iran when the Shah was overthrown, and with Nazi Germany. In several instances, children's images of war were tied to the United States involvement in Vietnam. When given a chance to express their fears, children reveal genuine concerns about how they feel living amidst the imminent possibility of warfare. The children's images of war expressed both remorse at the thought of being involved in war and disgust at

the way in which one human could kill another. One myth that we as adults might be harboring is the assumption that children should be spared or are protected from such feelings of anxiety. Increasingly numerous examples of the myth of the happy childhood are found in research, for example, on the way in which the threat of war affects the mental health of children and youth. Research is finding that growing up with knowledge of previous genocides as well as annihilation is having adverse consequences upon our youth's expectations of a life for the future--near and far.[22] When our national imagery about the "evil" nature of certain foreign countries intensifies, we can no longer pretend that our children's mental health is not being affected. The fact that none of the children mentioned peace-making individuals from within the United States is perhaps indicative of our national character. At their beginnings, mass movements--whether for a new philosophy, artistic doctrine, nation-state, or nuclear disarmament--are usually identified with a few heroes.[23] Such movements "need heroes to symbolize their genius and serve as models of behavior".[24]

Future orientations. Typically when discussing the second task the nations were symbolically more integrated. That is, the children's interpretations revealed more unifying themes. Janet discussed her future images in the following passage.

> I made the United States in the middle because the United States is a free country and the United States is a republic. It is a free country and it seems like today, immigrants are coming to the United States because they want freedom, so I made the United States in the middle and I made England on the side because England and the United States get along pretty well....If I had my way, USSR would be a republic because it is communist and I would [make] their ways the same as, all countries the same, not their trade but all would be a republic. Because it seems like we are fighting a lot for territory or land and we have different ways and people are fighting for different reasons and if I had my way it would stop, it would all come to an end. Nobody would be fighting, nobody would be dying of malnutrition, they would all be treated the same.
>
> I always pictured Poland right next to the USSR and Germany also. In Germany I wouldn't have a secret party going around finding....I would have freedom of speech in every country. And also because people are treated unfairly in USSR and Germany. Their education they could have the way they are, but not their government. In every country the government would be the same, but they could have their different customs, they wouldn't have to speak English or anything. Iran--their government is communist I am pretty sure. But I would have their ways different, like I wouldn't make women wear veils and I would be against the, Khomeni, I wouldn't want to invent things that would be bad for the air and pollution so that the air would smell better and be better for the birds and everything. Iceland--I wouldn't have as a place to hold prisoners. I would change the position of the sun. Korea and Czechoslovakia--I would change malnutrition and I would have a food supply there for ways to build houses and how to farm, USSR doesn't get along with anyone really. It is like its own government and land. But I make them get along together because Czechoslovakia gets along with Poland alright. [Which ones are now a republic?] United Kingdom, England, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Spain, France, Japan, China, Egypt, Iceland. [Communist?] Korea, Czechoslovakia, USSR, Poland, Germany, Hungary, Iran.[25]

In Janet's hopes for the future we can see a strong conviction toward bringing peace to the international community. However, her means to this end--doing away with communism--reveals the impasse encountered when solutions take the form of imposing one's own symbol system upon others. Through her candor, Janet has provided us with the symbols and myths that comprise her view of the world. From the "stories" she has collected and the events she has heard about or experienced, she has learned that her world, past and present, is made up of many different people who have as many different life styles. For Janet, these life styles include degrees of poverty and wealth, levels of status, cooperative and conflicting relationships, ways of distinguishing individuals, unifying themes such as religion and political ideology, and elaborate rationalizations for killing. From listening to her stories of other peoples, it is easy to raise questions and make judgments about their alleged moral character. More difficult, however, is recognizing how the norms and values in one's own culture might appear somewhat abhorrent to others.

Most of the interviewees' remarks reveal a hopeful link between present perceptions and hopes for the future. The general level of hope and optimism suggests that they have not given up the possibility of improving the world. Given the overwhelming presence of nationalism in their views of the present, it seems quite remarkable that the children interviewed remained optimistic. This means, perhaps, that, even though the world is now locked into a system of international politics which operates on the imperatives of nationalism and the nation state system, there are young people who would like the future to be different. Ascertaining how to transform these international perceptions based on nationalism into truly international pluralism is the task remaining.[26]

Implications for Curriculum and Instruction

Historically, education was designed to serve the ends of the dominant religious forces, to inculcate "the faith" and to insure its continuation. As the nation state replaced religion as a dominant force in the world, this function was inevitably secularized and transferred to the state. Education thus became the inseparable adjunct of the state. While it is common for most ideologies to be tied to a particular state, tribe, groups, or nation, the rights of individuals--or human rights--represents an idea that is growing in world wide acceptance.[27] Even though it is far more common to learn the Declaration of Independence or the Preamble to the Constitution than the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the time has come for the social studies curriculum to reassemble its priorities.[28] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, comprised of thirty articles, offers many principles for teaching tolerance and pluralism.

Articles 18 and 26 have particular relevance to the present discussion. Article 18 states: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.[29] Article 26 states: "(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance, and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.[30]

Given our pioneering heritage, Americans tend to focus on innovation and change. Yet, we sometimes delude ourselves by thinking that if we attach a new label to a phenomenon or process, we have identified it for the first time. These short-term illusions have less to do with memory than with the way words and symbols shape our views of the world. The words or symbols may change but the underlying mythical themes remain the same. For example, when thinking about selecting Janet as the case study because she presented a good mix between political and religious sentiments, I was initially reluctant because some of her reported events are somewhat dated. With Gorbachev opening up the Soviet Union and the general decline in popularity of communism, Janet's remarks might be interpreted as no longer relevant. I don't really believe that this is the case. In fact, recent events seem to have reinforced the mythical themes that reflect the United States' preoccupation with power. Many Americans are viewing the changes among communist countries as a way to reinforce the "rightness" of their own thinking, and in a sense, have limited the scope of pluralism in our world views. Rather than viewing communism as a political and economic theory whose implementation may or may not have succeeded in certain countries, some Americans are saying, "We were right and they were wrong." This dichotomy was made even more explicit when talking to a teacher who was describing the changes in her high school's curriculum after the events in Tiennaman Square. She said that the events in Tiennaman Square juxtaposed with glasnost and perestroika have brought about dramatic shifts in the way students study China and the Soviet Union. Suddenly, the Soviet Union has become one of our friends and China has taken the Communist enemy hot seat. How quickly the mythical polarization remained intact. If you combine these events with the events in the Persian Gulf additional mythical themes are reinforced. When political leaders mobilize their populations with military force, one of the first steps in justifying their actions is to discredit the foreign leaders and way of life of the so-called "enemy." Thus, given the contemporary scene, it doesn't appear that the values embedded in our culture have changed. Perhaps, this is why bridging the gap between religions and political ideologies is so crucial at this time.

In closing, it is true that the schools can contribute greatly to our knowledge about other cultures, more so than they have done in the past. Yet, as the children and youth interviewed in this study revealed, additional stories, legends, or factual knowledge is only a first step in learning about relationships among people. Without addressing the moral and spiritual ramifications of cultural differences in an international context, whether they are political or religious differences, educators are merely presenting the world in a very detached manner. Asking students to articulate and act upon the implications of these cultural differences for individuals who need to coexist in an international community is the necessary next step. For the meaning of such knowledge is defined only by the existential manner in which individuals act upon the question. These actions can take on a political or spiritual quest, but according to Fromm either route might be characterized as religious because the actions represent the act of being. Thus, while our social institutions may be able to separate church and state in a legal sense, in reality, church and state can never be separated in the context of an existential quest. Through the socialization process, the individual selectively integrates cultural phenomena. This paradox truly creates tremendous challenges for educators, professionals and parents.

A major challenge is to assess and broaden the extent to which we are helping the attainment of humanitarian images. Are we, instead, perpetuating a national ideology that encourages human alienation? In order to address these concerns, we must first look within ourselves to determine how our role can foster a more humane future for children and youth. Where children and youth are exposed to adults whose efforts are devoted to humanitarian goals there is greater hope for a future environment and their role in it. The challenge becomes, therefore, an existential quest for western humankind to rekindle the fires of religious "being", not merely the infusion of academic courses or religious and political systems throughout the world. When teachers spotlight the pluralism that envelopes their classroom, nation and world community as a means to exemplify the universal rights of individuals, our children and youth will learn to appreciate the value of human life first over the perpetuation of collective ideologies.

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RESPONSE TO "THE PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICAN YOUTH REGARDING THEIR OWN AND FOREIGN RELIGIONS AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS"

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In responding to the thought-provoking paper shared with us by Professor McEachron-Hirsch, we find that we are drawn, not to the premise or to the conclusions, but to the process by which those conclusions were reached. We agree that there probably are collective national patterns that can be identified; however, we are not as certain that those patterns have been validly identified here.

It is readily apparent that Professor McEachron-Hirsch has "lived" for some time with the ideas she explores in this paper. Indeed, the interviews and studies cited span an eleven-year period, and the conviction with which she writes is resoundingly sincere. Obviously, she knows her topic well. Because we were not present in the formulative stages of this study, though, we are puzzled as to the reasoning that led her to use a clinical field study of a relatively small, homogeneous sample to represent a large, non-homogeneous population; to omit acknowledgement of the effects of environment on beliefs; and to collectively report responses from youth ranging in age from nine to eighteen.

Our first concern is not only with the size of the sample studied but also with the apparent homogeneous nature of the youths. For this study, interviews were conducted with a group of eighteen middle class, Caucasian youths, aged nine to eighteen. The time span of the interviews was not given. In addition, excerpts were given from case studies of an eleven year-old and a thirteen-year-old. Can the views of these twenty youths truly represent "American youth"?

Although eminent researchers such as Anna Freud and Robert Coles advocate the use of clinical observation to analyze the facets of everyday life, they do so with not a few reservations. For, as Coles notes, the clinical field study involves substantial risks not found with "objective" research. While the well-constructed questionnaire inhibits researcher bias, the clinical field study, by its nature, is wholly subjective. The burden on the clinical observer/researcher, then, is to construct the boundaries of the study with extreme care, paying close attention to the size and background of the group as well as to the length of the study. As he writes,

> . . . If we are to try to understand the significance of one element of consciousness, then we need to do what Miss Freud suggests: put in our fair share of time with some children, at least--enough boys and girls (who come from different enough backgrounds) to give us a sense of whether such an issue as the nuclear bomb affects them, and if so, how often, and under what circumstances. It is context that matters--the significance of *this* matter compared with *that* one in the child's life. . . . To obtain this kind of information requires rather long involvement with children--"direct observation," sustained over the years.[1]

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Our second concern is with the relationship of environment to beliefs. If, as Jerome Bruner asserts, "Learning is not simply the kid operating solo in a random environment. . . . Learning is being part of a society," [2] then a person must be viewed in the context of his circumstances, considering fully the individuals with whom that person interacts, the beliefs those individuals hold, and the degree of interaction between the person and his environment.

While it is entirely possible that, in this study, the environment was found to be a negligible factor in the responses, we have no way of knowing. As the issue was not addressed, we find that we would very much like to know more about the backgrounds of the youth involved in the group study as well as those of the two case studies. (What type of schools did they attend? Inner city? Private? Parochial? To what extent did they seek active involvement with the world around them? How politically active were their parents? How religiously active? Environmentally active?) If the youths' responses *were* analyzed in light of their environments, what was the outcome?

The third area we would like to look more closely at is that of collectively reporting the responses of the youths in the group study. To say "Several students (19%)" and "most (81%)" does not allow sufficiently for differences in perception due to the ages of the respondents, which in this case range from age nine to age eighteen.

For more than forty years cognitive growth has been a topic of intense research, and the universality of cognitive stages has been, for the most part, upheld through many cross-cultural studies. Although we certainly could not say that a child or youth will understand a given concept at a particular age, we can identify awareness trends within age groupings. As seen in studies by Piaget, the thought processes of the child differ greatly from those of the adolescent:

> A study of the concept of nationality and the associated social attitudes has shown us that the child is sensitive to his family, to his place of residence, to his native language, to certain customs, etc., but that he preserves both an astonishing degree of ignorance and a striking insensitivity not only to his own designation or that of his associates as Swiss, French, etc.,but toward his own country as a collective reality. This is to be expected, since in the 7-11-year-old child, logic is applied only to concrete or manipulable objects. There is no operation available at this level which goes beyond the empirically given. The notions of humanity, social justice . . . , freedom of conscience, civic or intellectual courage, and so forth, like the idea of nationality, are ideals which profoundly influence the adolescent's affective life; but with the child's mentality, except for certain individual glimpses, they can neither be understood nor felt. [3]

Gesell goes a step further and provides a generalized cognitive description at each age from ten to sixteen. With regard to religion and ideas of a deity, a vast difference is shown in the thinking between children who are ten and adolescents who are sixteen. While at age ten, many "are still strongly influenced by the concepts of their parents and the religious culture they have come in contact with," by sixteen many "are finding their way into their own religious reality." [4]

The foregoing three areas aside, Professor McEachron-Hirsch has given us much to consider with this study. Could it be that we really are "perpetuating a national ideology that encourages human alienation?" Very possibly. Carl Rogers certainly thinks so. And her call for an "existential quest" clearly echoes his thoughts. He envisions (admittedly, an idealistic vision) a world in which there is no longer *"a"* reality. In its place, he sees a society which "would be based not on a blind commitment to a cause or creed or view of reality, but on a common commitment to each other as rightfully separate persons, with separate realities."[5] The classroom is a good place to start.

NOTES

1. Robert Coles, The Moral Life of Children (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986), 250.
2. Jonathan Miller, States of Mind (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), 41.
3. Howard E. Gruber and J. Jacques Vonech, eds., The Essential Piaget (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 442-443.
4. Arnold Gesell, Frances L. Ilg, and Louise B. Ames, Youth: The Years from Ten to Sixteen (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), 64, 273.
5. Carl R. Rogers, A Way of Being (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1980), 105.

RELIGION IN THE SCHOOLS

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Should religion be taught in the schools? There are unexceptionable answers to this question and highly controverted ones. Certainly religion should be taught in independent and parochial schools choosing to include such a subject in their curriculum. So we ask, should religion be taught in the public schools? Here too there are relatively uncontroversial answers to this question. Certainly religion should be taught as a component of other courses. The history of the United States would be unintelligible without some attention to religious experience. Thomas Jefferson wanted to be remembered as the author of the Virginia Statute on Religious Liberty. It would be nonsensical to ignore this point on the grounds that religion should not be taught in the schools. More topically, could we make any sense out of World War II without some reference to the Holocaust? But how could this be taught without reference to Judaism? Religion, then, has to be taught as an element of a rich curriculum, even in the public schools.

But what about teaching a course in religion itself, supposing that there was enough time in the day to add such a subject to an already full curriculum? Here again there seems to be an unremarkable answer to this question. Surely we can, and where possible ought to, teach a course where the manifold dimensions of the religious experience are treated. So the history of religion, its sociology, its philosophical and psychological ramifications, descriptive treatments of comparative religion, all of these are areas subject to knowledge claims, and certainly none of them is a priori excludable from a public school curriculum. Any area professing to teach <u>about</u> religion can be included within a public school curriculum.

So we ask again: but teaching <u>about</u> religion is not the same as teaching religion.[1] In the former case we may say knowledge is the issue. In the latter case some commitment is at stake. This is not to say that religion does not profess truth claims, but that, in addition to those claims, some commitment to their truth is involved. Analogously, in matters of aesthetic and moral values, some commitment is likewise necessarily present. Some engagement of the affective dimension of the mind is present in art and morality that is significantly different from ordinary knowledge claims. May we then teach commitment to some religious position in the public schools? We come at this point somewhat closer to an adequate statement of the question. It may help if we begin by making some claims about moral education in general in a public school setting, then discuss religion itself, concluding with a consideration of the appropriate mode of teaching values, including religious values. I shall illustrate this instructional mode with some excerpts from the Philosophy for Children program. I believe this program presents us with a model of how such

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questions should be taught in any school setting, including the public one. In this discussion I shall try to be sensitive to the points where religious values have important disanalogies with other values, particularly moral ones.

Should moral values be taught in the public schools? Again in all the unobjectionable ways mentioned above, the answer is surely yes. But it is the sense of commitment that interests us. Should we teach values in such a way that our students will come to have them, or will modify values they previously held, or reinforce such values? It may be helpful to think of the things we expect our teachers to profess. Certainly we expect them to have a lively respect for the truth. Truth is a value in the schools, certainly. We expect our teachers to know certain things to teach them faithfully. Errors in subject mastery are rarely held up to some deficiency in a teacher's truthfulness. We do not expect them to be tempted to lie about quadratic equations or grammar. When errors occur in such topics, we assume ignorance, not mendacity. So with our students. We presuppose a healthy regard for the truth among them just as much as among our teachers. This is not to say that we propose dogmatism in instruction. A healthy skepticism is part of the truth. Teaching the truth includes teaching when to doubt intelligently. Truthfulness, then, is a value and we expect it to be taught in the schools, at least in the sense of being reinforced.

Other moral values are equally instructive. Here too we tend to overlook some obvious if unspoken points. For instance the kind of respect for truth we spoke of earlier is a moral value which can be subsumed under a moral general value of honesty. So we expect our teachers and our students not to lie. All forms of cheating are forbidden in the schools. Not only this, but the public school has a set of special values consonant with its role in a democratic society. So we are expected to respect differences of opinion, to tolerate disagreement, to cherish persons, to be fair in the distribution of educational resources. Surely these values, all of them moral values, belong in the schools. They "come with the territory"[2] and deserve reinforcement and inculcation where they are deficient or wanting.

All of this, I take it, is likewise uncontroversial, although there can be problematic situations, and although all these values require clear articulation. What about the conflicting values and value-systems common in society and mirrored in the lives of all school personnel, faculty and students? What about sex education in the schools (as a moral matter, not as a merely medical or biological matter)? What about other controversial issues, ethics of war and peace, euthanasia, abortion? What about the exceptionally difficult cases where moral values are a function of religious commitment? First of all, it should be obvious from what has been said already that no easy way can be devised to exclude such issues from scholastic treatment. Values, including moral values, are the stock in trade of the schools. This is a correlate of a more general philosophical position that the concept of a value-free experience is a bit of abstractionist mythology. We might go farther and suggest that the concept of moral value as a "total paradigm"[3] of education is as valid as the claim that the schools exist for the sake of transmitting

knowledge and intellectual skills. The "total paradigm" of school is some inseparable union of knowledge and value. At any rate, simply to claim that values belong in the church or in the family is false to what the schools in fact do and to what they ought to do. The facile exclusion of controversy is likewise impossible. Controversies change with the weather. What is controversial to one individual may not be to another. It seems then that no simple formula can be devised that will serve the purpose of excluding values from a school setting.

Rather it seems to me that the correct management of controversial values within a school setting ought to be our goal, not simply deciding whether or not they should be there. At this point some theory of teaching and learning is essential. Obviously we can only outline such a theory, and we must keep it focused on the issues before us. Basically we can distinguish several modes of instruction in any subject area, played out on a kind of model of determination: thus we can distinguish teaching, indoctrination, conditioning, brainwashing (and hypnotism too, for that matter!) from the lightest "take it or leave it" approach to a thorough-going response-mechanism approach. While we may take it that only teaching is appropriate to the school, where teaching is understood as offering the opportunity to learn, in a properly rational fashion, it is important to notice that moral education usually involves some kind of habit-formation, possibly compatible with indoctrination and conditioning. (I take it that brainwashing techniques, including some techniques employed by religious cults, are always out of place in the schools.) Some writers distinguish "interventionist" from "libertarian" approaches to moral instruction, packing a subsoil of absolute convictions and moral dogmas into the former methodology, and focussing on a more relativistic, values clarification approach in the latter.[4]

I think a chapter can be borrowed from the critical thinking movement in approaching the issue of values instruction in the schools, especially moral values. "Critical thinking" is itself a term needing much analysis. I shall satisfy myself in this paper by stipulating a somewhat rich and large definition of the term, stressing its etymology. Critical thinking is good judgment. This is not to claim so restrictive a notion as to exclude clear conceptualization and good reasoning. But it is intended to stress the soundness of our judgments, soundness resting upon adequate standards and rich personal experience. Critical thinking is less a matter of 'critique' than it is a matter of 'criteria.' One advantage of taking this "phronetic" (to coin a term) approach to critical thinking is that it draws with it a rich set of axiological considerations. It becomes less John McPeck's "reflective skepticism" and more a matter of "justified" thinking, where 'justified' suggests again an etymology of "making just." My claim then is that moral education can be pursued in a mode of "critical thinking" because I understand critical thinking as itself already value-laden. A person cannot think critically without practical wisdom, and practical wisdom entails moral values. It also entails some public determination of the standards of good judgment. The social relationships necessary to the educational experience are also necessary to the formation of such public wisdom (or 'political phronesis,' to use Aristotle's term. Even if one should wish to stress a less value-laden approach to the

term 'critical,' incidentally, it is still the case that the word signifies generally in its history, a midway between dogmatism and skepticism. It also invariably implies in its common philological employment, the notion of improvement. Critical thinking then is always associated with a meliorist project, the betterment of the mind. It is optimistic and progressive, and, as such, offers the best chances for a full and humane moral growth.

It seems to me that values can and ought to be taught in the schools in a critical mode, one where the values are subjected to a rational, constructively skeptical, analysis, where the teacher takes a Socratic stance, assisting the child both to articulate her or his moral position, and to offer the strongest reasons for believing it. The rhetoric of such a classroom ought to be dialogical,[5] and the teacher, while entitled to her beliefs, ought rarely to impose them upon her students (I make an exception, based on my experience with teachers of some disadvantaged students, where the child comes from a radically dysfunctional home environment). The home and the church continue to be the primary value-creating institutions in society. But the school plays the essential role of serving as a clearing-house of values, where they are tested by the kinds of opposition found in a rich social setting.

The irritated listener (or reader) will by now object at least that this analysis does not deal with moral issues where controversy is hot, especially with those values which intersect with religious belief. Furthermore when will I get to the topic, <u>religious</u> education? It certainly is time to examine some disanalogies between moral and religious education. We can do so in terms of our "rich" critical thinking model. Religious opinion, it will be argued, is beyond all critical analysis and evaluation. Whatever similarities may exist between religious and moral values, it is certainly the case that much religious dogma is beyond any form of rational scrutiny. That is to say, its content dictates a mode of instruction necessarily interventionist. Factual or quasi-factual claims such as those concerning the Trinity or the Virgin Birth baffle the mind. They may be "candidates for knowledge," knowable to <u>some</u> mind. But they are beyond <u>our</u> minds. Even where a creed will insist on few such dogmas, very few creeds exclude all such dogmas. Some religious instruction then will not submit to the critical model, the model of rational inquiry. Such dogmas then are not fit for teaching, so much as for indoctrination or conditioning. In the area of moral theology, the situation is somewhat less mysterious, in one sense, although more hotly controverted. So, for instance, the Catholic Church has consistently held (with Thomas Aquinas) that the bedrock of its moral position lies in nature (Thomas Aquinas in fact held that the Ten Commandments are all matters of natural law; they needed revelation only because of the hardness of the human heart). But, even here, the Church has arrogated to itself a kind of custodianship of nature itself, so that, for instance, in matters of contraception or abortion, the Church becomes the proper teacher of what is natural. (This is hard for many, both within and without the Church; it introduces an additional element of mystery into ethics, where there is already enough of it!)

Another way of saying this is that a rich conception of critical thinking involves the willingness to be in error about the issue critically thought about. This is why critical thinking comes close to philosophy. Both emphasize the search for the truth and a persistent hesitation over its achievement. Religion, on the other hand, stresses, in creedal formulae especially, the achievement of the truth, not the quest for it. Faith is a gift, however much we may prepare the way for its reception by earnest inquiry. I take this as an important difference between moral values and religious ones, except where the moral value is itself revealed. So, for instance, humility, it was argued by the Stoics, was an irrational ideal, and by the Peripatetics, it was argued that it involved a deficiency of justifiable self-esteem. Augustine, on the other hand, made it the cornerstone of the City of God.[6] It is also arguable that moral values have a closer connection with religious ones than might first appear, especially if one holds a form of non-cognitivist meta-ethics, where rational or "scientific" methods are irrelevant to moral judgment. Discussion of this point would take us too far afield.

Ethics aside, most religious creeds, including the higher religions, contain some element of mystery beyond normal powers of rationality. They require a revelation, and a prophetic stance rather than a Socratic one (where Socrates is not in one of his ecstasies). What are we to do with such opinion? It is tempting to say, simply exclude it. Schools need not teach everything. They are not general purpose institutions. Religious faith should be left up to families and churches, and passed over in the schools. A public school may be necessarily a secular school. This is not an attractive alternative. First of all, it will be extremely difficult to teach <u>about</u> religion, still, I think, an unexceptionable practice, without allowing students to raise questions about the truth or falsity of the religion being discussed. Moreover, the exclusion of such discussion will have to be itself rigid and doctrinaire, a questionable posture for a school in a democratic society.

My suggestion would be twofold: First of all we might distinguish theory from practice, and permit the teaching of religion in schools, without allowing its practice. Thus an open reflective analysis of religious belief may be appropriate in a school setting, but all religious practices, including silent prayer, ought to be excluded. We may be required to behave morally in schools, but we should not be required (or allowed) to practice our religion. This suggestion is made with some misgivings. The dichotomy of theory and practice may not be possible in religion. What does it mean to believe a religious dogma if not to profess it, a kind of practice. Furthermore, if we are to test or assess religious commitment as a scholastic curricular area, must we not do so by observing practice? But at least we can reasonably exclude from the schools more formal kinds of practice, liturgical practices for instance.

Another suggestion will be to insist that the teacher not impose her religious belief on children. I have misgivings here as well. Not only will this require the utmost civility and tact, but it may be impossible to teach religion without a certain commitment. Some will say, for an atheist to teach Christianity will be simply absurd.

Certain fundamentalists would find it impossible to tolerate opposed positions. For them to help children articulate their opposed positions may seem to them irreligious. Finally there is the continued and disturbing fact that almost all religion contains some unintelligible mystery. "Teaching" such mystery involves a doctrinaire approach. Translating this into classroom practice can involve the teacher in a series of conflicting dogmatic postures, the net effect of which may be to introduce skepticism into the classroom, just the thing a truly critical teacher would want to avoid.

It seems unavoidable that certain extreme forms of religious experience will be permanently out of place in the public schools, cults, for example, superstition, and certain extreme fundamentalist postures. The public school is still theoretically a place where fundamental differences of opinion are tolerated. It is a "liberal" institution. No one ought to be excluded from a public education because of her or his religious beliefs. Nor should anyone's religious creed be maligned in a public school setting. But it seems that certain forms of religious belief involve necessarily an intolerance for opposed opinion, such that teaching such a creed entails <u>not</u> teaching alternative positions. It strikes me that teaching such religious positions in a school setting runs counter to the more fundamental moral and social ideal of toleration and pluralism, and can justifiably be excluded from a public school curriculum.

Should religion be taught in public schools? My conclusion is a hesitant affirmative. More is to be lost by excluding religion from the schools than by including it, however problematical including it may be. Education of the whole child has long been a cherished American educational ideal. Training of the intellectual faculties, preparation for the marketplace, and socialization into a prevailing social and political system have all been looked upon as incomplete goals of an educational system. The whole child is all of these and more. The whole child, moreover, is the individuated and highly unique personal locus of all these ideals. The whole child, then, is also a subject of religious belief. The exclusion of religion from the schools will entail a crucial modification of the "whole child" ambitions of democratic educational theory. Perhaps another kind of analogy will help. Schools frequently and reasonably seek to compensate for social and familial shortcomings. Health education, although primarily associated with the home, is frequently a necessary part of scholastic training. Sometimes these compensations are invasive, for instance, where the home environment is seriously deficient. Teachers I know in rural South Carolina take it upon themselves to impose minimum standards of civility on children whose family life is almost non-existent. The same story could be told of many inner-city schools. Perhaps teaching religion in the schools can have a similar compensatory role to play. By opening the classroom to the sharing of individual religious points of view, and with the sympathetic efforts of a tactful teacher to elicit appropriate questions and to help her students articulate their positions, students will come both to a deeper commitment to their own religious positions, and to a greater awareness of and sympathy for contrasting positions. From the point of view of the schools and of society this

would seem a desirable result. From the point of view of the religionists themselves it would seem desirable. Most religions profess some unique and absolute handle on the truth. As such, contrasting positions cannot have any ultimate destructive effect upon this. Ironically (to some), the deeper the commitment to a revealed truth, the more open and radical the questioning can be, since the bedrock commitment is at some point unassailable. Alternatively an unwillingness to permit religious instruction in the school can bespeak a lurking disbelief on the part of religionists, such that they fear the loss of faith where questions are raised. On the whole, then, although the practical problems are vast and sensitive, there seems to be no compelling a priori reason for excluding religion from the schools, and much to be gained both for religionists and society at large, if religious education is included.

Let me conclude with some comments about a program that does not shrink from including religious issues in its curriculum: Philosophy for Children. In the middle school text, Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery,[7] there are two episodes germane to some of the issues in this paper. In one of them a young boy, Dale, because of a religious commitment, refuses to stand during the pledge to the flag. In the other we find a treatment of the logical possibilities involved in claiming that God created the world "in the beginning." The latter issue is rich with theological history, and was a hotly controverted topic in the Middle Ages. The former has, like so much else in the program, an uncanny topicality, especially these days when allegiance to the flag strikes some as akin to a religious commitment.

The episode involving Dale[8] and the pledge to the flag turns on an extreme view (no particular religious sect is mentioned) of the commandment against idolatry. An additional complication arises from the fact that Dale's parents have instructed him not to stand for the pledge. So the matter involves both religious belief and obedience towards one's parents. The issue is discussed among the children, between the children and their parents, between the children and school teachers and the principal. Issues of definition abound. Is the flag an "image" or idol? Is standing up a sign of respect, or tantamount to "bowing down," a sign of worship. Issues of interpretation are raised, as well as issues of minority rights. Interestingly, the principal does a pretty poor job of managing the conflict. Finally Dale leaves the school, apparently to attend a new school (and one surmises a different kind of school). We are never introduced to Dale's parents. The narrative context of the Philosophy for Children program makes this whole question intensely interesting and children respond to it enthusiastically. Some of the teachers I work with have taught children whose religion forbade patriotic expression. Some teachers respect these differences. Once or twice I have found a teacher who insists that her children stand, whatever their faith holds. On these occasions my teacher training sessions have been animated, to say the least. It strikes me that, when combined with the Socratic pedagogy of the Philosophy for Children program, the issue makes a fine case study, and an excellent way of introducing religion into a school curriculum.

The second episode[9] is somewhat less controversial, at least in some circles, but it has the effect of showing how religion and logic can intersect fruitfully. Theology can be an instrument of introducing religion into a school setting, because it can focus on the logical questions as much as on the religious ones. Harry and his friends are discussing (at a slumber party! pace verisimilitude!) an issue bordering on arguments for God's existence. (Note again the graceful way in which controvery is hinted at.) Four possible combinations are discussed: "The world had a beginning, and was created by God;" "The world had a beginning, but wasn't created by God;" "The world didn't have a beginning and was created by God;" "The world didn't have a beginning, and wasn't created by God." Questions of the distinction between possibility and truth, elementary combinatorial logic (Anno's "Socrates and the Three Little Pigs" is a fine companion book), as well as topical questions concerning the Big Bang theory, all emerge in discussion. Again it is a good example of one way to introduce religion into a classroom, that is via philosophical theology. The episode concludes, by the way, with an Oedipal dream, offering depths to the sophisticated teacher and to certain types of children, that can bring religion and psychology together fruitfully.

My own experience with "Harry" and these particular episodes is limited to some rather enlightened school settings, and I cannot generalize much from this experience. Moreover I know of situations where even these two episodes could not be discussed, settings where the word 'God' is statutorily forbidden in class, and settings where an extreme fundamentalist posture forbids the open discussion of religion. But my own experience leads me to think that a philosophical, critical and dialogical approach to these issues is appropriate and non-threatening to most teachers and most children. So long as children propose the agenda and teachers 'facilitate' (that abused but precise term), the introduction of religious education into the schools can be justified. Again there seem to me to be no overwhelming theoretical objections to such instruction. The manner is all. I suggest that the manner provided by programs such as Philosophy for Children can preserve extra-scholastic autonomy to the religious experience and at the same time help us fulfill some of the larger ambitions we have of making the school a mirror of society.

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1. Or to use John Wilson's terms, education in religion differs from education about religion. See John B. Wilson and Samuel M. Natale, Education in Religious Understanding (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987).

2. See David Purpel and Kevin Ryan, "It Comes with the Territory: the Inevitability of Moral Education in the Schools, in Purpel and Ryan, Moral Education...It Comes with the Territory (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1976), 44-54.

3. See John Sealey, Religious Education: Philosophical Perspectives (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985), 22ff. I am indebted to this book for a good deal of my thinking on this issue. Religious Education (RE) has traditionally been part of public general education in Britain. There seems to be more thought there, consequently, about its philosophical foundations than there has been in this country.

4. Barry Chazan has good things to say about these issues in his article "'Indoctrination' and Religious Education," in Religious Education 67 (1972): 243-52.

5. The best treatment of the relation between dialogue and critical thinking remains Paolo Freire's. See his Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Continuum, 1970), 76ff.

6. City of God, preface.

7. Matthew Lipman, Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery (Upper Montclair, NJ: Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, 1974).

8. Ibid., chapter nine, 43-47.

9. Ibid., chapter thirteen, 64-68.

TEACHING NORMATIVE INQUIRY, K-12: A CONTINUING PEDAGOGICAL CRISIS IN TEACHER EDUCATION

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AN INITIAL FRAMEWORK: Suppose the State Legislature has passed the following statute:

> "For all X, X must be taught in the public schools iff X is a knowledge claim."

This biconditional requires both that if X is a knowledge claim then it must be taught and if X must be taught then it must be a knowledge claim. The irony of this utterance is that while it might appear only formal and purely logical, or, as we say in the postmodern world, "value-free," of course it is not. If we take "value" to include references to thoughtful evaluation, as surely we must, then immediately, we confront the following four evaluational tasks:

> (a) --first, we must establish identity conditions for what counts as a knowledge claim in order to define the content and conceptual limits of the curriculum under such a statute...
>
> (b) --second, we must assert practical conditions for what is to count as the actual curriculum, since it would be impossible as well as undesirable to teach all knowledge claims, whatever identity conditions for knowledge claims we may set. This amounts to both revising the statute to "For all X, X should be taught in the public schools iff X is an important knowledge claim" and then pursuing the ambitious project of deciding which knowledge claims we think are important and practicable to teach...
>
> (c) --third, we must examine whether the school curriculum, as well as the school setting, might valuably include experiences other than experiences with knowledge claims. Given the nature of the child, if not human beings in general, this seems unavoidable, no matter how we set identity conditions for knowledge claims. This amounts to supplementing a curriculum based on important knowledge claims and their associated pedagogy with intentionally designed extra-epistemic school experiences...

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(d) --fourth, essentially, we should let the students know, at some point in their public school career, how we, as educators, have handled (a) through (c) above. Otherwise, we would not be telling them what we are really doing. This requirement seems unavoidable if we are to believe that the public school experience is in any sense liberating for the persons being educated.

At every step from (a) through (d), we will necessarily and unavoidably have made critical judgements. Thus, this process is exactingly and pervasively "phronetic", and this is so both no matter what the State Legislature has or has not passed and no matter how well or poorly we have done or will do in recognizing and implementing the results of steps (a) through (d). To fail to take all of these steps is to fail to justify our public school programs.

This is my way of providing an initial framework within which to illustrate my agreement with the fundamental assertion in Professor Mulvaney's paper, namely, "..the concept of a value-free experience is a bit of abstractionist mythology."

The concept of a value-free self-conscious experience for reasoning creatures is an incoherent concept. The only realms within which it makes sense to me to speak of value-free experiences are the realms within which deliberative and and/or contemplative human action is absent. Thus, we could speak of value-free states of affairs regarding unconscious things, regarding un-self-conscious organisms, and regarding some states of affairs of an involuntary, pre-self-conscious kind for reasoning beings. However, we could never speak of value-free self-conscious experiences of, per se, reasoning beings. The concept of "reasoning being" simply precludes it. I take "abstractionist mythology" to refer to the startling result that a seemingly deliberate methodological principle of so many thinkers in our century could be so false! Yet, how many educators in American society, how many educators of the adults now preparing to enter teaching in our public schools, uncritically accept this methodological howler? How many of our own colleagues believe that to make a value claim is to "be prescriptive," where they intend such a phrase to be a pejorative epithet?

There is nothing in Professor Mulvaney's paper with which I differ save emphases. I agree that, to go forward substantively from the recognition of the impossibility of value-free experiences for reasonable beings, we must develop a theory of teaching and learning. I agree that teaching should be seen as offering the opportunity to learn in a reasonable fashion. I agree that this "reasonable fashion" has to emphasize critical thinking as the wide activity of justification rather than as merely reflective skepticism.

The world is a place within which to make things, to place them, for collective betterment. Life as critique, while the entertainment of some even though they have the skills to do more, leaves so many opportunities untaken, so many meaningful edifices unbuilt. The (a)-(d) framework, introduced above, can serve as a point of departure for

analyses of public school programs toward the end of justifying those programs. Professor Mulvaney's paper calls us to do just that. This is so because no satisfactory answer can be given to the question of whether and how to teach religion in the public schools until we have developed a comprehensive view of what normative inquiry is about and which conceptual, meta-normative, and empirical claims we must hold if normative inquiry is to occur.

Stated differently, we cannot answer the question of whether and how to teach religion in the public schools until we not only enter a foundational dialogue about the nature of normative inquiry in the philosophy of education, but also come to some basic agreements within that dialogue. This agreement must include acceptance of certain claims about what counts as evidence, as clear definition, as rules of inference, and as fundamental normative and meta-normative principles. Further, we must agree that and how these agreed upon claims can be contextualized to cases in appropriate pedagogical settings. But this is called "elitism" by many.

The "irony-added" is that many teacher educators do not see the value of philosophy of education, let alone the fundamental nature of the relationship of normative inquiry to the teaching act. I do not understand how things could have gotten so bad. I hope our joint session encourages all of us to re-enter that dialogue with vigor and with renewed tenacity. That is what we should be about in our lives and in our careers.

I agree that the Philosophy for Children (IAPC) materials are a signal resource and vehicle for discussing values and virtues in the schools. I respect the critical mode and the dialogical rhetoric with which the properly prepared teacher must proceed with these materials. Lastly, I agree with Professor Mulvaney's hestitant affirmative about teaching religion in the public schools, with his two-fold suggestion that in the schools religious theory should be separated from religious practice and that the teacher should not impose her religious views on the children, and with his misgivings about these suggestions. I will conclude with a brief analysis of why he, and we, should have these misgivings. Coupled with the framework I presented at the onset, this analysis of misgivings constitutes both my recognition of the continuing crisis regarding normative inquiry in teacher education in this country and my own joining of the call to address this crisis by teaching the knowledge bases and skills associated with contextualized normative inquiry, through using case studies, in our professional core courses (cf. e.g., pp. 45-47 of the Proceedings of this Society's 34th Annual Meeting).

AN ANALYSIS OF MISGIVINGS: Professor Mulvaney expresses misgivings regarding both the feasibility of separating theory from practice regarding religion and the feasibility (or desirability) of the teacher not imposing her religious views on the students. The first misgiving is sensitive to the fine interstices of a complex practice tied with tradition and symbol. It is much like asking what a penetrating poem means. The best answer is to read the poem again! Surely, no theory of poetry will exhaust, nor probably even present,

that meaning. The second misgiving is bred of the same kind of enriched observation: it is much like asking the logic professor to teach logic without a commitment to and enthusiasm for the principles of correct inference and the resulting elegant proofs!

But surely Professor Mulvaney is right to make his two-fold suggestion. And the only buffer against his rightly stated misgivings is to insist that normative inquiry be part of the professional core curriculum. There is no way to see the place and importance of religious studies in any scholarly setting or the significant role of religion in a human life without a sure familiarity with the knowledge bases and the associated skills of normative inquiry. For example, without a patient conceptual analysis of the term "humility" and its expressed application in a variety of contextual and historical settings, instructive disagreements between Saint Augustine and the Stoics will remain outside the lifeworld of today's public school educator. On the other hand, introducing certain elements of such contexts into even the K-3 classrooms, when done by the careful hand and eye of a teacher who has a grasp of these knowledge bases and skills, provides startling examples of the observational powers and mental acuity of our childrens' minds.

With such a renewed vision for the professional core curriculum in teacher education, of obvious historical relevance here in Williamsburg, Virginia, we could help fulfill one of the largest and most noble ambitions in our heritage, that of making the public school a mirror of the humane society our forebears intended.

My primary emphasis, then, is on the nature of the education of the teachers and on the knowledge, skills, and attitudes of <u>their</u> teachers. But the realm of consequences is necessarily larger. As a correlative to pedagogical crisis caused by the dominance of incoherent "value-free" methodology and the concomitant neglect of the fundamentalness of normative inquiry as an essential ingredient in the preparation of teachers, democracy today is seen by too many only apparently well-educated persons as merely a forum for factional adjudication. In our country, a sense of community has been displaced by operational awarenesses only of self and/or ethnic or lifestyle group. Worse, we still judge our GNP wih no reference whatsoever to the depletion of natural resources, as if growth needed no supply. When will we learn that prudence involves the constant observance of limits. A sense of limit is of course a basic element in and of normative inquiry. The trail always leads back to the same failure.

It is difficult to be optimistic.

BEYOND TOMORROW AS AN EXTENSION OF TODAY: SPIRITUALITY IN EDUCATION

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> In order to prepare our children properly for tomorrow's world, we must discern among the agitations and headlines of the day those trends and tendencies which are fundamental to our time and put aside whatever is accidental, secondary, ephemeral and anachronistic.1
>
> "Education in Western society today suffers essentially from a spiritual crisis." 2

It is truly "the worst of times and the best of times". So one is readily led to think if one is seriously listening to reports on the state of the planet from scientists, philosophers, and planetary leaders. The barrage of information, the infinite variety of "paradigmatic structures", ecolological and economic crisises, liberation movements, and religious disputations is truly overwhelming. There is an endless stream of technological innovations transmuting the way human beings conduct their lives and regard reality. There is the energy crisis, the changing status of women and minorities, the influence of television and the media, the crumbling economic and financial structure of the world's nations, the population explosion, pollution of the environment, crime, abortion, divorce, drugs, suicide, and terrorism. One can easily become lost in the multiple perspectives and complexities, be left wondering where to stand, unless one steps back and begins to decipher the fundamental spiritual and philosophical issues weaving within them: issues of values, attitudes, beliefs, concepts, and thought. Our culture has generally tended to solve its problems without experiencing its questions. This has been our genius as a civilization, but it is also our pathology. Now the pathology is overtaking its genius, and we are beginning to sense this everywhere.

Robert Muller, long time Secretary of the UN's Economic and Social Council, has joined the increasingly voluminous ranks of thinkers who are convinced that the planet is undergoing, and has been undergoing for some time, an evolutionary transformation of human consciousness. Sitting at the crossroads of international information,he has, even more than most of us, faced the experience of a world of so much information, so many layers of knowledge, so many perspectives from which human beings speak of their worlds that "finally the human person cannot take it anymore". Evaluations of our planetary future based on the positivistic, statistical data gathered by the United Nations on the state of the planet are foreboding. At a recent conference on Peace Education given in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, Muller read from a large volume of positivisitic data that has been consolidated and distributed

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by the United Nations. If we were to project the future of that planet from the trends indicated by the statistical data on ecology, population, crime, as well as many other issues, we must reasonably expect our planet's life to end in the next fourteen to forty years. But such data, he is absolutely convinced, does not tell the true story of what is happening on the planet. Overwhelmed by data such as this, yet sitting in this hub of moral and spiritual power, he considered retreat into privatism and anxiety neither a practical nor moral option. Instead, inspired by numerous great thinkers and statepersons, especially U Thant and Dag Hammerskjold, and having watched worldwide transformations in human thought and organization during forty years at the United Nations, Muller meditated on his experience at the united Nations, seeking for the significance of the changes experienced and observed. Synthesizing his observations led him to join the increasing ranks of thinkers who are convinced that the planet is undergoing, and has been undergoing for some time, an evolutionary transformation of human consciousness, a synthesis in which "simple" words like "love", "peace", "life", "light", "transformation" and "global spirituality" become the center of discourse and human understanding - and this on a planetary level, ringing throughout the meditation room, conference rooms and offices of the United Nations, into the nations of the world. In a profession of awe and faith Muller states:

> "During our human evolution and especially during the last few decades it has become increasingly clear that each individual human life is an astounding miracle. Scientists stand in wonder before their genetic discoveries and the functioning of the human being. The more they discover, the more each human appears as an incredible cosmos which has never existed before and never will exist again in the same form in all eternity. All great visionaries, religious leaders, prophets, philosophers and ethical luminaries knew that by intuition thousands of years ago. Great artists, poets and writers have proclaimed it throughout the course of human history. Pablo Casals and Martin Luther King were two of the latest to proclaim it in the most moving of terms and in visible action. Now science is confirming it in its own astonishing ways. There is no doubt that, of all life forms on our planet, humanity is the only one that can elevate itself above its condition, uncover a reality which was closed to its senses, comprehend outer space, inner space and ever larger and smaller infinities, conceive God and transcend itself continuously above its earthly abode. This is why, the more we advance, the more we stand in awe before this miraculous, mysterious, incomprehensible, mind-boggling cosmos called a human person.3

In a similar vein Czechoslavakia's new president, Vaclav Havel, stated before the United States Congress:

> Consciousness precedes being, and not the other way around, as the Marxists claim. . .Without a global revolution in the sphere of human consciousness, nothing will change for the better in the sphere of our being as humans, and the catastrophe toward which this world is headed--be it ecological, social, demographic or a general breakdown of civilization--will be unavoidable.

In the light of this public discourse, the visions of education we carry into our classrooms seem so small, minute, even "ephemeral and anachronistic", so thoroughly discordant with the needs and visions of our times. Here stands an incredible irony and apparent dilemma for educators. At the pinnacles of power, positivistic knowledge, much vaunted by educators, has richly manifested its highest possibilities, providing the planet with a rich, complex, detailed portrait of "the state of the planet", a portrait that clearly points to planetary extinction. Yet, ever more of the consolidators of this knowledge, persons who truly esteem its value in action as well as belief deny the validity of its projections; they deny, unequivocably, its power to describe both the true state of the planet or its future. They claim that positivistic knowledge derived from descriptions of material reality, however important and useful, is thoroughly inadequate in creating an understanding of current events. In fact, of itself, it leads only to extreme pessimism and helplessness. Mueller claims that understanding maybe derived through an elevation of thought to moral and spiritual dimensions; an understanding from which may be created a dynamic picture of what is happening, and a knowledge of a transformative process. Such understandings direct attention to constructive human activity being generated on planetary levels, and to the transformations in consciousness to which this picture and activity points.

Jacob Needleman, recognizing this, has argued persuasively that a vital aspect of human activity is being overlooked: the need to consider and reflect together on global spiritual and philosophical ideas. He continues by suggesting an almost deliberate repression at work in our educational system:

> Society is willing to deal with adolescents' intellectual, emotional, and sexual questions but not with their philosophical ones. One result of this unsatisfied need is a continuing restlessness, a vulnerability to any new idea or trend, however extreme--to drugs, to questionable religious movements or political ideologies.4

Yet, in the halls of educational academia, we remain wedded to a notion of theory founded on positivistic knowledge as true. In our papers and dissertations, knowledge is to be objectified and statistically verified. Who has yet heard of a dissertation in a department of education on the questions of global spirituality and education? of student engagement in envisioning and creating alternative future? on the birth of an idea? on the implications of planetary crisis for education? on the image of the human being we hold as educators and its educational implications? on the importance of love in education? Why is it that we feel these hidden taboos, these forbidden questions, so deeply that we hesitate to raise them in the classroom, or do so with such trepidation?

In the name of "objectivity" and religious freedom, have we unofficially but effectively banned such considerations from the halls of education schools, disempowering ourselves from even considering questions that are critical to our planetary future? Are we so caught up in materialism or so terrified of dissension that we close out the explorations of issues that are at the heart of education and of our life as human beings from the very classrooms from which our educators derive? Is this academic purity not, in fact, the height of moral irresponsibility?

The halls of academia have long been considered a center of cultural creativity, of exploration and of academic freedom. Yet, we contend that, caught up in a cult of positivism, we are failing in all the above missions in a time that urgently needs centers for such activity.

These centers are more and more appearing outside academia in conferences, workshops, and such organizations as the United Nations, where there are no academic taboos against words like love and spirituality, where rather their importance for the human being and the planet are explored in pluralistic settings. Can we then, in academia, not open up our doors to our exploration of moral and spiritual understandings from which we can derive direction for our future without falling into the pit of passionate dogmatism, or of cold, heartless, will-paralyzing objectivity? Can we not engage in compassionate discourse in which we enter into caring, empathetic relationships with each other, even while formulating our own thoughts with precision and clarity and helping others to do the same?

The United Nations provides a macrocosmic perspective of the tasks facing educators. American schools have taken on the task of integration of our vastly pluralistic society, a task that has been seen within a predominately assimilationist model of education. Contending against this model, advocates of schools of choice argue for schools that would enable parents to choose schools more congruent with their personal, family or community values. In either case, as currently defined, there is a failure of vision and moral courage. The challenges of pluralism and its possibilities are avoided; the very challenges poised by Dewey--to learn from each other, care for each other, teach each other, and, in the activities of reasoning, imagining and working together, define and address our shared concerns, thus, opening up the possibility of transformation of knowledge that may reveal new ways of being together in the world.

This paper explores the task of "reasoning together" within the context of a pluralistic setting in such a way as to bring potentially conflicting issues to the fore--not for the purposes of assimilation but for unifying ourselves in accord with higher values. These values that go beyond immediate, materialistic self-interest to diversified activity for the fulfillment of the common good. This is a fundamentally spiritual task which requires a binding of ourselves, one to the other, in mutual appreciation and respect, to seek creative visions of possibilities that will inspire all to action on behalf of all. Plunkett claims that only grounds for such a possibility are spiritual and characterizes the spiritual as follows: (Parenthesis are ours to highlight salient qualities relevant to our discussion).

> What are the characteristics of this spiritual vision that can positively challenge alternative perspectives? Several points can be cited. First of all, there is the heartfelt truth, whether it comes as intuition, creative impulse or as an inspiration, which makes the spiritual decisive; decisive to the point of self-sacrifice, for example. (first principle of vision of possibility). In this, the spiritual transcends the balancing acts of liberal democracy. It can be radically decisive. (will-filled action) Further, the spiritual can respect the value of the rational and the holistic. Although primary, it can acknowledge the fact of the incarnate, that is, of the legitimacy of the demands of mind, heart and body, and of the organic unity of all of these. (inclusive of the rational and holistic) And, thirdly, the spiritual represents not simply human interests but the presence of God in creation, and therefore the spiritual cannot authentically be enlisted to serve human rivalries. (unifies) This means that the spiritual cannot be divided against itself and must always see a higher order unity, even where there is lower order division, including, of course, moral evil. (elevates) The spiritual, when confronted by competing views, demands and offers respect and dialogue. (dialogical, communing)

> It is only through the spiritual that we can find radical conciliation, whether within ourselves or with others. It is worth pondering that all the main religions agree that spiritual peace must begin in individuals' hearts and then diffuse outwards. (transformative individually and socially) Why should such a powerful insight be ignored by human intelligence and emotions? Undoubtedly this is the question that leads us to the heart of the spiritual perception of good and evil. We are spiritually disempowered, and it is to spiritual re-empowerment that education most needs to generate commitment. (empowering and committment).5

II.

The spiritual crisis in education, as identified by Plunkett, is mirrored, and in part caused by a corresponding crisis in our culture. This spiritual blight, we argue, is at least partly a result of our impoverished view of the world and our confused and troubled sense of identity. Floyd Matson says: "The tragic history of the breaking of the human image parallels the disintegration of the inner sense of identity, the flight from autonomous conduct to automaton behavior, in the modern world".6 Rollo May says that the "sin of psychology is that it has reduced man from a Dantean tragic figure to a trivial being". 7 Herbert Mowrer, a clinical psychologist, writes:

> The same pre-suppositions and intellectual operations that have given us such unprecedented power over nature when extended to ourselves produces a pervasive feeling of helplessness, confusion, resignation, desperation. . . By the very principles and premises that have led to the conquest of the outer world, we ourselves lose our autonomy, dignity, self-mastery, responsibility, indeed our very identity. Little wonder, then, that we feel weak, lost, fearful, beat. Being part of nature, we, too, apparently obey strict cause-and-effect principles. And if this be true, . . . the whole notion of purpose, responsibility, meaning seems to vanish. 8

Maynard Adams considers the possibility of the derangement of the modern western mind. Cultural derangement, according to Adams, results from a distorted world view grounded in false assumptions about the constitutional principles of the human mind. He writes:

> Life lived from within it is like that of a mad man. One cannot through the exercise of his powers, structured by the internalized culture, know and cope with reality. All his efforts from within the culture suffer from the cultural defects, and, therefore, he cannot discover and correct these defects themselves without transcending the distorted world view and its underlying assumptions about the categorical structure of experience and thought.9

The great theme which runs through much of Professor Adams's work is the conflict between naturalistic and humanistic interpretations of persons and reality, and it is this distinction which provides us a handle on the cultural and educational crisis we have just reviewed.

Adams argues that western civilization experienced a revolution--the most momentous in human history--between the 13th and 17th centuries:

> The classical Greek, Hebraic, and Christian cultures were generated by man standing in the world asking primarily "What does reality require of me? How can I become what I ought to be and do what I ought to do?" Knowledge was conceived and developed in such a way that it would be useful in the human enterprise thus directed. The intellectual dimension of the culture was shaped largely by religious, moral, social, and political concerns. . . The humanistic view of knowledge generated by the classical orientation of man toward the world presented semantically a rich, multidimensional world which engaged man in all areas of experience and thought and provided ontological grounding for the various sectors of culture and support for the existing social structures.10

The classical world was grounded in the primacy of our distinctively human needs: the needs of psyche, society, and soul. Knowledge and, by extension, education was conceived in such a way as to give form, direction, and meaning to such needs. The world was something more than a space/time continuum: it had a social space and a time which located, grounded and gave direction to human life; people lived their lives sustained by webs of meaning, purpose, and value which pervaded their world.

This focus on purpose, value, and meaning even permeated an understanding of the physical realm. Aristotle, for example, taught that the physical world could not be fully understood apart from the categories of value and purpose. "Nature", Aristotle believed, "belongs to the class of causes which act for the sake of something" (Physics, Bk. II, ch. 8.) The rain falls, not simply "of necessity", but in order to make the plants grow.

Aristotelian physics appealed to all sorts of value concepts in explaining the world. Gravitational attraction was explained, for example, in terms of objects "seeking their natural places" or water leaves its "proper place" to prevent a vacuum from forming because vacuums are somehow "abhorrent".

Such a view implies the belief that persons are constituted by, and live within, "structures of meaning". A sharp distinction may be drawn between the bodily existence of a person and the realm of subjectivity or the semantic dimension of persons. The two are fundamentally different, and they must be understood in categorially different ways. The thoughts and actions of persons must be parsed in terms of the intentions which inform them and the logical matrix within which they acquire their meaning; they are not simple factual events, standing only in causal relationships with other events. Thoughts, perceptions, assertions, etc. are subject to rational appraisal; they can be assessed as veridical or illusory, as warranted or unwarranted, as true or false. Thought is a normative process. According to Adams: "Given certain assumptions and beliefs. . . certain others are normatively required; some others ought not to be, and still others ought to be questioned."11 The mind, by its very nature, cannot help but be moved by the force of reasoning, by the "pull of the ought": "in the realm of the mental, such normative requirements work towards their own realization."12 This is the force underlying the claim that persons are rational, meaning-seeking, purposeful, value oriented beings.

It is the reversal of this priority of meaning, value and purpose which accounts for the development of what Adams calls "the modern world view". He argues:

> The culture-generating stance of western man shifted between the thirteenth and the seventeenth centuries to that of man standing before the world asking, "How can I get what I want? How can I impose my will upon the world? How can I manipulate, control, and exploit it for my own purposes?" The new situation gave rise to fresh ways of looking at things and to a kind of knowledge that is power, that is know-how, in the manipulation and control of things. It was thus that modern science was born . . . Within the scientific approach, we count as relevant and genuine only such knowledge as would at least in principle be useful in making, manipulating and controlling things. The correlative of this is what we count as real only that which we would have to take account of and deal within controlling and manipulating changes in our world. 13

Modern science and technology re-form and re-formulate the world: we are to conceive it in a way which reduces the morally and spiritually thick social space and time into a neutral physical space and time.

At first only Nature was re-formulated, but the eighteenth and nineteenth century philosophical heirs of the scientific revolutionaries gathered under a more radical banner, that of a full-blown naturalism which made of persons no more than Galileo and Newton had made of nature: we too are without inherent purpose, meaning, or value.

The position of this paper is to reject the central presuppositions of naturalism. When modern science eliminated teleological causality of the kind formulated by classical thinkers, it created a split between facts and values, with values relegated to the realm of the merely "subjective". Knowledge of norms (that which we have traditionally referred to as "wisdom") was taken to be grounded in nothing more than convention or will, in emotive states or decisions which could not be appraised as true or false. We, on the other hand, argue for a value realism in which our emotive experiences provide us with what Professor Adams has called "epistemic encounters" with a normative world; our evaluative experiences, like our perceptual experiences, embody claims about the world which can be put into language, which can stand in logical relationships, and which can be called into questions by conflicting experiences; they are, in effect, corrigible, they make claims which are falsifiable. Needless to say, the logic of verification is incredibly complex; nonetheless, it makes sense to suppose that we live in a moral world which we have access to through our emotive experiences critically assessed.

Adams's notion of an "epistemic encounter involves in some way a knowledge yielding, data-gathering confrontation with reality. It includes the elements of: 1.) thinking that P, 2.) being correct in thinking that P, 3.) being responsible in thinking that P, and furthermore, 4.) the act of thinking that P being at least partially self-warranting (Adams, 1976, p. 65).

The question of whether our emotive experiences, broadly conceived to include our affective and conative experiences, have a place in our educational institutions, rides on how they may be conceived of as knowledge-yielding and provide us with "epistemic encounters with reality."

Knowledge-yielding, data-gathering confrontations with reality are conceived of as action-guiding. Thus, we recognize that room has to be made for rationality with respect to value judgments which reflect our emotive experiences and actions. It is here that we refer to the so-called "good-reasons" school of value theorists and ethics. Such theorists have recognized that in order for value judgments to provide any genuine guidance for action the process must not be one of brute actuality and blind causation but somehow intentionally, reason, and knowledge must be involved. In other words, a value utterance must have an intentional structure or semantic dimension so that it makes sense to ask "why"?--not in the sense that asks for an explanation of the utterance as an event, but in the sense that asks for a justifying or validating reason for the utterance commending, condemning, recommending, prescribing, or enjoining against something.

One typical scenario of the "good reasons" school goes something like this: To say "X is good" is to commend X and to say in effect that there are reasons for anyone absolutely or anyone in a certain position (with a certain perspective, orientation, concern, or circumstance) to choose, to support, to promote, or in some way to favor X. And to say to someone "you ought to do X" is to tell him to do X and to say in effect that there are reasons for anyone in his situation to do X. It is always meaningful to ask of anything commended, "why is it good"? and of anything you are told that you ought to do, "why should I do it"? These "why's" ask for reasons. Hence, it is argued, a student should look for the arguments which can be brought to back up value utterances.

Thus, beliefs and value judgments both have a semantic dimension: they stand in logical relationships, in complex webs of reasons, perceptions, expectations, other beliefs, and so on; they may be rational or irrational, justified or unjustified. To understand a belief is to be able to place it in the "semantic field that constitutes the mind of the person whose belief it is" (Adams, 1976, p. 212). This must be done in a extra-scientific way; not in an observational way, but in a communicative, intersubjective way in which there is a sharing of concepts, thoughts, semantic contents in various logical forms. This is the spiritualistic and humanistic way of learning and knowing as distinct from the scientific approach. Adams, for example, writes:

> If we approach the beliefs of a person or a people in a humanistic way, any attempt to alter them would not be through the manipulation and control of their scientifically discovered causal conditions, for that would be to understand and to treat people under the categories of things rather than those of people and therefore would be, by the very nature of the approach, dehumanizing. A humanistic approach would require that people be approached . . . as rational agents, who are capable of reflective, critical assessment of their beliefs in light of evidence and logical considerations. Thus, any proper attempt to alter their beliefs would use instructional and educational methods rather than causal, manipulative techniques. 14

This is the community of spiritual and humanistic inquiry we envision. A community of inquiry where the categories would be those of persons and things; meaning and existence; the factual and the normative; the physical, the mental, and the social; physical space, logical space, and social space; time and eternity; the necessary and the contingent; and so on, all interwoven into a multidimensional conceptual fabric. Such an intellectual environment would be

grounded in, elicit responses from, and engage all the powers of the human mind; and support and structure all the dimensions of our world and social order so that life-morale and spiritual zest would again be possible.

Spiritual experiences, the impact of seeing one's own existence and identity in the total scheme of things as one understands the world, would no longer be a shattering experience. Such an awareness could once again be empowering, invigorating, and sustaining. It would be possible to live with an affirmative spiritual consciousness, a high life-morale, grounded in a sense of meaningfulness of his existence in a world that makes possible, produces, and supports his identity as a person. In such a world normative requirements and restraints are imposed upon him as well as factual possibilities and limitations. These define a way of life, gives direction, provide a sense of values, and purpose. The post modern era would then be a reality.

1. Robert Muller, New Genesis: Shaping a Global Spirituality (New York: Ardsley-on-Hudson, 1989), p.3.
2. Dudley Plunkett, Secular and Spiritual Values: Grounds for Hope in Education (New York: Routledge, 1990), p.108.
3. Muller, New Genesis, 74.
4. Jacob Needleman, The Heart of Philosophy (Alfred A. Knopf,1982), p.5.
5. Plunkett, Secular and Spiritual Values, p.116.
6. Floyd Matson, The Broken Image (NY:Doubleday & Co, 1976), p.vi.
7. Rollo May, Psychology and the Human Dilemma (NJ: D.Van Norstand, 1967), p. 2.
8. Herbert Mowrer, "Psychiatry and Religion," Atlantic (July 1961): 2-17.
9. E. Maynard Adams, Philosophy and the Modern Mind (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1976), p.12.
10. Ibid., p.48-49.
11. Ibid., p.199-200.
12. Ibid., p. 200.
13. Ibid., p. 49.
14. Ibid., p. 213.

Would You Repeat the Question?: Response to Bittings and Southworth's "Beyond Tomorrow as an Extension of Today"

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Introduction

Bittings and Southworth open their paper by recalling the days of the French Revolution. Let us continue with Dickens thought: "... it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way--in short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only." As it was then in comparison, so has it been. The "large jawed kings and the queens, either plain or fair", that Dickens spoke of continue to fulfill their destiny in declaring the spiritual and material order to be settled and sound, requiring only obedience and fidelity to obtain fulfillment. Meanwhile the masses looking ever backwards and around, perceive these words also as "mere messages in the earthly order of events" as they continue the march into the future. We continue to live, by comparison, in heady times. But degenerative? evolutionary? or transformative? demanding new forms of spiritual consciousness? Perhaps. Let us look at the argument presented by Bittings and Southworth.

The Argument

I understand the argument to be something like this: We are currently faced with crisis of both national and global scale. Technology is run amuck; things don't work anymore, and indeed are falling apart around us; the planet is facing ecological disaster; social deviance is rampant and threatens to overrun the cities and countryside; the financial community is near bankruptcy; while the economy is stagnant. The list could go on. The point, however, is that something must be done, and soon, or the very survival of the species could be threatened.

Now inspired as much by hope as by data, Bittings and Southworth join Muller in glimpsing the "evolutionary transformation of human consciousness, a synthesis in which 'simple' terms like 'love', 'peace', 'life', 'light', 'transformation' and 'global spirituality' become the center of discourse and human understanding" (p. 3) In support of these glimmerings, Bittings and Southworth propose to re-introduce to education investigation of questions of value and spirituality. This is to take the form of "value realism in which our emotive experiences provide us with... epistemic encounters with our normative world; our evaluative experiences, like our perceptual experiences, embody claims about the world which can be put into language, which can stand in

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logical relationships, and which can be called into questions by conflicting experiences; they are, in effect, corrigible, they make claims that are falsifiable" (p.17).

One of the great barriers to attainment of spiritual consciousness, of value realism, is the hegemony of naturalism, and its intellectual child, positivism. Bittings and Southworth suggest, for example, that:

> ..in the halls of educational academia, we remain wedded to a notion of theory founded on positivistic knowledge as true. In our papers and dissertations, knowledge is to be totally objectified and statistically verified. Only questions can be asked that can be thus validated and cross-validated (p. 6, emphasis added).

One purpose of their paper, then, is to reject the central claims of hegemonic naturalism and the positivistic sciences and to substitute more synthetic claims of epistemic grounding.

Deconstruction

1. The society does indeed appear to be undergoing rapid change. In 1976 Daniel Bell heralded The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. Others used terms like "the post-economic society" (Herman Kahn), "the post-scarcity society" (Murray Bookchin), "the knowledge society" (Kenneth Boulding), or "the technetronic era" (Zbigniew Brzezinski). Still others describe our culture as "post-modern" (Jean-Francois Lyotard) and our theories as "post-positivist" (Patti Lather) and "post-structuralist" (Madan Sarup). By these accounts we are living in the "after age", it just isn't clear what we are after, nor how we are to go about building the new social order. One difficulty for me in the paper is that there is no attempt to theorize or interpret these changes. Rather one gets the sense only that the sky is falling, and that unless we reach through the heavens to transcendental metanarrative (i.e., global spirituality) we are surely doomed. This is a neo-conservative response.

2. Positivism is dominant and dead. So might speak Zarathrustra, or in his place, Bittings and Southworth. But their description seems more caricature than generalization. Critique of positivism is nothing new. Reflect for only a moment upon the work of Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, the Habermas-Gadamer and Kuhn-Popper debates, Polanyi's defense of Personal Knowledge, or Feyerabend's Farewell to Reason. That positivism flourished in the academy, and that theory founded on positivistic knowledge was granted academic and popular legitimacy, while other forms of knowing were depreciated is undeniable. But the halcyon days of unfettered positivism are behind us and have been for some time. While positivism still has defenders, alternative relativist epistemologies abound (e.g., structuralism, post-structuralism and hermeneutics). These approaches are considered by some to undermine their own epistemology, giving rise to post-modern uncertainties and the search for local, relativist epistemologies. To persist in granting hegemonic status to positivism and to deny the existence of alternative, post-positive and post-modern approaches, is to joist with the imaginary. Moreover, it appears to me that rather than reject positivism, Bittings and Southworth embellish it with expressionism and spirituality; relative positivism for "good reasons" (Schopenhauer's "sufficient reason"?) and with a human face.

3. Bittings and Southworth imply in their discussion that we have somehow failed to address questions of value and belief within the educational establishment. This I cannot accept. Even during its hegemonic period, positivism was constituted by axiological as well as epistemological dimensions. And these dimensions somehow found their way into students heads. While one might dispute the values, it is difficult to support the argument that values were neglected. But that is not really Bittings and Southworth's point. They wish to see greater attention directed to explicit analysis and critique of social values within the classroom, and even more they wish to promote values of global spirituality.

Widespread questioning of prevailing values is nothing new to society; one need only look at events surrounding social and cultural production dur.ng the 1920s, and again in the 1960s. But neither is the call for spiritualism unique; one may trace this line of inquiry unbroken as far back as the ancient Greek philosophers. Recent examples include Max Weber's hope for society to embrace value-rationality; Jurgen Habermas' hope for universal pragmatics. Bittings and Southworth now offer a spiritualist apologetics and an invitation to engage in examination of values within the classroom. I would suggest that the genera of values studies is already an established feature (at least rhetorically) of liberal education and is manifest in a substantial number of educational classrooms. I would ask, for example, who among this group does not engage in examination and critique of social and epistemological values as a program requirement in teacher preparation programs? Further, are not values and meaning oriented curriculums being advocated even now by the learned societies (e.g., National Science Teachers Association advocating a Science-Technology-Society (S-T-S) curriculum; The MLA and language arts teachers adopting whole language approaches; such foundational groups as AESA) advocating greater emphasis upon social, historical, and philosophic studies)?

All teaching includes a value dimension. We may still argue over issues of degree, or in favor of one or another cluster of values, but that is a different issue.

Reconstruction: Establishing the Phenomena

In the opening pages of Bittings and Southworth's paper they note that "Our culture has generally tended to solve its problems without experiencing is questions." It appears to me that this paper is located squarely within the mainstream of this cultural tradition. I wish to begin to reframe the question.

The issues noted in the section above are troubling to me. They represent a neo-conservative theme that if people would just adopt a global epistemology and then love one another, then we would overcome the babble of incommensurable language games, and walk together toward the promised land. But which of the thick jawed kings shall we follow -- the spiritual, the charismatic, the most powerful? Moreover, while the examination of values, and even adoption of "value realism", may lead eventually to examination and critique of "materialist" institutional relationships constituting the social formation (and which produce and reproduce our current difficulties), such examination is not an explicit demand of Bittings and Southworth's project. Value realism

could serve only to create a new subjectivity engaging in business as usual within the parameters of extant monopoly capitalist and state socialist (which have always been more statist than socialist) institutional formations; this is the new wine in old bottles metaphor.

There is, however, a critical analytic potentiality inherent in Bittings and Southworth's work. Value realism may be read as a synthesis of instrumental and value rational dimensions in a form in which values mediate between specification of ends and means. We might call this "spiritually mediated positivism." It substitutes the metanarrative of spiritualism or existentialism for that of positivism, naturalism, capitalism, or socialism. That is, value rationality (e.g., spiritualism) is substituted for instrumental rationality as the "first principle" of epistemology. It is a centering of values intended to erect a spiritualist matanarrative upon the ashes of the material and instrumental/technical. While such a substitution might influence social consciousness in new directions I would hesitate to call it "transformative." Adopting such a view would lead to an asocial and ahistorical conception of axiology and epistemology, and has a low probability of success within this post-positive, post-structuralist age of rejection of metanarrative. It seems that Bittings and Southworth, however, are adopting this position

Value realism may also be read in a manner which combines the Dionysian and Apollonian dimensions while each retains its separate identity; value realism as dualism. This is a Kantian solution which attempts to de-center both value and instrumental reason. It suggests creation of The Dialectical Imagination (Martin Jay) guiding "epistemic encounter with a normative world." For such encounter to be more than simply another epistemological alternative for one's Being-in-the-world we must ask, following Lenin (but in a different context), What is to be Done. "What" not is the sense of procedure, although that is surely of importance, but rather for what objective. And relatedly how are we to generate and mobilize the necessary social commitment for success. It would seem to me that we should not be so concerned with the cultivation of spiritualism, which in world history has tended to degenerate into fanaticism and domination, or for that matter any particular "ismic" thinking, but rather that we should cultivate an attitude of critical analytics, perhaps in the tradition of the Frankfurt School. In this way perhaps we may begin to experience the questions prior to solving the problem.

Our questions and critique may then take a variety of forms in our classrooms, e.g., What is the structure of our material and social world? What are the consequences both manifest and latent, positive and negative of those structures? Is the problem primarily one of having lost our spiritual morrings, or is it rooted in structures of inequality of power and privilege? What is the role of ideology in reproducing extant relationships and what are the potentials for transformation? What are the prevailing curriculums and pedagogues? What difference do they make? Do they serve to reproduce and change the social formation? How? There are, of course, other questions that may be asked, but without adopting a posture of critical analytics, there may be no transformative questions or epistemologies, but only "mere messages in the earthly order of events".

HORACE MANN: A UNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE ON RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

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Horace Mann is popularly remembered as "more responsible than any other person for the secularization of the public schools of Massachusetts."[1] Secularization, however, was not a word used by Mann when he spoke on the role of religion in the common schools. Mann spoke of "non-sectarianism," "moral education," and "natural theology," but not secularization. Mann did not support the secularization of the public schools. On the contrary, Mann wanted a kind of religious education, though not indoctrination, for the children of the budding republic. Mann wanted schoolchildren to hear passages from the Bible, to believe in God, to love their fellow human beings, and to act morally.

It is the goal of this paper to describe Mann's policy regarding religion in the common school and to examine how Mann's early religious formation and orientation toward Unitarianism are related to his thinking in this area. Though it requires a stretch of the imagination, the implications of Mann's policy in 1840 for the American public schools in 1990 will also be suggested.

Horace Mann's Formative Religious Experiences

Horace Mann's family went to the Congregational church in Franklin, Massachusetts every Sunday. The minister there during the entire time he was growing up was a Dr. Emmons, a very traditional Calvinist, who firmly believed that some souls would be saved, and others would not, without regard to the efforts made by those souls. Horace's head was full of this "blight of theological inculcations"[2] when his brother died. The following Sunday, Horace was sitting next to his mother when Dr. Emmons preached on the danger of dying unconverted. Horace's mother groaned in misery. At that moment, Horace decided that if God was an inexorable judge who could condemn his brother to eternal torment, then he would hate God.[3]

Young Horace's decision to hate God was a turning point in his life, a conversion of sorts. Ever after, he would have strong feelings against orthodox Calvinism, for he blamed Calvinism for having deprived him of "that filial love for God, that tenderness, that sweetness, that intimacy, that desiring, nestling love, which I say it is natural the child should feel towards a Father who combines all excellence...when I would rush into his arms and breathe out unspeakable love and adoration, then the grim old Calvinistic spectre thrusts itself before me. I am as a frightened child, whose eye, knowledge, experience, belief, even, are not sufficient to obliterate the image which an early fright burnt in upon his soul."[4]

A felicitous result of this negative experience is that it opened Mann to other ways of thinking about religious questions. Mann wrote that after the spell of Calvinism had been broken, "I began to construct the theory of Christian ethics and doctrine respecting virtue and vice, rewards and penalties, time and eternity, God and his providence, which, with such modifications as advancing age and a wider vision must impart, I still retain, and out of which my life has flowed."[5] This freedom to think for himself prepared Mann to be drawn to the Unitarian church, a church which was not well known or accepted until many years after Mann's childhood

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alienation from the Calvinistic God.

Later, when Mann became mature, he began to attend Unitarian churches in Boston where he heard the sermons of Rev. William Ellery Channing and Rev. E. Taylor. Both were liberal Protestant ministers. Channing was one of the founders of the Unitarian church. These two ministers seem to have been very influential in reinforcing, if not introducing, Mann's liberal religious beliefs. According to Mary P. T. Mann, "they deepened his favorite thought, that love to man is the best test of love to God, and must precede it."[6]

Mann mentions the effect Rev. Taylor's sermons had on him in his journal during the time he was deciding whether or not to become Secretary of the Board of Education in Massachusetts. He was asked to take the position on May 18, 1837.[7] On May 21, he was struck by the excellence of Rev. Taylor's sermon on "the duty of nonconformity to the world."[8] On May 23, Mann was named to the Board of Education.[9] On July 2, Sunday, the day after Mann had formally assumed his duties as Secretary of the Board, Mann praised another of Mr. Taylor's sermons, in which we can see Mann's orientation toward the teaching of religion to children:

> I heard Mr. Taylor this afternoon. How wonderfully rare it is to hear a sentiment of toleration uttered by a man who cares aught about religion! A sceptic may well indorse the right of private judgment on religious subjects; for it is only an error on a topic which at least he holds to be worthless. But for one whose heart yearns towards religion; who believes it to be the "all," --for such an one to avow, practise, feel, the noble sentiment of universal toleration, can proceed from nothing but a profound recognition of human rights and the conscientious obedience to all their requirements. Yet such is Mr. Taylor. In my early life, I was accustomed to hear all doctrines, creeds, tenets, which did not exactly conform to the standard set up, denounced as heresies; their believers cast out from fellowship in this life, and coolly consigned to eternal perdition in the next. I think it would have made an immense difference, both in my happiness and character, had the genial, encouraging, ennobling spirit of liberality been infused into my mind when its sentiments were first capable of being excited on that subject. Then it would always have been a matter of ready impulse, of spontaneous feeling, instead of my being obliged to work out that problem of duty by the most painful efforts of the intellect.[10]

It is apparent from reading Mann's journals that although he was Unitarian, he joined the Unitarian church long after he had developed in that direction of his own accord, based on his own reflections on his experience. This is evident in the event of his brother's death and his subsequent renunciation of God as Judge. This is also evident in his response to sermons as an adult; Mann validates Rev. Taylor's sermon on religious toleration primarily through examining his own religious training, commenting on the immense difference it would have made had a spirit of liberality been infused into his mind, (presumably in contrast to the sermons of Rev. Emmons).

Thus, while Unitarianism did have an influence on Mann, he was a free-thinker, always examining new ideas from the perspective of his own experience. Unitarian ministers only provided him with a starting point from which to develop. Mann had no trouble identifying himself as a Unitarian, however. In fact, he was one of the founders of the First Unitarian Society in Newton, at West Newton, Massachusetts, in 1848.[11]

Unitarianism in Massachusetts in the 1840s

Before looking for evidence of Unitarianism in Mann's views of the role of religion in the schools, it is very important to identify what Unitarianism was at that time and its place in the Massachusetts life of the time. William W. Fenn has provided a clear description of Unitarianism as compared to the Calvinism which preceded it. Fenn outlines four theological points on which the Liberal Protestants (including Unitarians) differed from orthodox Calvinists. They are as follows:

1) Liberals (meaning Liberal Protestants) did not believe that the Bible teaches the doctrine of the Trinity, at least in the tritheistic form held by the Orthodox.

2) Liberals stressed the humanity of Christ rather than his divinity. Some liberals went further and believed in the simple humanity of Jesus.

3) Liberals rejected the doctrine of human depravity, arguing instead for the inherent dignity and worth of humans. Liberals believed that humans were created in God's image, so divine elements were already in them.

4) Since liberals did not believe in human depravity, then regeneration was unnecessary. Instead, it was important to cultivate the divine elements in each human through education and training. [12]

It was this combination of belief in the divine element in humanity and the belief that this divine element could be cultivated and reinforced to triumph over whatever sin might be choking it, that led to the large interest in education by which Unitarians have been distinguished.[13]

Mann's Policy Regarding Religion in the Public Schools

What was Mann's view of religion in the common school? It might be helpful first to describe what it was not. Although some would credit Mann for secularizing the school system, this was not Mann's intent. In his twelfth report to the Board, Mann explicitly denied trying to keep religion out of the school, proudly reporting an increase in the number of schools in which the Bible was read.[14]

Second, though Mann's contemporaneous opponents would try to identify Mann as the originator of a policy of non-sectarianism in the common schools, this policy did not originate with him. By the time he assumed office in 1837, a law mandating non-sectarianism in the schools had already been on the books for 10 years. The Law of 1827 stated "That said committee shall never direct any school books to be purchased or used, in any of the schools under their superintendence, which are calculated to favor any particular religious sect or tenet." [15] Mann certainly agreed with and supported this law, but he did not author it.

Third, Mann did not have the power as Secretary of the Board to enforce his policy in the schools. He could only argue, persuade, and recommend. The board had no legislative power. [16] Thus, the power of the board lay in the power of its recommendations, but neither Mann nor the board could have enforced non-sectarianism in the common schools without the consent of the people. The only binding legislation regarding non-sectarianism was the Law of 1827, which had been passed previous to the creation of the board.

Mann's views on the role of religion in the common schools are clearly laid out in his first report to the board in 1838. First, Mann supported the law of 1827. He believed that that law was enacted "to prevent the school from being converted into an engine of religious proselytism; to debar successive teachers in the same school, from successively inculcating hostile religious creeds, until the children in their simple-mindedness should be alienated, not only from creeds, but from religion itself." [17]

Second, in addition to describing what should not be taught (sectarian creeds and doctrines), Mann proposes what he thinks should be taught instead:

> Independently, therefore, of the immeasurable importance of moral teaching in itself considered, this entire exclusion of religious teaching, though justifiable under the circumstances, enhances and magnifies a thousand fold, the indispensableness of moral instruction and training. Entirely to discard the inculcation of the great doctrines of morality and of natural theology has a vehement tendency to drive mankind into opposite extremes; to make them devotees on one side, or profligate on the other; each about equally regardless of the true constituents of human welfare. Against a tendency to these fatal extremes, the beautiful and sublime truths of ethics and of natural religion have a poising power. [18]

Thus, Mann had a twofold plan for religion in the common school: to keep out sectarianism, and to bring in morality and natural theology. Morality, for Mann, was "notions of right and wrong in feeling and in conduct, so that the appetites and passions, as they spring up in the mind, may, by a natural process, be conformed to the principles, instead of the principles being made to conform to the passions and appetites." [19] Horace Mann did not hesitate to outline the particulars of what it means for a child to be moral. In his 1846 letter to the 200,000 schoolchildren of Albany, New York, he wrote:

> The truth which I wish you to understand is this; that every thing which the good God has made was made for some particular purpose or purposes, and not for others;--was made to be used in certain ways and at certain times, and not inother ways or at other times...So all of you, my dear children and friends, were made to live in a certain way and to do certain things; and there are other ways in which you cannot live, and other things you must not do.[20]

Under "Things to Avoid," Mann names: lying, stealing, using profane or obscene language; being intemperate; quarreling with your playmates; being unkind to brothers or sisters; being disobedient to parents and teachers; scoffing or mocking at what is holy and good. Mann's list of "Things to Do" includes: be industrious; be temperate; be clean and neat; be gentlemanly and ladylike; be kind, generous, and magnanimous; learn something new every day; be moral and religious.[21]

Morality was more than a dominance of principles over passions and appetites, however. It was also a feeling of connectedness to the world through the heart:

> The human heart is not like a box, or a trunk, or a bag, which will hold just so much and no more. A boy's heart is not like his vest or his jacket, which would split open if he should grow into a man in five minutes. The heart may be very small,--so small as only to embrace one's self in its thoughts and desires;--this makes a very mean, selfish person. The heart may be enlarged so as to embrace a town;--this makes a good townsman. Or it may take in one's whole nation;--this makes a patriot. Or it may take in all mankind;--this makes a philanthropist. Or it may embrace in its affections the whole universe and the great Creator of it;--this makes one godlike;--and, all the way, let me tell you, from the narrowest limit to the vastest expansion, its happiness will be in proportion to its enlargement.[22]

The "natural theology" which Mann proposed for the common school meant "the

belief in God, and the reverence for him, gained from the evidences of the physical universe."[23] This contrasts with revealed religion, which is believed to originate as a direct revelation from God mediated by holy persons.[24] For Mann, knowledge of God as Creator was essential for the development of the young children. He wrote a passage reminiscent of I Corinthians 13 in his 1846 letter to the schoolchildren of New York:

> There is no other conceivable privation to be compared with an ignorance of our Creator. If a man be blind, he but loses the outward light. If a man be deaf, he but loses music and the sweet converse of friends. If a man be bereaved of companions, and the nearest and dearest kindred are plucked from his bosom; if he be persecuted and imprisoned, and torn limb from limb, by the hatred and malice of men, he is only beneath a temporary cloud, which will pass away like the vapor of the morning. But if he is "without God," he is a wanderer and a solitary in the universe, with no haven or hope before him, when beaten upon by the storms of fate; with no home or sanctuary to flee to, though all the spirits of darkness should have made him their victim.[25]

It is clear from reading this passage that Mann did not intend to secularize the schools. He did not hesitate to talk about God in the school setting. Rather, he advocated restricting this God-talk to talk about the God which most sects would acknowledge, God the Creator of the world.

Undercurrents of Unitarianism in Mann's Policy

Many of the ideas underlying Mann's policy concerning religion in the schools are closely tied to his religious views, especially those reflected in Unitarianism. First of all, Mann insisted on non-sectarianism primarily because he insisted on schools which would educate all children, rich or poor, Unitarian or orthodox, American or immigrant. He well recognized that if sectarianism were allowed to rule in school, many children would be excluded.

This firm conviction in universal education is mirrored in the Unitarian belief in universal salvation. Unitarians, like Universalists, did not believe that humans are morally depraved at birth and in need of regeneration. They believed instead that the divine elements in humans could be encouraged and reinforced through education. Thus, when Mann's fervor in promoting universal education reads like the fervor of an evangelist, it is because Mann was promoting a kind of salvation for all children, interpreted through Unitarian eyes. In fact, Mann asserts that God himself has planned the world so that education could be enjoyed by all:

> In this part of the Divine economy, the privilege of primogeniture attaches to all; and every son and daughter of Adam is heir to an infinite patrimony...Let education, then teach children this great truth, written, as it is, on the fore-front of the universe, that God has so constituted this world, into which He has sent them, that whatever is really and truly valuable may be possessed by all, and possessed in exhaustless abundance.[26]

Once again, those who know the Bible well will hear the echoes of John 3:16 in the last sentence, "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him shall not perish, but shall have life everlasting." Thus, Mann's zeal in protecting the common good, the "route to salvation," e.g. developing one's own divine character, seems to flow out of the Unitarian faith in education as a critical formative agent in people's lives. Universal schooling becomes a form of universal salvation.

Secondly, those who read Mann's journal entries and his letter are left with a strong impression of his love of and feeling of duty to his fellow humans. His wife Mary, as we saw in an earlier quote, referred to Mann's love for others as his "favorite thought." Mann's parting words in his last speech, his baccalaureate address at Antioch College in 1859, were: "Be ashamed to die until you have won some victory for humanity." [27] Unitarians, too, were humanitarian, focussing on the humanity of Jesus and the divine element in humans. Out of this heartfelt humanitarianism came Mann's strong urgings that morality be taught in the schools, for morality is about social relationships.

Some conservative Orthodox Calvinist churchmen were quite upset with Mann's policy of non-sectarianism in the schools.[28] The fact that no sect would be taught in the common school,however, did not particularly disturb Unitarians, including Mann. Unitarians were anti-creedal and a-doctrinal. It was not until 1887, for example, that Unitarians made some preliminary efforts to articulate "Things Commonly Believed Among Us." Even this statement was introduced only on the condition that "it was not binding on a single member...the statement being always open to re-statement and to be regarded only as the thought of the majority." [29]

Not only did Mann consider sectarian interpretation of the Bible in the schools inappropriate and against the Law of 1827, but also against the laws of God. He believed in God-given rights of conscience. The belief in rights of conscience was fundamental to the free-thinking Unitarians. Mann wrote in a letter to an opponent of non-sectarianism:

> Everyone who has availed himself of the means of arriving at the truth, on this point, knows that I am in favor of religious instruction in our schools, to the extremest verge to which it can be carried without invading those rights of conscience which are established by the laws of God, and guaranteed to us by the Constitution of the State.[30]

As we saw in his analysis of a sermon by Rev. Taylor, Mann regarded experience as a source for beliefs. In an 1836 letter to his sister, Mann wrote:

> What we learn from books, even what we think we are taught in the Bible, may be mistake or misapprehension: but the lessons we learn from our own consciousness are the very voice of the Being that created us; and about it can there be any mistake? [31]

This propensity toward independent thinking and reliance on experience as a source of truth is typically Unitarian. Therefore, it is not surprising that Mann argued for the integration of natural theology into the curriculum of the common schools. Natural theology is the only route to God which remains when one rejects doctrines and creeds. It was mentioned earlier in this paper that Mann himself had a hard time accepting and loving God after the negative images impressed on him in childhood. He even postponed talking about God with his children, thinking that the concept would frighten his children. [32]Nevertheless, Mann did believe in God and wanted children to know and love God as Creator of the world, the God of natural theology. Although not all Unitarians today are theists, nineteenth century Unitarians were. God the Creator was congruent with their reliance on experience and reason as sources of truth, since the wonders of nature were seen as proof of a Creator.

Finally, Mann may not have even accepted the secretaryship of the board if he had

not believed, as did other Unitarians of his day, in the moral perfectability of man. Mann's journal entry of June 30, 1837, the day he accepted the secretaryship, has often been quoted, but bears repeating in the light of this Unitarian optimism and faith in humans:

> Henceforth, so long as I hold this office, I devote myself to the supremest welfare of mankind upon earth. An inconceivably greater labor is undertaken. With the highest degree of prosperity, results will manifest themselves but slowly. The harvest is far distant from the seed-time. Faith is the only sustainer. I have faith in the improvability of the race,--in their accelerating improvability. This effort may do, apparently, but little. But mere beginning in a good cause is never little. [33]

If Mann had remained orthodox rather than become a Unitarian he may not have accepted the position of secretary of the board. Mann had a mission, and that was to promote the progress of the human race through education. To this he devoted his life.

The Implications of Mann's Policy for the Public Schools Today

It would be unfair to Mann to attempt to transplant his policy for schools then to schools now without recognizing the significant differences in our social and historical context. Nevertheless, we share a common humanity and a historical and cultural continuity with the people of Massachusetts of the 1840s. We, too, are concerned that our children learn to control their appetites and passions through a commitment to principles. We hope to convey to our children a faith in some ultimate being or purpose which will buoy them up in times of trouble. We encourage our children to develop their sense of connectedness to each other and to the universe. At the same time, we are also concerned, as was Mann, that the public school remain a place where children of all races, religions, and social groups feel included and accepted. Therefore, it would be useful to examine the principles that guided Mann in his formulation of a policy for the role of religion in the public schools. These same principles, being tied more to the human condition than to any one historical or social context, could be helpful to us in determining the direction in which we should go.

The most salient principle in Mann's policy, which some may consider surprising for that historical period, was the principle of tolerance, or "toleration," as Mann called it. The focal point of Reverend Taylor's July 2, 1837 sermon which thrilled Mann so was "toleration" for "the right of private judgment on religious subjects." This toleration proceeds from a "profound recognition of human rights." The "spirit of liberality" which values rights of conscience is also evident in Mann's own rhetoric. As mentioned earlier, Mann believed these rights of conscience to be "established by the laws of God," for our own consciousness is "the very voice of the Being that created us." This principle of tolerance and respect for the rights of conscience were fundamental to Mann in all his decision-making. Therefore, it seems likely that he would insist today, as then, that no one faith be inculcated in the children in the public schools. It also seems likely that he would encourage children to listen to their own consciousness and form ideas about religion based on their own experience, since Mann did likewise, even in his youth.

A second principle that was a consistent theme in Mann's thinking was that children should receive a moral education. For Mann, it was crucial that children learn principles that could guide and restrain the passions and appetite. The primary moral principle seemed to be a respect and concern for others. The large,

embracing heart which would not be satisfied until it had won some "victory for humanity" was what Mann was about and what he thought everyone should be about. Therefore, it seems reasonably safe to say that Mann would be a strong proponent of moral education in the public schools. Indeed, the most general purposes of education in Mann's eyes were to "preserve the good and to repudiate the evil." [34]

Finally, faith in God and faith in the human race were strong values of Mann's. He could conceive of no greater happiness for children than "to know and feel how good their Creator is," no greater privation than to be "without God." When Mann accepted the position of Secretary of the Board, he wrote that "faith was the only sustainer. I have faith in the improvability of the race--in their accelerating improvability." [35]

For Mann, faith in both God and the human race was in fact his sustainer. He believed that the test of love of God was love of "man," or our fellow human beings. Thus, it does not seem likely that Mann would advocate the secularization of our schools, if this would mean the removal of discussions of faith in God and our fellow human beings. He would no doubt be surprised and bewildered by our extreme reluctance to talk about God in the public schools today, for how can we hope that our children will have faith when we remain silent on the subject?

At the same time, since Mann felt equally strongly about rights of conscience as he did about faith, it seems likely that he would advocate teaching about religion insofar as this can be done without inculcating those religions in the students. This same concern for tolerance leads one logically to teaching about the religions of the world. While it might be difficult to picture Mann, a nineteenth century New Englander, proposing that students learn about the world religions, this does flow from his three basic principles of tolerance, morality, and faith.

Conclusion

Horace Mann's devotion to the common schools was rooted in his vision of a better and more humane race through education. This vision infuses all of Mann's writings, but one final example shall suffice. In Mann's twelfth and final annual report, delivered in 1848, Mann described the Massachusetts system of Common Schools thus:

> Without money and without price, it throws open its doors, and spreads the table of its bounty, for all the children of the State. Like the sun, it shines, not only upon the good, but upon the evil, that they may become good; and, like the rain, its blessings descend, not only upon the just, but upon the unjust, that their injustice may depart from them and be known no more. [36]

The spirit of Horace Mann is alive today in all those who work selflessly to improve the public schools in hopes of improving the human race. Were Mann here today, he might remind us that "toleration" is not only practical in a pluralistic society, but also a necessary ingredient in our love and consideration for others. He would have us examine the moral principles we are teaching our children in the schools, in the unwritten as well as the written curriculum. He would ask us if we are inspiring the children to "win some victory for humanity" during their lifetime. Finally, he would look in our schools for evidence of faith in God and faith in humanity, through our actions as well as our words.

RESPONSE TO "HORACE MANN: A UNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE ON RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS"

Professor Patrick M. Socoski
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I enjoyed reading this paper. If ever there were a true American hero, it would be Horace Mann. Zoller Wagner reflects a great enthusiasm about Mann. I resonate to this enthusiasm and would encourage more of it.

On the other hand, Zoller Wagner relies heavily on secondary sources, of which there are many. I would like to see her, as well as others, do more serious work utilizing Mann's original writings, such as the Annual Addresses. Mann has fallen somewhat out of fashion as an object of scholarly inquiry and there is room for fresh scholarship.

Zoller Wagner does build a sound argument for utilizing Mann to make a case for moral education efforts today. I have no problem in agreeing that Mann would be a strong proponent of moral education in our public schools of today. Yet Zoller Wagner does not speculate on what form this moral education, inspired by Mann's thinking, would take. A full exploration of this would, of course, constitute another paper, but I would like to see her at least begin to think about how Mann's thought might inform contemporary moral education efforts.

Mann's rejection of orthodox Calvinism and his embracing of a tolerant optimistic Unitarianism may suggest something for us. Groups such as the people for the American Way and others who monitor the activities of the religious right have noted an uprising of religious intolerance in the last decade or so. I think that Mann would want to protect our schools from the agenda of some of these groups. Specifically, I'm thinking of local, regional, and national organizations who seek to ban the works of Mark Twain and other recognized literary figures from classrooms and library shelves.

In the same category are those who orbit around a single burning issue such as making all abortions illegal. Indeed any group who would have their minority moral agenda inculcated into our students at the public's expense is anathema to Mann's spirit and works, as I see it.

This spirit, as I reflect on Mann's legacy, would encourage schools to be places where many opinions are entertained. Students, in this scenario, are encouraged to form their own opinions on moral and ethical matters. This is not to say that every opinion is acceptable. There are certainly more

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morally adequate as well as less morally adequate responses to ethical quandaries. In this connection I would encourage teachers to become familiar with what I view as a legitimate theory of moral development, Kohlberg's cognitive moral theory. While this theory is problematic, it at least provides a gridwork for stages of moral growth that are progressively more universal, reciprocal and principled. Others would encourage movement toward a morality which is more caring and interpersonally connected. This I see as another legitimate way of conceiving growth toward moral maturity.

In any case, teachers need to form a vision of moral maturity and move their students toward the highest peaks of this maturity. This vision must not only respect, but embrace the religious and cultural diversity that <u>is</u> American society, and which is an only partially tapped source of great national strength. In this connection we must tolerate even the intolerance of some religions and groups with religious affiliations. We must tolerate the scepticism toward or even the outright rejection of religiousity. This we must do no matter how personally opposed we are to such positions.

I say this because, in the end, I believe all we can do as educators and teachers of educators is promote rational decision making by our students. I realize that these terms may be laden with certain values and ideology, but I think we at least have to believe that it is possible for human beings to become more rational, as Aristotle did.

I further contend that the process of becoming rational, or more rational, will take us through Mann's notion of religious tolerance. We have to even admit the possibility of rationality taking us beyond Judeo-Christian morality. In any event, since people tend to want religion, and suffer when they are not allowed to practice it, the concept of tolerance Wagner discusses will probably always have its place in schooling which is democratic.

As a postscript, I would like to add that many of the points I have made in this response have been made by others at this conference. In particular, Charles Haynes' call for schools to cultivate civic values stands out in my mind. Values such as trust, cooperation, and caring should be cultivated and exercised in schools. They should become part of the institutional climate of the schools. Furthermore, I believe that these, and other, civic values, can be espoused in shools without invoking specific religious doctrines.

At the same time,these values can be consistent with specific religious orientations. Our desire as educators should not be to dilute or modify our students' religious faith. But the moral climate of the schools must admit a diversity of ethical orientations at the same time that it fosters our students' development of moral competence.

Mann was acutely aware of the difficulties that surround this charge. Many of these dificulties remain today. Probably teachers and other school personnel who actively promote moral education will never escape most of the problems and controversies that surround these efforts. But this is no reason to abstain from such efforts. Every teacher is a moral educator.

We must, as teacher educators, get this message across to each new corps of teachers we prepare. Zoller Wagner's paper, and others at this conference, represent efforts to deal with these matters in teacher education. And these efforts are consistent with an old adage which applies here: "Moral education is old hat. But it is a hat that each generation of teachers must wear."

TEACHING ABOUT RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL CURRICULUM: A LEGAL PROSPECTIVE

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> "it might well be said that one's education is not complete without a study of comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of civilization."[1]

Some thirty years ago, in a series of establishment clause cases, the United States Supreme Court forbad prayers and devotions in the public schools. The result of those decisions has been that public school educators prefer to avoid any reference to religion in the curriculum because it could be regarded as a violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. This belief, in part, is premised on the Court's reliance on Thomas Jefferson's metaphor of a "wall of separation between church and State."

An analytic study of these early school-related establishment clause decisions and more recent decisions shows the Supreme Court always has recognized the polity incorporated in the Constitution by the religion clauses as not freedom from religion but freedom for religion, a recognition the Court has made clear in its distinction between "advancement of religion" and "teaching about religion" in the public schools. This distinction acknowledges that religions are comprehensive belief systems present in the "marketplace of ideas." If so conceived, then they need to be included in public school curriculum as another belief system.

This paper proposes that the Supreme Court has supported a pluralistic viewpoint that encourages as many viewpoints as possible in public school curriculum, both secular and sectarian. This pluralistic viewpoint acknowledges the "marketplace of ideas" as a desirable goal for schools in preparing students. The Court, in a search for a way to achieve neutrality toward religion and schools, has changed from a stance of strict separation to accommodation and, more recently, to pluralism.

This paper contends that the legal mandate of neutrality that is manifested by the Court's pluralistic viewpoint complements the general purpose of public education--a competent citizen. This relationship of pluralism and civic competence, supported by the Court and educators, acknowledges that a society's educational system inevitably inculcates values. A properly defined legal definition of religion indicates inclusion in the value discussions inherent in education. Therefore, public school curriculum cannot evade a false sense of what the establishment clause means by excluding religion and still be neutral toward religion. Since exclusion of religious viewpoints is inherently

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non-neutral, the paper concludes not only is pluralism equitable, the Constitution requires it.

Strict Separation

Strict separation of church and state, which was the Supreme Court's position for a century and a half, was its initial viewpoint for establishment clause analysis. Jefferson and Madison provided the intellectual genesis for the strict separation doctrine. Their position was a conceptual departure from the then accepted theory of church-state separation.[2] The Court indicated strict separation as a constitutional interpretation when it quoted Jefferson's wall metaphor.

The decision that clearly solidified strict separation in a school context as a doctrinal viewpoint was Everson v. Board of Education.[3] In Everson, the Court upheld a New Jersey statute which authorized reimbursement to parents of parochial school children for bus transportation. The Court reasoned that the legislation did not violate the establishment clause because it provided a general program to help parents safely get their children to school.

The majority opinion in Everson was premised on a negative orientation regarding the meaning of neutrality.

> Neither a state nor the Federal government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions nor prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.[4]

While the foregoing explanation of what neutrality required under the establishment clause was proscriptive rather than prescriptive, it clearly espoused strict separation regarding church and state relationships.

A school policy allowing religious released time activities within the school building was ruled a violation of strict separation in McCollum v. Board of Education.[5] The Supreme Court reasoned the practice constituted state aid to religious groups, because the activities were conducted on school premises during school time. Four years after the McCollum decision, however, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a released time program in Zorach v. Clausen.[6] The Court had not rejected the strict separation doctrine, but distinguished Zorach from McCollum on the basis of facts. The Zorach released time program required students to attend religious instruction off school premises.

The Court under Chief Justice Warren also held to a strict separation doctrine in three of its four religion and education cases. In Engel v. Vitale,[7] the Court ruled unconstitutional a daily nondenominational prayer required by New York statute. The Court held that the State had engaged in a purely religious activity for the purposes of establishing religious beliefs even though student participation was voluntary. The second case was School District v. Schempp.[8] The Court held that mandated Bible readings in public schools violated the establishment clause. A third case was Epperson v. Arkansas.[9] The Court ruled unconstitutional an Arkansas statute that forbad the teaching of evolution because the legislature had enacted the law for a religious purpose.

The strict separation doctrine articulated by Justice Black in Everson came under increasing criticism as its application resulted in inconsistent outcomes and lacked clear guidelines.[10] The Court in Everson, while insisting on strict separation, allowed parents subsidies for the transportation of their children to sectarian schools. The Court bootlegged the "child welfare" rationale to permit the subsidy. The released time cases of McCollum and Zorach were distinguished by the ad-hoc distinction between on and off campus. Yet, in these cases, the Court stated the decisions upheld the strict separation doctrine.

Beside legal dissatisfaction with the strict separation doctrine, it was becoming more difficult to apply as government continued to expand its role in the economic, social, and personal lives of all citizens. This resulted in the Court considering cases that required an expanded view of the distinction between religious belief and practice, especially as it affected the meaning of neutrality.

Accommodation

A second doctrinal viewpoint began to emerge under the changes occurring in America. It was accommodation. Through accommodation, the Court attempted to limit potential government inducement of choice by protecting zones of interaction and permitting religious and nonreligious choices to be equally permissible. Thus the Court was endeavoring to recognize certain practices in which government could accommodate religious activities, yet not establish a religion. The features of the accommodation doctrine were first articulated in a two-part test in the Schempp decision. They were that a government law or practice to avoid violation of the establishment clause must have a "secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."[11] If a law or practice fails either part it is unconstitutional. The Court reasoned the two-part test would prevent the danger of the establishment clause being enacted. Historical evidence had shown that majority religious sects "might bring about a fusion of governmental and religious functions or a concert or dependency of one upon the other to the end that official support of the State or Federal Government would be placed behind the tenets of one or all orthodoxies."[12]

A third part to the accommodation doctrine was added in the Waltz v. Tax Commission.[13] A property owner brought suit to stop New York from extending property tax exemptions to religious organizations. The Court found that the primary purpose of the law was to relieve all nonprofit institutions from the burden of tax liability, including such secular agencies as hospitals and

museums. There was also no primary effect of advancing religion. The Court, however, then focused on whether the law would result in "excessive governmental entanglement with religion."[14] The Court stated that any direct money subsidy, excluding the challenged tax exemption, that required extensive government monitoring procedures would constitute excessive entanglement. The Court said the need for the excessive entanglement analysis was to prevent the government from interfering in the affairs of religious organizations. As to the New York statute, the Court ruled that tax exemption was the least intrusive approach to protect religious practice. The law was, therefore, not a violation of the establishment clause.

The Court synthesized the three-part test developed in Schempp and Waltz when it decided Lemon v. Kurtzman.[15] This decision involved two separate cases. A Pennsylvania statute provided reimbursement for teachers' salaries and textbooks for courses taught in sectarian schools. A Rhode Island statute permitted the State to directly supplement teacher salaries in sectarian schools for teaching secular subjects. The well-known Lemon test states a "statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'"[16] Using the three-part test, the Court found that the statutes had a secular purpose because they were to enhance the quality of secular education for all children. However, the Court regarded the amount of government supervision to assure the parochial school teachers did not infuse sectarian material into secular subjects would require excessive supervision. Therefore, the statutes were unconstitutional.

The application of the Lemon test has resulted in some flexibility for the courts to resolve church and state relationships in education. However, the Supreme Court's reluctance to use a categorical approach in applying the test has resulted in divergent outcomes. The Court ruled in Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist tuition reimbursement grants and income tax credits to parents whose children attended sectarian schools advanced religion.[17] Yet, in Mueller v. Allen,[18] the Court held a Minnesota statute that permitted parents tax deductions for expenses incurred in sending their children to sectarian schools to be constitutional. The Court reasoned that the tax deduction in Mueller was for all parents while in Nyquist the tax credit was for parents whose children attended nonpublic schools.

The Court's decisions regarding curriculum oriented issues have also been as mixed as the aid cases when applying the Lemon test. A New York statute was struck down by the Court in Levitt v. Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty.[19] The Court ruled that reimbursing nonpublic schools for expenses incurred in administering state tests, maintaining student attendance and health records, and reporting teacher qualifications, would have the primary effect of advancing religion. Also, it would lead to excessive entanglement. Then, in Commission for Public Education v. Regan,[20] ten years later, the Court ruled a revised New York law that reimbursed all public and private schools for expenses associated with state testing and record keeping did not violate the establishment clause.

Two cases especially show the resulting confusion as to what is permissible under the Lemon test. The Meek v. Pittinger case involved a Pennsylvania statute

that permitted auxiliary services for the exceptional and disadvantaged nonpublic school students.[21] It provided for the lending of instructional materials, equipment, and textbooks. The Court invalidated all but the textbook provision on the grounds that the statute had the unconstitutional primary effect of advancing religion because of the predominantly religious character of some of the receiving schools. The Wolman v. Walter decision held as constitutional an Ohio statute that provided nonpublic students with books, standardized testing and scoring, diagnostic services, and remedial services.[22] The provision was found unconstitutional in regard to supplying instructional material and field trips because nonpublic school teachers could use them for sectarian instruction. Excessive entanglement would be required to assure they did not do so. The foregoing accommodation cases did indicate the Court was more flexible about aid to religion than under the strict separation doctrine.

The Court, however, continued to remain very sensitive to possible religious practices in the public schools under the Lemon test. A noted decision by the Court was Stone v. Graham.[23] Declared unconstitutional was a Kentucky statute that required the posting of the Ten Commandments in all public school classrooms. The Court reasoned the posting did not serve an educational purpose and its effect was to encourage students to "read, meditate upon, and perhaps to venerate and obey the Commandments."[24] In Wallace v. Jaffree,[25] the Court also ruled unconstitutional a "moment of silence" law because the legislative history showed the Alabama legislature passed it for religious purposes. The Edwards v. Aguillard decision held a Louisiana statute requiring the teaching of creative science whenever evolution was taught as unconstitutional because the law was enacted for a religious purpose.[26]

A close reading of the accommodation decisions, however, indicates that the Court has been more concerned about either supporting or mandating religious beliefs or practices than treating religion and nonreligion in an equal manner. Dicta in a number of the cases suggested the Lemon test would not bar, for example, the Bible as a text in a comparative religion class, so long as it is done in a nonindoctrinating manner.

The Lemon test has been the basis for determining religion and education issues because it was more flexible than the strict separation doctrine. Recently, however, legal scholars, citizens, and the Court itself, have begun to reexamine the Lemon test.[27] Some citizens have regarded the effect of the Lemon test to be anti-religious especially in regard to the curriculum.[28] The main emphasis is that while the establishment clause requires that the government not advocate any particular religion or nonreligion, it also requires that government not favor nonreligion over religion or foster anti-religion.

Pluralism

Certain Justices on the Supreme Court also have acknowledged the weakness of the Lemon test. Former Chief Justice Burger, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy have voiced strong reservations. They have been more willing to view the legislative purposes and primary effect prongs as encouraging pluralism. Also they have been more willing to accept a certain degree of entanglement with religion to assure religion remains in the "marketplace of ideas."

In Marsh v. Chambers,[29] Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion did not apply the Lemon test to uphold the Nebraska legislature paying chaplains to deliver a prayer before each session. He simply concluded the practice had such a long history that it was part of society's fabric and was a practice with "a tolerable acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among the people of this country."[30]

A second and more significant exception to the Lemon test was the Lynch v. Donnelly decision.[31] The city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island erected a nativity scene in a park owned by a nonprofit civic organization. It was part of a Christmas display that included such secular symbols as Santa Claus, reindeer, and Christmas trees. Chief Justice Burger again wrote the majority opinion wherein he did use the Lemon test which he had written. The Court found, however, the city had not intentionally advanced religion nor was there any sectarian purpose. If any benefit to religion resulted from the creche's inclusion, it was incidental. The Court made an analogy between the use of the creche and the inclusion of religious paintings in a municipal museum.

Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, strongly argued for a refinement of the Lemon test. She stated that the secular purpose and primary effect parts were relevant to the constitutionality of the creche if they served to determine if the government's action conveyed an endorsement of religion. The purpose aspect should ask whether the city intended to endorse Christianity with the creche's inclusion, and the effect test should ask whether the city actually conveyed a message of endorsement. She believed the case facts only showed the city had made a neutral acknowledgement of religion, as did the inclusion of "In God We Trust" on coins and opening the Court's own sessions with "God save the United States and this honorable court." She regarded these types of practices served "the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society."[32] Justice O'Connor's primary concern in Lynch was whether the governmental activity sent "a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community."[33]

While only a year later in Wallace v. Jaffree the Court reasserted the Lemon test, both Justice O'Connor's concurrence and then, Justice Rehnquist's forceful dissent, clearly indicated strong reservations about the Lemon test's utility. Justice O'Connor agreed that legislative history showed the primary purpose of the moment of silence was to endorse the Christian religion. She cautioned, however, if a similar type of statute did not show such a clear purpose, the Court should then defer to the state when it has expressed a plausible secular purpose for the legislation or denies any intent to encourage religious activity. Again, as in Lynch, her main concern was whether the state conveys or attempts to convey the message that the children should pray during the moment of silence.

Justice Rehnquist wrote a long dissent asserting the Court had been wrong in relying on Jefferson's metaphor. He argued that the religion clauses were adopted to prohibit the establishment of a national religion and discrimination among religions. He also found nothing in the history of the religion clauses indicating government neutrality between religion and

nonreligion or prohibiting the government from providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion. Rehnquist concluded his dissent by stating the Lemon test was faulty because it has resulted in producing "consistent unpredictability." He called for a new approach for the analysis of the establishment clause.

While some Justices on the Court had become dissatisfied with the Lemon test, it was used in a recent case that focused on curriculum. In Edwards v. Aguillar,[34] Justice Brennan ruled the Louisiana Balanced Treatment for Creation Science and Evolution Science in the Public School Instruction Act was a violation of the establishment clause. In the 7 to 2 majority opinion, he said the Act's primary purpose was the promotion of a particular belief--a supernatural being created humankind.

Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued the Louisiana legislature had articulated a secular purpose for the Act. Using language very critical of the majority opinion, he contended they had taken a quantum leap by inferring a religious purpose, and the Court should exercise deference to state actions unless clear evidence shows a constitutional violation.

Two recent decisions have indicated a growing change in the Court's view on the establishment clause mandate that neutrality is better achieved by the pluralistic doctrine. Both decisions showed the force of Justice O'Connor's endorsement test. The first case was County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union.[35] The case facts were that a Holy Name Society, a Roman Catholic lay organization, donated a creche display. It was displayed in the Allegheny County Courthouse's Grand Stairway with a sign proclaiming "Gloria in Excelsis Deo." There were no other holiday symbols present in the display other than two evergreen trees and poinsettias surrounding the creche. A second holiday display also was challenged by the plaintiffs. This display consisted of an 18 foot Chanukah menorah, which was located outside the City-County Building. A 45 foot Christmas tree was in the display too, along with a sign with the Mayor's name and a statement expressing Pittsburgh's "salute to liberty."

Justice Blackmun, who wrote the 5 to 4 opinion, ruled the creche display violated the establishment clause because its primary effect was "endorsing" a patently Christian message. As to the Chanukah and Christmas tree display, he said it had no effect of simultaneously "endorsing" Christian and Jewish faiths, but was a secular manifestation of Christmas, a recognized holiday season, coupled with the acknowledgement of Chanukah as a contemporaneous alternative tradition. A studied reading of the Allegheny decision clearly indicates that the Lemon purpose and effect tests were interpreted on the premise of endorsement.

Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, agreed the Chanukah and Christmas tree display did not violate the establishment clause. She reasoned, that while the Chanukah was a religious symbol, its inclusion with the tree and sign conveyed a message of pluralism and freedom of belief in a setting that neither could be viewed as endorsing either Christianity or Judaism nor disapproving alternative beliefs.

Justice Kennedy wrote a strong opinion, both concurring and dissenting with parts of the judgment. He was joined by Rehnquist, White, and Scalia.

His main contention was the Lemon test has resulted in a hostility toward religion which is a violation of the establishment clause and inconsistent with American history.

The Board of Education of Westside Community School v. Mergens decision indicated a shift to the pluralistic doctrine in a public school setting.[36] The case dealt with the interpretation of the Equal Access Act. The issue in the case was whether the Act prohibited a school district "from denying a student religious group permission to meet on school premises during noninstructional time, and if so, whether the Act, so construed, violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment."[37] The Court, in a 6 to 3 opinion written by Justice O'Connor, ruled the school district had violated the students' rights under the Act. As to the establishment clause issue, Justice O'Connor was joined only by the Chief Justice and Justices White and Blackmun. The plurality stated the Act did not contravene the establishment clause. One reason was secondary students were "mature enough and are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis."[38]

The concurring opinions also agreed the Act did not violate the establishment clause. Justices Kennedy and Scalia joined to state that the Lemon test was not needed to decide the issue. All that was required to establish the Act's neutrality was a determination there was no direct benefit to religion and whether students or employees would be coerced to participate in a religious activity. Of particular interest was that Justices Marshall and Brennan, in their concurring opinion, agreed the Act did not violate the establishment clause. They only cautioned that a school district should publicly disclaim any endorsement of the Bible study group to assure there was no perceived endorsement.

Curriculum Implications

What can be determined from this brief sketch of Supreme Court decisions regarding teaching about religion in the public school curriculum? It is clear that any curriculum that requires a student to profess a religious belief or participate in a religious activity would be a violation of the establishment clause. Also, any curriculum that promotes one religious viewpoint to the detriment of other religions or nonreligion would be unconstitutional. The establishment clause also mandates that government cannot promote hostility to religion. Namely, government must be neutral between religions, and between religion and nonreligion.

The achievement of neutrality mandated by the establishment clause has encouraged the Court to shift from a strict separation doctrine to a pluralistic one. This shift can be characterized as equal treatment. In an applied sense, it means a right not to believe or to believe, but it does not mean the establishment clause must achieve neutrality by requiring schools to include in the curriculum only subject matter stemming from secular value systems that omit belief in any type of religion.

Whether one agrees or disagrees with the foregoing interpretation, public schools continue to be required to transmit a society's value system. Given the value-laden nature of public school curriculum, it has become evident in recent court cases that parents have challenged the nonobjective instruction about religion or its total exclusion.

These concerns regarding the value-orientation of public education have brought into focus a basic question--Is the public school fundamentally a secular institution? It is, if secular means the schools cannot teach or coerce religious beliefs to the exclusion of other belief systems. Secular, however, does not mean the absence of all things religious in the curriculum. To do so would place the schools in a legally tenuous position of providing a balanced education without reference to a dynamic force in humankind's history, a position that could be regarded as hostile toward religion.

An historically accurate and legally acceptable viewpoint of what secular means would be to reaffirm the public school as a pluralistic institution dedicated to a neutral stance in regard to religion in the curriculum. This stance has been recognized by the Supreme Court even under the strict separation doctrine, but even more so under the emerging pluralistic doctrine.

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1. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
2. See: Comment, "Constitutional Fiction: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Religion Clauses," 47 Louisiana Law Review 169 (1986).
3. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
4. Id. at 15-16.
5. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
6. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
7. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
8. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
9. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
10. See: John T. Valauri, "The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine," 48 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 83 (1986).
11. 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
12. Id.
13. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
14. Id. at 674.
15. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
16. Id. at 612-13.
17. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
18. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
19. 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
20. 444 U.S. 388 (1983).
21. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
22. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
23. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
24. Id. at 42.
25. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
26. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
27. See: Comment, "Developments in Approaches to Establishment Clause Analysis: Consistency for the Future," 38 American University Law Review 395 (1989); Comment, "The Constitutionality of Christmas Programs in Public Schools--Should the United States Supreme Court Modify Its Interpretation of the Establishment Clause?," 11 Southern Illinois University Law Journal 1233 (1987); and Comment, "Constitutional Fiction: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Religion Clause," 47 Louisiana Law Review 170 (1986).

28. See Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987) (reversing a decision that numerous public school textbooks violated establishment clause by advancing the religion of secular humanism); Mozart v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (free exercise rights not violated for fundamentalists because public school would not accommodate their religious objections to offensive reading materials), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1029 (1988).
29. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
30. Id. at 792.
31. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
32. Id. at 693.
33. Id. at 688.
34. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
35. 109 S.Ct. 3086 (1989).
36. 110 S.Ct. 2356 (1990).
37. Id. at 2362.
38. Id. at 2372.

A RESPONSE TO "TEACHING ABOUT RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL CURRICULUM: A LEGAL PROSPECTIVE"

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It seems obvious in responding to a paper on the relationship between religion and the state to begin by quoting the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. I'm going to take another tack and quote from the other extreme in this issue, the Bible. Paraphrasing from Mark 12: 13-17:

> Christ was obliged to face the issue when confronted by the Pharisees and Herodiens. The groups pressured him to answer the question, "Is it lawful to give tribute to Caesar or not?" Christ answered, "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's."

Dr. Beezer "proposes that the Supreme Court has supported a pluralistic viewpoint that encourages as many viewpoints as possible in public school curriculum, both secular and sectarian" (p. 1). He states, "The Court, in a search for a way to achieve neutrality toward religion and schools, has changed from a stance of strict separation to accommodation and, more recently, to pluralism. Finally, he contends "that the legal mandate of neutrality that is manifested by the Court's pluralistic viewpoint complements the general purpose of public education--a competent citizen" (p. 1).

I will respond to Dr. Beezer's remarks by looking at the same case trends as he chose--separation, accommodation, and pluralism. In the end I will argue that pluralism is a misnomer for the third wave, and that neutrality may even be more courteous than the Court deserves. It is my contention that the Court, in its age of "pluralism," is not plural at all. The Court is drawing a line between what is Caesar's and what is not.

Separation

The cases cited under the separation doctrine clearly reveal, as Dr. Beezer has described, that the Court would not allow the public schools to establish and/or promote religion. In cases where establishment/promotion of religion was a clear issue and a violation of the First Amendment, the Court ruled the action unconstitutional:

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McCollum (1948)--release time for religious instruction on public school grounds
Engel (1962)--nondenominational prayer required by the NY Board of Regents
Schempp (1963)--mandated Bible reading
Epperson (1968)--teaching of evolution for religious purposes.

The Court ruled as constitutional action for which the main objective was educational:

Everson (1947)--reimbursement of travel costs for parents
Zorach (1952)--release time for religious instruction off public school grounds.

Accommodation

Cases cited under the accommodation argument again reveal that the Court would not allow the public schools to be used to establish and/or promote religion. The following issues were ruled unconstitutional:

Nyquist (1973)--tuition tax credits and reimbursements for sectarian schools only
Levitt (1973)--reimbursing non-public schools for administering state tests, maintaining health records and reporting teacher quality
Meek (1975)--lending instructional materials and equipment
Wolman (1977)--public support through books, testing, diagnostic and remedial aid
Stone (1980)--posting the Ten Commandments in a public school
Wallace (1985)--moment of silence with a religious tradition
Edwards (1987)--teaching of creationism for religious purposes when evolution was taught.

The following situations were found to be constitutional:

Mueller (1983)--tax deductions for educational expenses are constitutional when public and non-public school parents benefit
Regan (1983)--reimbursement for state testing and record keeping are constitutional when public and non-public schools benefit
Meek (1975)--lending textbooks to non-public schools is constitutional.

Pluralism

Again, where the intent of action was the establishment and/or promotion of religion, the Court ruled such action unconstitutional. In the following cases the Court found actions to be unconstitutional:

> Wallace (1985)--moment of silence law with a religious tradition
> Edwards (1987)--teaching of creationism for religious purposes when evolution was taught
> County of Allegheny (1989)--creche display in a courthouse.

In the following cases the Court found actions to be constitutional:

> Marsh (1983)--legislature paying chaplain to deliver opening prayer before each session
> Lynch (1984)--nativity scene erected by a city in a park owned by a non-profit organization; included secular symbols
> County of Allegheny (1989)--Christmas and Chanukah menorah outside city-county building
> Westside Community School (1990)--Student religious group meeting on school grounds during non-instructional time.

It is interesting, and I think crucial to note that in three of the just mentioned cases where the Court ruled actions to be constitutional--Marsh, Lynch, and County of Allegheny--the Court considered the issue under question to be not a religious issue but a secular issue. In Marsh, the opening prayer was more a matter of tradition. In Lynch the nativity scene was viewed as one of many secular symbols, not a religious symbol. And in County of Allegheny the lone creche in the courthouse was ruled unconstitutional, while the Christmas tree and Chanukah menorah were secular manifestations of Christmas, and again, not religious symbols.

The Court in effect removed the issue of religion from the decisions, and with it the possibilities of religious pluralism. Where the case was one of religious emphasis (with the possible exception of Westside Community School) such as Wallace and Edwards, the Court ruled for unconstitutionality. It is again interesting and crucial to my argument against pluralism that in both Wallace and Edwards, Dr. Beezer cites minority opinions in defense of his case. Forceful opinions maybe; minority nonetheless. Finally, three of the cases cited in defense of religious pluralism in public schools--Marsh, Lynch, and Allegheny are not substantively related to the public schools.

To deny religious emphasis and purpose to some extent, and I think a great extent, removes the possibility of religious pluralism, at least in the logic of recent Supreme Court decisions cited here. If an issue is not religious in nature, can it promote religious pluralism? Maybe the Court, rather than promoting pluralism, seems to be suggesting that we render unto God the things that are God's. Maybe the Court is also saying that sometimes Caesar's things are not religious anyway.

Grace in Teaching[1]

Eric Bredo
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What is good teaching? While virtually everyone has an opinion, teaching seems to be too diffuse and various to reach any definite conclusion. The question nevertheless continues to inspire answers.

One answer derives from "process-product" research on teaching. Such research seeks to find the teaching behaviors which result in increases in student learning, usually as measured by standardized tests. It implicitly suggests that good teaching is that which causes increases in these outcomes.[2] This answer is like saying that the way to live a good life is to do whatever makes a lot of money. But how does one balance this goal against others? Should one seek to make more money even at the expense of spending less time with the children, for example? By the same token, should present achievement scores be improved even at the expense of having students dislike a subject, thereby undermining their future achievement? Process-product research results in technical advice on how to achieve a given goal, but says nothing about whether that goal is worthwhile or how it should be traded-off against others.

Another answer, deriving from research on teacher problem-solving, suggests that good teaching is a result of problem-solving expertise. The more the knowledge and problem-solving strategies of novice teachers come to resemble those of expert teachers, it is suggested, the better and more easily will they be able to solve the recurring problems of teaching and thus, by implication, the better teachers they will become. However, this approach assumes that current experts have formulated their problems well. It is quite possible that they may have become good at solving the "wrong" problem, with the result that their problem-solving efforts actually create worse problems in their wake.[3]

The difficulties evident with both process-product and problem-solving approaches are that each presupposes appropriately defined problems and separable goals. Yet a vital part of the problem of "good" teaching seems to involve creatively redefining situations and managing interacting rather than separable goals. As Lampert suggests:

> Some of the problems the practitioner is required to do something about might be defined as unsolvable.... I will argue...that, from the teacher's point of view, trying to solve many common pedagogical problems leads to practical dilemmas....This is because she brings many contradictory aims to each instance of her work, and the resolution of their dissonance cannot be neat or simple.[4]

With interacting problems, solving one problem may undo the solution to another, making it unclear how to proceed. Linear problem-solving strategies, like those implicit in both the process-product and problem-solving approaches, only exacerbate difficulties in such situations

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[1] I want to thank the Commonwealth Center for the Education of Teachers at the University of Virginia for support for this research.

[2] This normative position is only *implicit* in this research, many of whose practitioners would draw a categorical line between normative and descriptive propositions.

[3] Edward Seidman, "Values, Justice, and Social Science," in Rita J. Simon (Ed.), *Research in Law and Sociology*, JAI Press, Vol. 1, 1978: 175-200.

[4] Magdalene Lampert, "How Do Teachers Manage to Teach?: Perspectives on Problems in Practice," *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol 55, No. 2, May 1985: 180-181.

because they systematically ignore nonlinear interactions among goals and the problem-reframing needed to make them more managable.[1]

A different approach would be to back off from the linear-instrumental orientation that characterizes both process-product and problem-solving research and ask more broadly about the *art* of teaching. If nothing else, art seems to be addressed to the consideration of how things may be viewed in new ways as well as to harmonies and dissonances among different goals. Rather than taking goals as given and separable, it considers alternative goals and their interrelation.' An exploration of aesthetics and its application to teaching may thus furnish a kind of counterpose to the usual scientific approach to thinking about good teaching. In what follows I will adopt this tack and explore the nature of art as considered by John Dewey, Gregory Bateson, and Nelson Goodman. After discussing each of their visions of the aesthetic, I will consider what each has to say about the corrective nature of art, and then what this implies for the art of teaching. I conclude with some of their broader implications for reconceiving the relationship between the art and science of teaching.

Visions of the Aesthetic

Dewey

Everyone knows what it is like when an activity goes "just right." Imagine taking a kayak through a series of rapids where each maneuver around a rock is accomplished in a smooth fashion, neatly setting one up for the next maneuver so that the whole rapid is successfully shot in a continuous, integral flow. This image is much like Dewey's view of art in which artfulness can be implicit in any activity.

Dewey's conception of art is closely related to his analysis of the means-ends continuum. Art represents for him a synthesis or "interpenetration" of ends and means. As he puts it,

> ...normal artistic experience involves bringing to a better balance than is found elsewhere in either nature or experience the consummatory and instrumental phases of events.[2]

Here, as elsewhere, Dewey considers activities to be composed of two phases, a doing and an undergoing. One acts and is acted upon in return. The active or instrumental aspect of an activity is the part that involves artfulness, i.e. sensitively controlled production. On the other hand, the passive or consummatory phase of an activity constitutes its aesthetic aspect. Considered as a whole, art involves both of these phases, each well-integrated with the other. As Richard Bernstein explains the point,

> Life and experience can become more artistic and esthetic when there is a genuine interpenetration of means and ends—when we do not treat means as mere or external necessities, but as modes of activity inherently and immediately enjoyable, which are

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[1] Some work in the process-product tradition has investigated interaction effects, but it does so from a purely inductive direction, i.e. the empirical search for one interaction effect after another. Without a more focused approach there are quickly too many interactions to make sense of, especially if, as Cronbach pointed out, the interactions interact with one another. For the suggestion that the search needs more deductive, theoretical guidance see D. C. Phillips, *Philosophy, Science, and Social Inquiry*, N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1987: 50-66. For a response to Phillips which argues for a combination of inductive and deductive approaches see Eric Bredo, "After Positivism, What?," *Educational Theory*, Vol. 39, No. 4: 401-413,

[2] John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, N.Y.: Dover, 1958: xv-xvi

> full of enjoyed meanings and values--and when ends are not simply final points to be reached in a far-off future, but are genuine consummations and fulfillments in which means are integrated.[1]

This view is not esoteric. It simply suggests that an activity is artful when the process of working towards some desired goal is fully enjoyable and fully taken up with that goal. From Dewey's point of view, this type of mutually-implicating relationship is what is implicit in the very meaning of the terms "means" and "ends."

In this view, artful action fluidly combines short-run acts into larger actions. Like the kyack's swoop around each rock, the parts of an artful act are well-formed wholes in and of themselves, which also fit together without double takes, stutters, or backtracks, to make up a well-defined larger whole. As Dewey puts it,

> Art is a union of the generic, recurrent, ordered...with that which is...still uncertain, contingent, novel, particular....Of any aesthetic act and product it may be said both that it is inevitable in its rightness, that nothing in it can be altered without altering all, and that its occurrence is spontaneous, unexpected, fresh, unpredictable.[2]

In short, art combines the general and the particular, the stable and the transient, in a single activity. Like life itself, it is a creation at the interface.

Dewey uses this notion of non-alienated action as a basis from which to criticize dualistic philosophies in which means and ends are separated from each other and taken as different things. He criticizes those who adopt fixed ends and seek to fit their actions to them, for, "in a moving world solidification is always dangerous."[3] What initially seems like a desirable goal may later be seen as impossible or undesirable. Educational examples include those who believe in fixed patterns of individual development or see education as preparation for a given future, or purely as a means for economic development or social integration.[4] Dewey similarly criticized those who hold to fixed means which are to be used as given building blocks to reach larger ends. An example is the effort to teach behaviors in isolation which are then put together to make up larger sequences of behavior. The difficulty is that skills learned in isolation may be badly modulated in the context of everyday use .

The separation of means and ends in Western life and philosophy represented for Dewey,

> a problem so deep-seated and far-reaching that it may be said to be *the* problem of existence. For all the intelligent activities of men, no matter whether expressed in science, fine arts, or social relationships, have for their task the conversion of causal bonds, relations of succession, into connection of means-consequence, into meanings. When the task is achieved the result is art: and in art everything is common between means and ends. Whenever so-called means remain external and servile, and so-called ends are enjoyed objects whose further causative status is unperceived, ignored, or denied, the situation is proofpositive of limitations of art.[5]

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1 Richard J. Bernstein, *John Dewey*, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Pub. Co., 1966: 154-155.

2 Ibid, p. 359.

3 Ibid, pp. 409-410.

4 John Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, N.Y.: Free Press, 1916.

5 *Experience and Nature*, pp. 369-370.

He suggested that such a division between means and ends is likely to occur when there are strong social divisions between those who produce and those who consume, or between those who act and those who think.

Rather than separating science and art, Dewey saw science, considered as a concrete activity, as itself an art, every bit as much as poetry, painting, or philosophy itself.

> It would then be seen that science is an art, that art is practice, and that the only distinction work drawing is not between practice and theory, but between those modes of practice that are not intelligent, not inherently and immediately enjoyable, and those which are full of enjoyed meaning. When this perception dawns, it will be a commonplace that art--the mode of activity that is charged with meanings capable of immediately enjoyed possession--is the complete culmination of nature, and that "science" is properly a handmaiden that conducts natural events to this happy issue.[1]

Science too is an effort to link meanings of different extent and stability, such as fact and theory, with one another. On the other hand, science is a particular kind of art which focuses on the causal connections among events, hence its "handmaiden" status.

One sees in Dewey's vision the intertwining of instrumental and aesthetic concerns that he thought was essential to art. His whole philosophy is an instrumental one focusing on means-ends connections and seeing thinking, language, and philosophy itself, as functional tools for human adaptation. On the other hand, the way he thought of instrumental action was based on an aesthetics involving the possibility of actions in which each present act is pregnant with future meaning just as future ideals are actively alive in present action.

Bateson

Although he is less well-known than Dewey in educational circles, the anthropologist Gregory Bateson also had interesting things to say about art and learning.[2] In most of his work Bateson was primarily concerned with interpersonal communication rather than with instrumental action. He focused on various "pathologies" of relationship, such as arms races, in which interaction gets stuck in self-reinforcing cycles of mutual frustration and disconfirmation. Such loops he viewed as exacerbated by narrowly linear "conscious purpose," which art can help correct.

Bateson cites Aldous Huxley to the effect that the "central problem for humanity is the quest for grace."

> He (Huxley) argued--like Walt Whitman--that the communication and behavior of animals has a naivete', a simplicity, which man has lost. Man's behavior is corrupted by deceit--even self-deceit--by purpose, and by self-consciousness. As Aldous saw the matter, man had lost the "grace" which animals still have.
>
> I argue that art is part of man's quest for grace; sometimes his ecstasy of partial success, sometimes his rage and agony at failure.[3]

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1 Ibid, p. 358.

2 See, especially, Gregory Bateson, *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*, N.Y.: Ballantine, 1972.

3 Ibid., p.128-129.

Art was for Bateson a means of putting oneself in touch with the larger "system" of which one is a part and establishing a better relationship with that system. It was also a tool of psychic integration, with the psyche interpreted broadly to include relations with others and with the broader natural environment.

Bateson saw consciousness as only a small and selective part of the larger functional system of "mind."

> ...the content of consciousness is, at best, a small part of the truth about the self. But if this part be *selected* in any systematic manner, it is certain that the partial truths of consciousness will be, in aggregate, a distortion of the truth of some larger whole....and if the content of consciousness is only a sampling of different parts and localities in this network; then, inevitably, the conscious view of the network as a whole is a monstrous denial of the *integration* of that whole.....
>
> What the unaided consciousness (unaided by art, dreams, and the like) can never appreciate is the *systemic* nature of mind.[1]

Consciousness can be seen as analogous to a governor atop a steam engine. The governor samples some of the steam engine's behavior, such as the speed of the output shaft, and sends corrective "messages" which regulate it, such as by lowering the steam pressure. However, the governor cannot be sensitive to all aspects of the governor-plus-steam-engine's behavior. In some cases, such as when the governor's behavior is badly matched to the rest of the system, it may respond too rapidly or too slowly for the response time of the rest of the machine, throwing the whole system into destructive oscillation. For problems of this type the governor is actually part of the problem rather than part of the solution since its control "efforts" only contribute to instability in the behavior of the whole governor-plus-steam-engine system. Bateson describes this danger of "purposive rationality" as follows:

> ...mere purposive rationality...is necessarily pathenogenic and destructive of life;....its virulence springs specificially from the circumstance that life depends upon interlocking *circuits* of contingency, while consciousness can see only such short arcs of such circuits as human purpose may direct.[2]

Bateson used considerations such as these in analyzing interactional pathology in the self, in interpersonal relationships, and in the broader relationship between man and nature. With respect to the self, he considered cases in which an exaggerated sense of self-control contributes to the problem of acting non-adaptively. Examples include a dieter who tries to control their eating by trying harder, but then feels so deprived that they reward themselves with food, thereby reinforcing their dependence on eating as a reward when under stress, or an alcholic who tries to prove they can control their drinking by showing that they can drink "just one more," thereby falling off the wagon and reinforcing their dependence on alcohol, or a depressed person who tries to will themselves to act and, failing this, becomes more depressed and more confirmed in the hoplessness of acting. In each case the personality broadly considered is larger than the conscious mind, and not so easily manipulated. The difficulty is that conscious efforts tend to work within the same relationships that are the source of the original difficulty, such as prideful competitiveness with the "other" that one is trying to best. Tacit belief in consciousness as separate from and in control of the situation maintains the myth that more effort will solve the problem, thereby postponing the day when more fundamental

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[1] Ibid., p. 144-145.

[2] Ibid., p. 146.

changes in approach will be undertaken. The typical result is oscillation between abstinence and binge, followed by guilt, and new abstinence and binge.

Bateson's analysis of interpersonal communication is similar. Communication has its content and its relationship aspects; its *what* and its *how*. When all goes well, the relationship aspects of a message, signaled by its style or manner, suggest how its content is to be interpreted in a consistent manner. In less fortunate cases what is communicated is contradicted by how it is expressed, such as claiming to be sincere in a forced way. It is then unclear whether to believe the content of the message ("I am sincere") or the style ("I am trying very hard to *appear* sincere"), each of which appears to contradict the other. Bateson was particularly concerned with families of schizophrenics where such communicative paradoxes were common, as with a mother who says, "I love you" in a distant way to a child, who listlessly replies "Of course, I know you do." In each case the style of the message disconfirms its content, giving mixed messages about the love of one on whom one is most dependent. In particularly pathological cases mutual disconfirmation is persistent and self-reinforcing, with the struggle surround it absorbing practically all aspects of the relationship.

One can relate these communicative paradoxes to the effects of conscious purpose by noting that they tend to arise when a narrow focus on a certain objective, such as getting a particular content across, interferes with sensitivity to other concerns, such as the relationship with the other person. The more one *tries* to convince the other, the more the effort disconfirms one's care, thereby undermining its own intent. As with alcoholism, a narrow effort at control, or "conscious purpose," can be part of the problem itself.

Bateson saw a similar pathology in Western society's relation to nature. Although we are only a small part of nature, we often treat nature as though it were a separate thing to control as we like. By focusing only on narrow instrumental purposes we neglect and may destroy the broader system of which we are a part. He saw some of the ideological roots of this problem in Western theology, with its placement of God outside of and superior to nature, as opposed to the immanent god(s) of, say, animistic religions. And, he saw modern science, with its focus on small, determinate connections between easily controlled events as part of the problem, since broader and longer-run causal loops tend to be neglected. The social sciences were also viewed as contributing to pathologies by adopting physical metaphors such as those of "power," when they would do better to base themselves on the parts of science dealing with information and communication.

Art figures in all of this as a form of communication between different levels of "mind," helping to integrate its conscious and unconscious aspects. The artist is involved in a paradox, since they are consciously *trying* to show the unconscious relationships underlying their actions.

> The artist's dilemma is of a peculiar sort. He must practice in order to perform the craft components of his job. But to practice...makes him, on the one hand, more able to do whatever it is he is attempting; and, on the other hand,...less aware of how he does it. If his attempt is to communicate about the unconscious components of his performance, then it follows that he is on a sort of moving stairway (or escalator) about whose position he is trying to communicate but whose movement is itself a function of his efforts to communicate. Clearly, his task is impossible, but, as has been remarked, some people do it prettily.[1]

This paradox was neatly summed up by the Danish poet and scientist, Piet Hein, when he wrote:

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[1] Ibid., p. 138.

There is one art,
No more, no less,
To do all things
With artlessness.[1]

Grace or artlessness is a state in which such paradoxes have been overcome, at least momentarily. It is when what is done and how it is done are mutually consistent, such as when communicative form is consistent with content or when one "cannot tell the dancer from the dance." One message communicated in such moments is that of humility, of accepting the limitations of one's conscious control. By showing how partial is consciousness, art can suggest a better, more humble relationship between our conscious and unconscious selves.

Goodman

A third vision of the aesthetic comes from the philosopher Nelson Goodman. Goodman focuses on cultural symbol systems rather than on instrumental action or interpersonal communication, and in so doing develops a more elaborated semiotics than did either Dewey or Bateson.

Goodman views the "world," or at least everything we can talk about, count, point to, etc., as a symbolic construction. There is no world prior to symbolization, he suggests, no primordial given or unsymbolized world "out there," for if we cannot talk about it or indicate it using symbols, then it is a "world well lost." Furthermore, since everything is a symbolic construct using some system of conventions there is no "naked eye," no "immaculate perception" independent of the prior commitments implicit in such systems. As Bruner says of Goodman's position:

> Its central thesis, "constructivism," is that contrary to commmon sense there is no unique "real world" that preexists and is independent of human mental activity and human symbolic language; that what we call the world is a product of some mind whose symbolic procedures construct the world.[2]

One implication of this philosophy is that no description or depiction takes priority as "the way the world is." Since there are many different symbol systems, we may say either that there are many different worlds or that "the world is many ways."[3] We sometimes talk as though there were different worlds, as in "the *world* of art," and other times as though there were only different versions of one all-encompassing world. For Goodman, this distinction is itself a matter of convention.

Acceptance of many different worlds leads Goodman to acknowledge that he is a relativist, but a "radical relativist under rigorous restraint." He does not agree that "anything goes," that is,

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1 Piet Hein, *Grooks*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966.

2 Bruner, Jerome Bruner, *Actual Minds, Possible Worlds*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986: 95.

3 Nelson Goodman, "The Ways the World Is," *Problems and Projects*, Indianapolis: Hackett Press, 1972. Compare with Dewey: "If these accounts turn out different in some respects, as well as congruous in others, this is no reason for assuming the content of one to be exclusively 'real," and that of others to be 'phenomenal." The proper comparison is "not between *a Reality* and various approximations to, or phenomenal representations of Reality, but between different reals of experience." Cited in George Dykhizen, *The Life and Mind of John Dewey*, Carbondale, Il: Southern Illinois University Press, 1973: 125.

that all descriptions or depictions are equally good. Rather, a good description or depiction is constrained by various conventions and practical considerations which may include its simplicity, appropriateness, relevance, and so forth. These criteria for judging the adequacy of a description or depiction are aspects of its "rightness." Truth may be one of these, even in art (as in a fiction novel in which glaring factual errors would be jarring), but truth alone is not enough.

> Truth, far from being a solemn and severe master, is a docile and obedient servant. The scientist who supposes that he is single-mindedly dedicated to the search for truth deceives himself. He is unconcerned with the trivial truths he could grind out endlessly; and he looks to the multifaceted and irregular results of observations for little more than suggestions of overall structures and significant generalizations. He seeks system, simplicity, scope; and when satisfied on these scores he tailors truth to fit. He as much decrees as discovers the laws he sets forth, as much designs as discerns the patterns he delineates.[1]

Furthermore, in the case of pictorial representations truth does not even apply, since no propositions are being asserted.

The point of Goodman's analysis is both to undermine the dogmatic view that there is only one way the world is and to broaden our conception of the cognitive to include art. Where battle lines are often drawn between natural science and literature, Goodman would expand the scope to include painting and the performing arts. He would also soften lines between these activities by emphasizing what science, literature, and art have in common, as well as how they differ. For instance, they share some general principles of world-making, such as all using symbol systems to recode some symbolic given, thereby making new "worlds," as well as using criteria of "rightness" in evaluating the resulting descriptions or depictions.[2] The aim of this broader view is, then, a more general theory of human "understanding" as contrasted with current theories of "thinking."

Goodman also points out differences between art and science. Art and science differ primarily in their methods of symbol use, not in their in subject matter, such as objects versus emotions (contra Suzanne Langer). Art tends to *express* things analogically.[3] That is, the symbols used in art tend to be analog symbols that differ only in degree, like the shade of a line. Furthermore, art tends to express things, rather than say them, by which Goodman means that it shows rather than tells, and that it shows in a metaphorical rather than literal light. Science, on the other hand, tends to use digital symbols for literal representation. Its symbols tend to be clearly distinct, like the distinctive numbers on a digital watch, and are used to literally label distinct sets of individuals. The difference between science and art, then, tends to be a matter of different types of symbol systems and ways of use, with art *showing* metaphorically and ambiguously, while science *describes* literally and articulately.

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1 Nelson Goodman, *Ways of Worldmaking*, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1978: 18. My review of this book appears in the *Journal of Aesthetic Education*, Vo. 13, No. 4, Oct., 1979:109-119.

2 See Dewey, op. cit, p. xvi, for a similar position.

3 The present discussion greatly simplifies Goodman's distinctions. See Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art*, Indianapolis: Hackett Press, 1976 and Nelson Goodman, *Ways of Worldmaking*, op. cit.

The Corrective Functions of Art

Despite their different starting points--instrumental action, interpersonal communication, and cultural symbol systems--one can discern a number of common patterns in these three visions of the aesthetic. They largely agree that the source of most of the difficulties they identify is a narrowness arising from a denial of interaction and a lack of reflectiveness. Dewey sees the root difficulty in means and ends being treated as separate things rather than as part and whole. Bateson sees the principal difficulties as arising from the partial nature of conscious mind, which nevertheless pridefully treats its data as full and complete. And Goodman views those who believe in the myth of the given--in *the* way the world is--as unaware of their own contribution to constructing "worlds."

The practical result or these beliefs tends to be instrumental action which is literally "out of it." Such action may easily be self-undermining, since, by focusing on only a single aim, a single way in which a problemmatic situation may be framed, it fails to take account of the side-effects of that pursuit which may undo other goals. It defeats its own aims through contextual insensitivity.

These three visions can be seen as suggesting a common solution to this problem: the adoption of a more interactive, humble, or provisional stance. As Dewey viewed it, being humble did not imply that one's actions were without meaning.

> A chastened sense of our importance, apprehension that it is not a yard-stick by which to measure the whole, is consistent with the belief that we and our endeavors are significant not only for themselves but in the whole.
>
> Fidelity to the nature to which we belong, as parts however weak, demands that we cherish our desires and ideals till we have converted them into intelligence, revised them in terms of the ways and means which nature makes possible.[1]

Dewey later goes on to identify the root difficulty not in partiality itself, which is inevitable, but in a denial of partiality and interaction:

> Yet if man is within nature, not a little god outside, and is within as a mode of energy inseparably connected with other modes, interaction is the one unescapable trait of every human concern; thinking, even philosophic thinking, is not exempt. This interaction is subject to partiality because the human factor has bent and bias, But partiality is not obnoxious just because it is partial...What is obnoxious in partiality is due to the illusion that there are states and acts which are not also interactions. Immature and undisciplined mind believes in actions which have their seat and sources in a particular and separate being, from which they issue. This is the very belief which the advance of intelligent criticism destroys. The latter transforms the notion of isolated one-sided acts into acknowledged interactions.[2]

All three visions depict this revised, more humble, stance as involving artfulness. For Dewey, artful action is that which is "in tune" with the possibilities inherent in a concrete situation, helping to actualize those possibilities that are desired. Acting in this way involves situated intelligence, as in figuring out how to act here and now with this particular set of individuals involved in this activity rather than in some formally or externally correct way.

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[1] Dewey, op. cit, p. 420.

[2] Dewey, op. cit., pp. 434-435.

Bateson tended to emphasize a graceful congruence between what is said and how it is said, as in fully showing that you care for someone when you say that you do. When conscious purpose gets in the way of graceful communciation, art can be a corrective by revealing the relationships underlying that purpose, thereby helping to put consciousness in its place as a partial activity. Essentially, he sees art as showing the interrelation of conscious and unconscious. This is particularly evident in his interpretation of a Balinese painting:

> In final analysis, the picture can be seen as an affirmation that to choose either turbulence or serenity as a human purpose would be a vulgar error....The unity and integration of the picture assert that neither of these contrasting poles can be chosen to the exclusion of the other, because the poles are mutually dependent. This profound and general truth is simultaneously asserted for the fields of sex, social organization, and death.[1]

Finally, Goodman sees attention to art as usefully broadening our notion of what knowledge is, and emphasizing that it is many ways. For Goodman all knowledge is dependent on largely aesthetic criteria of "rightness," involving various forms of fitness, such as simplicity, elegance, relevance, usefulness, and truth. By showing that even our "hardest" knowledge involves such broad and contextually sensitive criteria, Goodman may also be seen as attempting to return knowledge to its contexts of use.

The Art of Teaching

Dewey applied his conception of art to teaching and learning by considering how teachers can artfully create conditions in which children may also artful. Much of his advice concerns how teachers can adopt a less directive stance while acting positively but indirectly to foster educative experiences for children. This stance derives from his rejection of alienating external aims, i.e. of ends which are extrinsic to a social activity.

> In other words, the external idea of the aim leads to a separation of means from end, while an end which grows up within an activity as plan for its direction is always both ends and means, the distinction being only one of convenience.[2]

In emphasizing how the ends of teaching can arise within the activity, Dewey is in effect suggesting that artful teaching occurs when one goes with the grain of the activity rather than forcing it. Teaching can be like the work of a craftsman who utilizes the grain in a piece of wood to suggest what it might become, rather than mechanically sawing it into two-by-fours.

More particularly, good aims should satisfy a number of criteria. They should be sensitive to the initial situation. For instance, they "must be founded upon the intrinsic activities and needs... of the given individual to be educated" rather than being directed to some fictive "normal" student.[3] Second, good aims should be flexible so that when conditions change they can change and continue to guide inquiry. In school this means that an aim "must suggest the kind of environment needed to liberate and to organize *their* capacities. Unless it lends itself to the construction of specific procedures, and unless these procedures test, correct, and amplify the aim, the latter is worthless."[4] This is opposed to teaching by following the lesson plan to the

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1 Bateson, op. cit., pp. 151-152.

2 *Democracy and Education*, p. 106.

3 Ibid, pp. 107-108.

4 Ibid, p. 108.

letter or doggedly plowing through the material regardless of impinging events. Finally, good aims are those whose accomplishment ramifies and opens up new lines of action and inquiry. Accomplishment of a given lesson, for instance, should have meaning or implications extending beyond the lesson, helping to inspire and guide future inquiry, rather than being something that is merely "gotten over with."

As these criteria for educational aims suggest, the artful teacher must combine sensitivity and adaptability to current conditions with longer-run continuity and fruitfulness.[1] Like a good craftsman, they must be sensitive both to present shape and detail and to what it might become. Dewey sums this up as follows:

> It is an old saying that unity in variety marks every work of genuine art. Certainly the art of teaching bears out the saying. If one recalls his contacts with teachers who left a permanent impress, one will find that, although they may have violated in their teaching many of the set rules of pedagogy, they were persons who could maintain continuity of thought and effort even when admitting what seemed to be diversions and forays into side fields; that they were persons who introduced novelty and variety to keep attention alert and taut, but who also utilized these factors to contribute to the building up of the main problem and the enrichment of the main theme.[2]

Bateson's view of art also seems to suggest a less directive relationship with students, applying most directly to issues of control and authenticity. Teachers often think *they* are in control of their classes, a view that is reinforced by standard conceptions of their jobs. However, this attitude can contribute to poor social relations by placing too much of the burden on teachers and undermining students' efforts at self-control. It leads to notions of teachers' being responsible for "making" students learn, thereby placing students in a passive and dependent positon, rather seeing educative interaction as a cooperative endeavor. The power/dependence aspects of the relationship can easily get out of control and lead to increasing distrust as teachers attempt to make students learn and students respond by becoming more passive. As Bateson notes of the belief in power:

> They say that power corrupts; but this, I suspect, is nonsense. What is true is that the *idea of power* corrupts. Power corrupts most rapidly those who believe in it, and it is they who will want it most....Perhaps there is no such thing as unilateral power. After all, the man "in power" depends on receiving information all the time from outside. He responds to that information just as much as he "causes" things to happen....But the *myth* of power is, of course a very powerful myth and probably most people in this world more or less believe it. It is a myth which, if everybody believes in it, becomes to that extent self-validating. But it is still epistemological luancy and leads inevitably to various sorts of disaster.[3]

In contrast to this "ugly" belief in power, a more artful approach to teaching would be more humble and respectful of the collaborative nature of teaching and learning. Seen in this way teaching is not so much a "treatment" which causes certain results as it is the creation of an opportunity, a set of jointly-constructed conditions in which valuable things *may* happen.

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[1] As Dewey lays out in *Experience and Education* (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1938), good, educative experiences are those that satisify criteria of "interaction" and "continuity," i.e. that are well-fitted to where a person is at present and that lead on and build upon one another.

[2] John Dewey, *How We Think*, N.Y.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1933: 54-55.

[3] Gregory Bateson, op. cit., 1972: 486-7.

The other side of control is that of authenticity, since greater humility towards oneself parallels greater humility towards others. Bateson's notion of grace would seem to involve a better coordination between what one says and how one says it, or between conscious and unconscious aspects of communication. The authentic willingness to accept and openly be who one is, with all one's limitations, errors, and vanities, would seem to be a part of graceful teaching, as conceived by Bateson. Both aspects of humility--towards others and towards oneself--could help in allowing those moments to occur when the members of a class forget who is "teacher" and who "student" and lose themselves in inquiry.

Goodman has not been as overtly concerned with the moral or educational significance of his work as were Dewey or Bateson, but some of its implications may nevertheless be tenatively drawn. Since his work focuses on symbol systems one might expect it to be most immediately applicable to the content of teaching. By undermining the myth of the given, Goodman points to a less dogmatic or authoritarian approach to knowledge. If the world is many ways, and truth or other forms of rightness are relative to worlds, then the assumptions on which knowledge is based are more easily questioned. Knowledge becomes more hypothetical and more contingently based on existing habits rather than dogmatically given. This may seem obvious enough, but a certain dogmatism with respect to knowledge is built into many of the most influential educational theories. As Bruner points out,

> Even Piaget, whose epistemological theory was a constructivist one--with more elaborated constructs encompassing simpler ones in the course of growth--clung nevertheless to a residual naive realism. Constructions for him were representations of an autonomous real world to which the growing child had to fit or "accommodate."[1]

In emphasizing a variety of different forms of symbolization, Goodman's work also serves to legitimize many different approaches to knowing. If art and science are no longer so different, then perhaps they should not be given such different status. By the same token, perhaps we need to enlarge our view of what counts as knowledge in school. And, in emphasizing that knowledge is made rather than found, Goodman implicitly invites others to help in its construction. If teachers and students can consider how it is made, what kinds of codification are used, and whether it was made well, then they can get some distance from these practices, as though describing our culture to an outsider. One can ask many legitimate questions about how something is represented, for instance, rather than taking the way the problem is framed for granted. Such an approach may help create a more favorable attitude towards the subject, which now becomes just one practice among many rather than *the* only way the world is.

Conclusions

These three visions of aesthetics suggest some of the characteristics of good teaching. That they do not fully answer the originial question should not be surprising since good teaching comes in many forms. Artful teaching cannot be reduced to a formula, just as artful painting is not painting-by-numbers. However, the considerations raised in these views of art can be useful in thinking about good teaching, not the least because they raise issues that are often neglected.

All three views of art can be seen as protests against an unreflective, mechanical approach to teaching or any other activity. To the extent that aims are external (Dewey), purposes narrow and instrumental (Bateson), or one-right-way thinking utilized (Goodman), artfulness is destroyed. The implication is that narrowly linear approaches to teaching may actually

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[1] Bruner, op. cit., p. 98.

contribute to poor teaching, if taken literally, for the mechanical use of an answer destroys thoughtfulness and contextual sensitivity.

The remedy they propose is to bring contextual sensitivity back in. In Dewey's case this means having ends that evolve out of the situation rather than being imposed from outside. The problems that students attempt to solve, for example, must be their problems, problems arising from dilemmas evident in their activity. For Bateson, the social context must be taken into account. Nonpathological contexts would involve greater communicative authenticity and humility; an acknowledgment of the cooperative, collaborative construction of educational activity rather than a search for control. And for Goodman, it is the importance of conceptual contexts that needs to be acknowledged, since truth and other forms of rightness are relative to worlds.

An altered view of the science of teaching is also suggested in these aesthetic views. Both Dewey and Bateson suggest that a science of teaching and learning must not only be sensitive to its own context, but also to the way those being studied create and use contexts. Such a reflexive science would be more alive to the ways in which people frame and reframe their problems, define and redefine their contexts, conceive and reconceive of their knowledge. It would see itself as part of this process, for science is part of the way in which we redefine and reorganize ourselves. And it would see phenomena that Bateson liked to emphasize, such as play, humor, paradox, and ritual as important to a science of teaching and learning rather than as frills to be ignored. Such a social science could be more artful by being more sensitive to the artfulness of those being studied.

This view of the science of teaching and its relation to the art of teaching is quite different from some of the prevailing ones. For instance, Gage suggested that scientific results can provide a *basis* for teaching by specifying a few optimally fixed parameters for teachers, while adjustment of the rest is left to the teacher's art. From the present point of view, this is like saying that the way to play basketball well is to nail one foot down in the best position on the floor and then adapt as best you can. A great deal of rigidity is brought in by treating scientific generalizations as fixed constraints rather than as hypothetical guides to action and investigation in the context. Others, such as Bruner see art as proposing hypotheses which science disposes of, much as qualitative research is often seen as a preliminary to more rigorous quantitative testing. However, this is an overly narrow view of art, which involves suggesting entire new language games--new worlds--and not just new propositions.[1] We might do better in thinking of science and art as each involving the other; as mutually constituting activities, like Escher's "Two Hands Drawing," rather than as two separate "things." Seen in this way what is focal for science--solving well-defined problems--is peripheral to art. On the other hand, what is focal to art, the values implicit in a given solution or "object," is peripheral to science. Each activity calls upon the other in creating itself.

Of course this portrayal of the possible relationship between the art and science of teaching is not simply "the way the world is." It is one view, based on its own presuppositions and commitments, such as a belief in the importance of context. Furthermore, the relationship between art and science depends upon what we make it. Depending on how their proponents approach one another, art and science may become relatively cooperative with or antagonistic to one another. Seeing art and science as mutually constituting is not only a way of describing their relationship, but is also a way of attempting to improve it.

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[1] See Bruner, op. cit, p. 52. Bruner's view also excludes the non-propositional and non-cognitive aspects of both art and science.

DISEMBODIMENT AND REEMBODIMENT IN TEACHING AND LEARNING

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INTRODUCTION

Professor Bredo first of all is to be commended for the courage he displays in asking the large question "What is good teaching?", and commended for providing significant answers to this question. We learn that good teaching includes qualities such as grace and humility, dialogue and democracy, aesthetic technique and contextuality. Not new ideas, of course, but ones of which all teachers need reminding. Commendable also are professor Bredo's efforts to bring together such different thinkers as Dewey, Bateson, and Goodman and the philosophical and sociological contributions they make to our understanding of to the art of good teaching. It is no small achievement to present these philosophies as clearly and concisely as Bredo manages to do.

But alas, although the paper is filled with many interesting hints and suggestions about the nature of good teaching, Bredo fails to pursue very far any one of them. His paper is largely a descriptive-comparative survey of certain aspects of Dewey's, Bateson's and Goodman's thought, with some attempt to make applications to the nature of good teaching. But he fails to provide a careful, critical analysis of any of the valuable hints scattered throughout his paper. Put differently, my main complaint is that Bredo's paper, like many family vacations, attempts to traverse far too much terrain in far too little time. The agenda he sets for himself is too ambitious; he does not allow himself or us sufficient time to sit and enjoy the rapidly receding but nevertheless spectacular scenery. In the remainder of this paper I plan to to sit and enjoy one such scene; there are three or four others which warrant similar attention.

EMBODIMENT AND TEACHING

Several times in his paper Bredo drops, but otherwise fails to analyze, the hint that the art of good teaching assumes the contextuality of knowledge. Especially in reference to Goodman's "constructivist" views, Bredo suggests that "all knowledge [is] dependent on what are essentially aesthetic criteria of 'rightness.' ...Even our hardest, firmest knowledge involves...broad contextual criteria...[and is] shaped by its contexts...."[1] Hence, for Goodman and Bredo there is no "real world that preexists," there is no "naked eye," no "immaculate perception," "no primordial given or unsymbolized world 'out there,'" no purely abstract, ahistorical, universal knowledge existing independent of a person's or society's "symbol system."[2] But what does this mean for teaching? What difference does it make for teaching and learning to acknowledge that knowledge is situated, constituted by its historical and cultural context? Regrettably Bredo never tells us, he seems uninterested in pursuing very far the implications of this constructivist claim for the art of teaching. This I shall try to do by appealing to two chief sources of Western philosophical and pedagogical tradition, Platonic and Christian.

Greek and Christian sources really provide differing, if not conflicting, models of teaching and learning. These models are con-

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stituted by different assumptions about the nature of knowledge, the aims of education, and the method whereby these aims are achieved. The aim of learning in the Platonic tradition, for example, is disembodied knowledge, whereas the aim of learning in the Christian tradition is embodied knowledge. My thesis is that good teaching favors the Christian tradition over the Platonic. In what follows, I try to provide historical explanation and philosophical justification for this model.

The difference between Platonic and Christian models of teaching and learning are perhaps most vividly depicted by contrasting the Platonic and Christian beliefs regarding life after death. The contrast is familiar; for Plato eternal life consists in the immortality of the soul, whereas for Christians, although sometimes mistakenly absorbing this Platonic belief, eternal life consists in resurrection of the body. This difference in belief regarding eternal life makes all the difference, as it were, for teaching and learning.

In the Phaedo, Plato recounts the death of Socrates and in so doing provides us with "perhaps the most sublime doctrine ever presented on the immoratlity of soul."[3] Plato"s argument is well known, and is summarized nicely by Oscar Cullmann. "Our body is only an outer garment which, as long as we live, prevents our soul from moving freely and from living in conformity to its proper eternal essence. It imposes upon the soul a law which is not appropriate to it. The soul, confined within the body, belongs to the eternal world. As long as we live, our soul finds itself in a prison, that is, in a body essentially alien to it. Death, in fact, is the great liberator. It looses the chains, since it leads the soul out of the prison of the body and back to its eternal home."[4] Thus, not only does destruction of the body not mean the destruction of the soul, but destruction of the body is essential if the soul is to soar to its highest immortal fulfillment. In his final moments of life, in fact, Socrates continued to teach and to show how even in this present life we accelerate the freedom of the soul when our minds occupy themselves with eternal truths. That is, through philosophy, through the education of the soul, "we penetrate into the eternal world of ideas to which the soul [truly] belongs, and we free the soul from the prison of the body. Death does no more than complete this liberation"[5] In this context it is not surprising to hear Socrates saying that philosophers, as true teachers of wisdom, "make dying their profession."[6] But what has this to do with teaching and learning?

First, this Platonic model of learning was retrieved by the Enlightenment and forwarded as an essential element of modern education. Although under attack, it is this Platonic/Enlightenment model which continues to dominate educational philosophy today. Second, one pedagogical assumption of this model is that genuine knowledge consists of transcendent, disembodied knowledge; knowledge which has escaped the prison of its cultural body; knowledge which is abstract, universal, ahistorical and hence immortal. Third, accordingly, the aim of learning is liberation and not recreation; teacher and student try to find pedagogical ways of distilling ideas embedded in and distorted by the insufferable particularity of human experience. Reason, in this view, is a razor by which the body of human cultures and traditions are pared away in order to expose immaculate and immaculately perceived rational principles. In short, this modern pedagogical ideal favors an image of teacher as disembodied soul (i.e., objective observer) assisting the student in the practice of disembodiment.

This pedagogical process of disembodiment is explicit in various

Socratic dialogues. For example, in the Symposium, "eros" to Phaedrus, who speaks first, means the concrete, embodied experience of sexual passion; the intervening four speakers progressively disembody eros, until for Socrates, who speaks last, eros is entirely disembodied and abstracted as absolute beauty itself, whatever that may be. Similarly, in the Meno, virtue suffers an identical process of disembodiment and abstraction, and so on in most of the Socratic dialogues.

In stark contrast to the Platonic/modern model of teaching and learning is the Judeo/Christian model. Exemplified most explicitly in the experience of Jesus and taught in the early church especially by St. Paul, resurrection or reembodiment discards the Greek notion that the material, the bodily is injurious to the soul and must be destroyed if humans are to secure eternal life and eternal truths. Rather, the idea of resurrection assumes that only through reembodiment, only by recreating the concrete bodily life of ideas do we penetrate to the rich soul of their meaning. What significance does this difference have for teaching and learning?

Clearly classroom activities will strive for reembodying ideas in concrete, cultural forms and historical narratives. As Goodman and Bredo suggest, the aim of learning is situated, contextual, encultured knowledge. Education becomes an activity, not of progressively dying to one's own embodied self, but of reembodiment, of resurrecting ideas in the body and blood of concrete and common human experiences. The aim of teacher and student, then, is somehow jointly to find narrative ways of making ideas come alive for them in their experience. The assumption of this model, of course, is that a pedagogical method of embodiment is able to penetrate the depths of human emotion and experience in a way in which the method of disembodiment is unable. That is why students generally would rather read a novel than a scholarly essay. For ironically, the more disembodied, abstract and universal the idea, the more universally inaccessible it becomes. Students have little access to abstracted, disembodied ideas (although with enough graduate training anyone can gain such access). Or perhaps it is that disembodied ideas have little access to students; as disembodied they are fitted for immortal life in heaven not embodied life on earth. As abstracted, as disembodied they have little chance of penetrating to the depths of human life, and hence little chance of recreating and revitalizing students' experience. For the teacher and student alike, then, the fact of an idea's embodiment is as crucial as the idea embodied.

In short, the embodied pedagogical model implies narrative teaching and learning, which of course is nothing new. The Hebrew prophets, Jewish rabbis and Jesus all made liberal use of narrative teaching, especially in its form as parable. Jesus' teaching employs narrative as a primary pedagogical technique, and for the Christian tradition his life, death and resurrection convey eternal ideas in a concrete, embodied way; that is, they convey "the natural expression of mind that sees truth in concrete pictures rather than conceives it [as does the Socratic model] in abstraction."[7]

CONCLUSION

What is the significance of this difference between these two classical pedagogical models, Platonic and Christian? Soren Kierkegaard provides a rather poignant metaphor in which ventriloquism depicts the significance of this difference.[8] The medium for the Platonic model of education is ventriloquism, which consists in "speaking is such a way that it cannot be determined who the speaker

is; the words are heard all right, but as if they were not localized, as if no one were speaking them." That is, ventriloquism as the modern pedagogical model, "means to speak in such a way that the speaker cannot be recognized: it is a mystification in which the I is disguised as a third person, or as an abstract, [disembodied] I." All speech, of course, is an abstraction; but not all speech is abstracted like the modern Socratic ventiloquism, in which ideally both the speaker and the situation is deliberately disguised or obscured. As ventriloquist the scholar, the teacher, the student need not bear responsibility for his voice, that is, for the distortion which his disembodied voice gives to speech. Nor does the teacher as ventriloquist, bear responsibility for, what Kierkegaard calls, "the situation," which situation is "the decisive factor in determining whether the speaker is or is not in character regarding what he is saying; or the situation decides whether what is being said is airy nonsense, speech without real roots, which...is true of all speech which is devoid of situation."[8]

Yet it is precisely ventriloquism, this ideal of speech disembodied from its voice and situation, which characterizes most modern education and makes its enlightened scholarship and teaching an illusory experience, so that "one could really just as well use a machine" in the classroom.[8] So I reaffirm the thesis with which I began: that educators would do well to discard the Platonic model of learning, as Goodman and Bredo seem to have done, and fashion their professional endeavors after the reembodiment model, in which voice is reunited with speaker and situation.

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1. Eric Bredo, "Grace in Teaching and Learning." Paper presented to the South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society, The College of William and Mary, September 28-29, 1990, 9.

2. Bredo, 6.

3. Cullmann, Oscar, Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead? London: Epworth Press, 1958, 19.

4. Cullmann, 19-20.

5. Cullmann, 20.

6. Plato, Phaedo, Trans. by Hugh Tredennick, in the Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. by E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, Princeton: Princeton Univeristy Press, 1961, 67e.

7. C.H. Dodd, The Parables of the Kingdom, New York: Charles Scribners and Sons, 1961, 5.

8. Soren Kierkegaard, Soren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, 7 Vols., ed. and trans. by H. Hong and E. Hong, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1978 XI^{A} A 106.

THE ALIENATED STUDENT, THE RESTLESS HEART AND RELIGIOUS STUDY

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> "Hear people say, well, he got what he deserved, or, well, he didn't deserve what he got. Don't nobody hardly ever say, well, he got what he got, which is about the onliest thing you need to know cause that's where the hammer comes down."
>
> Jack Farris

The quote above taken from Jack Farris'[1] character Claude Dee Moran, Jr., reflects the pervasiveness of value judgments in our perspective on human behavior and the world around us. There may be many laments about the religious and moral conditions of Western civilization, but the presence of a religious sentiment is hard to ignore. The evening newscasts almost daily report events which have religious connotations and as this paper is being prepared religious debates have come close to overwhelming the political scene. About a year ago, in Charleston, South Carolina, where author Pat Conroy's literary heritage has some of its roots, his novel The Prince of Tides[2] stirred controversy as some religious leaders sought to have it removed as supplementary reading in a local high school. This book, replete as it is with moral and religious themes, was attacked because of the presence of "unacceptable" words. More recently, the rap group 2 Live Crew has become famous (and outlawed) because of the "explicitness" of their lyrics. The abortion debate, framed cognitively as the contest between the protection of the rights of the unborn and the rights of the women to choose their own destinies, is recognized by the anger, bitterness and even hate which seems so absurd for proponents of either life or choice! In June, 1990, the Vatican promulgated guidelines for Catholic theologians which made doctrinal and moral debate a private matter, not to be aired in a forum which would attract the media.

This litany could be much extended, but the point which I wish to emphasize is not only the intense infusion of "religion" into the public life of our society, but also the corollary tendency to define religion as synonymous with control. The Latin root of the term "religion" with its reference to "binding" seems clearly reflected in these citations. Even the ease with which many religious leaders associate their fervor with a rather narrow nationalism reinforces this limited scope in our public conception of religion and religious study. Batson[3], in his review of the literature on the "human capacity for caring" states: "All the research I have mentioned suggests that our capacity for altruistic caring is limited to those for whom we feel empathy." Surely, the ease with which human groups (including the fervent believers on both sides of the abortion issue) with religious ties and/or symbols can attribute evil to those outside of their camp is a source of deep concern as we wrestle with the issues of religion and religious study in public education. The rather Kierkegaardian notation by one of Walker Percy's[4] creations seems to spring to life: "Christ should leave us. He is too much with us and I don't like his friends. We have no hope of recovering Christ until Christ leaves us. There is after all something worse than being God-forsaken. It is when God overstays his welcome and takes up with the wrong people."

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These are troubling thoughts as we come to face the development of a curriculum which wishes to explore the religious dimensions of the human condition. It is not difficult to sense the wisdom of the Founding Fathers as they framed the "Establishment Clause" of the First Amendment and to recognize the legal tip-toeing inherent in such judicial options as the "Lemon test." The simple approach would be to pretend that religion did not exist or that it was an outmoded precursor of science. But there is another reality which observers of the human scene have consistently noted -- mankind is never satisfied; there is always an uneasiness; there is a need to find meaning even in the everyday happenings of life. Augustine described this restless heart (cor inquietum) as the pain that persisted even after intense pleasure; Francis Thompson captured the idea in his metaphor of the "hound of heaven";even the agnostic Freud as presented by Bettelheim[5] views life as a continuous struggle, making "it difficult for us to be at peace with ourselves for anything but short periods." It is this aspect of the human experience that brings us face to face with religion and to ignore this experience in the school curriculum is to make education incomplete.

So how does one face the task of creating an innovative curriculum for inner city high school students that will avoid the negative (in the author's view) potential of religious study described earlier while allowing for the role of religion in our human quest for meaning and completeness? This issue can not be addressed without recognizing the challenge intrinsic in working with minority adolescents in the school setting. The literature is replete with research data which document the alienation and boredom endemic in high schools and especially in inner city high schools. Farrel, Peguero, Lindsey and White[6] present an intriguing picture of the anger and frustration which characterizes the students in such schools. (The study is enhanced by the fact that three of the authors are student collaborators who interviewed peers.) From this and other studies (e.g., Dillon[7]), it seems clear that curriculum engagement is as much a function of the school and classroom dynamics as it is of the content. The attempt to create the "ideal curriculum" in a vacuum might be interesting cognitively, but has high risk in terms of impact.

After two years of discussion and exploration, The Citadel and Burke High School, an all black, inner city school with about 1200 students in grades 9 through 12, decided to implement a pilot program which was to have the potential for expansion as a model for the entire school. This pilot program, now partially supported through a grant from the Jessie Ball duPont Fund, was initiated without special funding. The project, now titled Project Challenge, was built on two interacting aspects: a creative approach to the content of the curriculum and a redesign of the academic structure. Since we believe that this structural change is the component which allows the curriculum innovation to work, it demands some brief description. At the same time, it is not unrelated to the issue of religious studies since we conceived of the structure as the embodiment of a value statement. This structure has four basic components:

1. the students are kept together as a unit across the four core subjects;
2. the teachers of the four core subjects are a team who plan together and who jointly assess students' status;
3. the philosophy of the program makes the teacher team responsible for finding resources to assist where needed;

4. the parent(s) are actively involved through direct contact on a regular basis.

The intent of this structure is to create both a sense of community and a sense of identification with the school (or, at least, with the project). In this way, the perception of alienation is reduced and a model of "caring" is presented. This structure is further used to induce a sense of interdependence across the learners with emphasis on assuring that each person succeeds rather than on a competitive model. Intrinsic to this design is the use of group counseling sessions to provide an outlet for feelings and to assure that felt problems are recognized. In such fashion, we hope that our message is not only that "we care", but that we believe in them and value them as co-adventurers. Another aspect of this arrangement which may be less obvious, but is no less important, is the model of cooperation and joint planning presented by the four core teachers. And this brings us to the somewhat radical approach to the curriculum.

Many efforts to develop curricula for inner city high schools have focused on "relevance" as the bottom line. They have tried to evolve learning experiences which have direct connections to pay-off in terms of jobs or pressing needs. While such programs also seem to recognize the adolescents' "restless heart", they seem to view it more in hormonal than spiritual terms. (This is not to deny the reality of the hormonal world, but that too can become part of the broader issue of seeking meaning and completion.) Project Challenge took a different tack: the decision was made to create an intellectually demanding curriculum which would be designed to engage these inner city minority youth in discovering their own talents while leading them to wrestle with the demanding cognitive challenges.

The first step in this process was to address a concern which anybody who spends much time in high school must face: the fragmentation of learning. (The same problem exists in colleges, but there it is often balanced by higher levels of motivation.) Students leave English, close their books and move on to the next subject as if there were not interrelationships. Our approach was to create a curriculum which would be organized around a theme and would allow for the integration of English, social studies, science and mathematics. A theme which emerged was **order and disorder in the universe**. The appeal of this theme extended beyond the academic subjects; we saw it as a way of relating perceptions of one's personal world and the world in general to our learning model. As an example, in our initial 9th grade class, a discussion arose over the topic of abortion and the teacher steered this discussion to the theme: how does abortion lead to greater order and disorder? That discussion was intense, but reasoned as the students talked of how abortion could create greater order in a teenager's life, but also bring about disorder in relationships of self-worth. While this example indicates how the theme is utilized in dealing with the pressing issues of the students, the curriculum itself introduces conflicts which call upon the learner to search for order.

The first unit for the 9th grade students has to do with origins. In science, they are confronted with theories of the beginning of the universe; in English, they read creation stories (including some from Africa); in social studies, they look at the anthropological research on man's beginnings; in math, the attention is on the development of a number system to help record, describe and explain natural phenomena. This unit provokes a

number of personal and current issues with religious overtones with particular emphasis on the nature of the human being and his/her connection to the rest of the universe. A later unit is introduced through the study of astronomy and the history of science -- the shift from a geocentric to a heliocentric perspective. This scientific revolution is connected to the dissolution of the image of the great chain of being which dominated the middle ages and its impact upon the social and political climate. Students read and contrast Bishop Bossuet's writings on the divine right of kings with the positions of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes. In the midst of these social science readings, the students also study Dickens' A Tale of Two Cities. A corollary experience is the viewing of the film Casablanca and the question is raised as to the "why" of behaviors which involve self-sacrifice to make for a better chance for others. This unit which covers the scientific and political revolutions provokes discussion about when is a government or a religion justified in taking repressive actions against individuals in the name of preserving order.

The examples of the introduction of moral and religious issues through the use of content from the core subjects could be expanded significantly. A major activity for the 10th grade in the immediate future is a public debate on the killings of Socrates, Caesar and Christ--how could they be justified or is it ever right for the state or persons acting "for the good of the state" to take an individual's life? But the intent of this paper is to go beyond a case description and to use Project Challenge to illustrate an approach to religious study and moral education. The importance of the context of the study has already been discussed; we feel strongly that the climate of the educational setting must mirror the openness and the willingness to hear radical positions which are necessary if we are to elicit the thoughts and feelings of these youth. It is equally important that the climate convey both caring and respect so that an outcome will be an expansion of the empathy basic to being able to feel how others, quite different from us, may feel on these issues.

Yet, equally important as the context, is a clear sense of purpose in the development of the curriculum. Implicit throughout Project Challenge's curriculum is the goal of assisting these youth toward becoming responsible decision-makers. In our view, this carries with it a need for intense self- exploration leading into self-creation. Here, again, we come to see the theme of "order and disorder" prominently invoked. As our students seek to look at the "whys" of the ideas, beliefs and actions presented in the subject content, they not only are forced to analyze these data in terms of order-disorder theme, but they are naturally led to look at themselves, their beliefs and cognitions. In their own way, we wish for them the experience which Yeats expressed in these lines:

> Those friends that have it I do wrong
> Whenever I remake a song
> Should know what issue is at stake.
> It is myself that I remake.

Central in our effort is our perspective that judgments/decisions stem from values. These values themselves emerge from an ethos which is the product of both announced and less obvious ideologies. The students are challenged to pursue the decisions-actions-judgments which they come across from the vantage point of how does the ethos shape these and what are the underlying ideologies. Not only does this assist in the "order-disorder" analysis, but it introduces the model which we require that they use as they look upon

themselves and their behaviors. For example, the effort to ban disruptive ideas in the late Middle Ages becomes more meaningful to a 15 year old black in 1990 when he or she is forced to become immersed in the ethos of that period and to articulate the ideologies prominent at that time. The meaningfulness increases even more when the topic is related to the controversy over some of the lyrics of rap groups and the attempt to ban recordings and presentations of such groups. Rather than just react favorably or unfavorably to these censorship efforts, students must "get inside" the minds and emotions of persons on both sides of the issue.

In this way, we attempt to open our students to self-awareness and self-exploration while using the crucible of peer interactions as a medium for sharpening such insight. The role of the climate in the classroom is basic to the success of this undertaking. While we are honest about desiring to share a process of looking at life and its demands with the students, we are scrupulous about avoiding the danger of seducing them into our belief systems. The medium for the development of this "religious" orientation is that of involvement with issues and direct experimentation; indoctrination is the antithesis of our goals if this is read as "selling a doctrine" or position. Again, let me use an example. The 10th grade class studied the monastic movement as part of their curriculum last Spring and the question arose as to why anyone would wish to be a monk. After using our values-ethos-ideology model, there was still much skepticism about monastic life and the kind of people who would be monks. A visit by these 48 students to a Cistercian monastery and a morning long dialogue with the abbot created a whole new perspective for these youth (and, we believe, left the Trappist monks much impressed with the intelligence, insight and courtesy of these inner city youths). Another example of involvement called for the "rewriting" of **Everyman** as a modern stage presentation and this mode of experimentation once more enhanced the students' sense of the morality play.

Before we undertook the curriculum design and its direct emphasis on learning as the vehicle for personal growth through the pursuit of meaning, we looked at the literature on moral development. Kohlberg's[8] writings on the stages of moral development made us sensitive to the role of cognitive processes in this arena, but we remained much aware of the importance of cultural influences. Indeed, Carol Gilligan's[9] work with its conclusion that women tend to consider relationship factors more than men do in moral decisions made us wary of a formal program on moral reasoning and moral education. Indeed, we found ourselves leaning much more toward an experiential model built upon a curriculum which is intellectually challenging. A consequence of that decision as to how best to use the curriculum for personal growth as a decision-maker was our implementation of a group counseling experience within the curriculum. If we see the educational process as one of encouraging self-exploration, then there is need for a focused design to support that growth. The evolution of our program leads us now to question whether one can honestly initiate an educational sequence which challenges students without also providing an emotional support system. This modification fits with our theme -- as the students begin to experience some internal "disorder", there is the supplemental activity which serves to lead them toward finding order. From another perspective, our overall curriculum will almost inevitably stimulate feelings of unease or of the "restless heart" since the road to meaning is filled with many uncertainties. We have concluded that the counseling segment is essential to the educational endeavor.

The question, of course, can easily arise: is it proper for the public education endeavor to create such a program? There will be those who see in this kind of curriculum either hubris or an invasion into the rights of the family. Once again, we are confronted with the purposes of education. Our conviction is that education is a serious business with serious risks, but that it must be built upon an assumption that growth and self-awareness are preferable to ignoring that gnawing sense of restlessness or emptiness which is so easily translated into frenzied behaviors on the part of adolescents, especially those from less advantaged homes. We are also aware of James Coleman's[10] concept that today's youth grow up with less "social capital" than has previously been the case. He argues that the quality of interaction in the home has declined and that we must find other resources to provide this social capital which he characterizes as "attention, personal interest, and intensity of involvement, some persistence and continuity over time, and a certain degree of intimacy."[11] The design of Project Challenge is intended to meet just those needs and, given that context, cannot avoid the spiritual, religious and moral issues central to human development.

The effectiveness and fate of teacher education is certainly related to our position. We are reminded of a quotation by William Bean[12] writing about medical education in 1976:

> "Perhaps the situation today may be summed up best by saying if one has a fearful lesion or disease, his chances of getting cured, corrected or significantly palliated are far better than a hundred years ago. If, however, the main need is to calm agitation, to soothe worry, or to assuage anxiety by comforting talk with a wise, kind, compassionate physician with plenty of time on his hands, the chances are not good."

The status of teacher education is much the same. We have improved the education of teachers as technicians and made them more insightful about effectiveness of techniques within narrow confines, but we have not placed sufficient emphasis on the humanism of the teacher nor have we provided the models in our programs for such development. NCATE, in its revised standards, has emphasized the primacy of conceptual models grounded in a well ordered knowledge base, and this is certainly the first step. The danger, nonetheless, is that the models will be those tied to the technical aspects of the teaching-learning dynamic rather than ones which recognize the gestalt. As a beginning toward a redesign for teacher education, we would suggests several steps:

1. the implementation of a "group counseling" format into each component that involves field experiences and the emphasis in these counseling sessions on self-exploration and on looking at "whys" rather than "whats" and "hows;"
2. the incorporation of a team teaching model among the teacher education faculty so that the subjects are tied together and so that this faculty team takes responsibility for student success;
3. the acceptance, after debate, of a theme to integrate the learnings in the teacher education sequence so that the methods and practice courses are connected to the courses which provide the humanistic substance through theory and research (e.g., we suggest "man as a pilgrim" as a theme which will permit the connection across not only the teacher education sequence, but also across the specialty and general education areas).

There is a need for further elaboration of this approach to teacher education and that need points to an even more pervasive problem. The past decade has seen the production of a number of prestigious "reform" reports. Most of these have agreed that our educational system is falling short of the desired level of performance and most have singled out the shortcomings in our workings with minority children and youth. But the calls for change in these reports have been timid and probably deceptive. Patricia Graham[13] called our attention to our silence about the purposes of education several years ago and articulated her position that we should be fostering "character and wit." The model which has become Project Challenge could certainly be encompassed within those twin goals, but to create a system to reach those goals must go beyond the recommendations of most of the commission reports. Those recommendations are surface at best and pay little attention to the role of education in drawing out the individual and assisting him/her to a fuller self creation. So long as our focus is solely on enhancing employability and reducing social ills such as substance abuse our successes will be limited. Our experience (not totally unbiased!) leads us to conclude that the revitalization of public (and private) education demands several steps:

1. changes in teacher education and in-service programs in the directions described above;
2. the restructuring of schools to:
   a) integrated curricula
   b) provide a sense of belonging and identity
   c) create a community through shared responsibility
   d) incorporate counseling experiences into courses
3. using the curriculum as a vehicle to place self into the learning process and developing experiences which allow the student to test out himself/herself.

But let me return in closing to Project Challenge. Does it work? The answer to that question is years --perhaps decades-- away. There are some intriguing data, however. Our 9th grade students begin the year complaining about the amount of work and wondering aloud why they should do this when they could obtain better grades with less work in other courses. But at the end of this past year, only one of the 48 students expressed the desire to leave the program. At the parent activity in May, over two-thirds of the 97 students in the program had family representation. But our real sense of success comes from our and other persons' observations of these youth. They are still "kids" and they demonstrate the behaviors which can make them impossible one day and a joy the next, but every observer comments about their poise in debate, their sense of self-assurance, their capacity to take criticism and change their perspective. Equally impressive to us is the enthusiasm -- enthusiasm over learning. These youth look at learning as an intense interaction, not as a task to be endured. They see themselves reflected in the learning and see the classroom as an avenue toward self-discovery. To us, this comes close to Walter Ong's[14] idea of "agonistic education" and it is a viable strategy for using the school as a potent medium for religious education where religion has to do with our human experience of incompleteness and our unending search for meaning.

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1. Jack Farris, The Abiding Gospel of Claude Dee Moran, Jr. (Atlanta: Peachtree Publications, 1987).

2. Pat Conroy, The Prince of Tides (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1986).

3. C. Daniel Batson, "How Social an Animal: The Human Capacity for Caring," American Psychologist 45 (March, 1990) : 344.

4. Walker Percy, The Last Gentleman (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1966) : 372.

5. Bruno Bettleheim, "Reflections (Freud)," The New York Torker (March 1, 1982) : 91.

6. Edwin Farrell, George Peguero, Rasheed Lindsey and Ronald White, "Giving Voice to High School Students: Pressure and Boredom, Ya Know What I'm Saying," American Educational Research Journal 25 (Winter, 1988) : 489-502.

7. Deborah Dillon, "Showing Them That I Want Them to Learn and I Care Who They Are: A Microthenography of the Social Organization of a Secondary Low-Track English-Reading Classroom," American Educational Research Journal 26 (Summer, 1989) : 227-260.

8. Lawrence Kohlburg, The Psychology of Moral Development (San Francisco : Harper and Row, 1984).

9. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, MA: The Harvard University Press, 1982).

10. James Coleman, "Families and Schools." Educational Researcher 16 (August-September 1987) : 32-38.

11. Ibid., 38.

12. William Bean, "Worry about Physicians," Journal of Medical Education 51 (1976) : 983-4.

13. Patricia Graham, "Schools: Cacaphony about Practice, Silence about Purpose," Daedalus 113 (1984) : 29-58.

14 Walter Ong, "Agnostic Structures in Academia: to Present," Daedalus 103 (1974) : 229-238.

A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR MAHAN'S PAPER, "THE ALIENATED STUDENT, THE RESTLESS HEART AND RELIGIOUS STUDY"

By
Paul Zisman
Mary Washington College

The experimental project in moral education described by Professor Mahan deserves, in my opinion, national attention. First, any partnership between universities and public schools should be lauded. The public schools benefit from the infusion of intellectual rigor. Accordingly, Professor Mahan identifies a goal of the program "to create an intellectually demanding curriculum ...leading [students] to wrestle with demanding cognitive challenges."[1] It is probably this feature which gave the program its name, "Project Challenge". But certainly such a project is equally challenging to the innovators, since their target population is inner city adolescents, undoubtedly the most alienated of school groups. So its second laudable feature is its unflinching leap into the toughest of all educational situations. The third feature I call to your attention is the uniqueness of the conception of moral purpose and moral education. In this age of competitive creativity and trivialization, one hears a freshness in an old idea: moral education is no different from good liberal arts education. Hence, the program is based partly on a perennialist position. It believes that wrestling with great ideas will claim the interest of adolescents, particularly because they are in the throes of transformation. But its uniqueness does not stop here. The exploration of perennial ideas can elicit exploration of the self, and serious self-exploration needs direct attention. So Project Challenge includes counseling sessions, a move toward an existentialist position.

This apparent contradictory combination of perennialism and existentialism is a nub around which I will pose my first question. Lloyd Duck reminds us: "In both styles [perennialism and existentialism] the techniques may appear similar, but their philosophical bases are quite different."[2] Perennialism holds that the

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[1]Thomas W. Mahan, "The Alienated Student, the Restless Heart and Religious Study." Paper presented at the annual conference of the South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society, Williamsburg, Va., 1990. P. 3.
[2]Lloyd Duck, Teaching with Charisma (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1981), p. 218.

eternal truths are "out there" in an objective world. Morality is the cultivation of these truths within one's character by the type of immersion in epoch-shaping literature advocated in Project Challenge.[3] Existential education, in contrast, seeks an "expansion of empathy" and "self-creation", goals also promoted in the program. The implication here is that such values are relative and come from exploration of the interior life. The values are wrought from one's life experience, and not from the passive reading of someone else's. As Duck points out, the former seeks convergence on a single set of values while the latter seeks individual divergence. Perhaps this results in a form of fragmentation, different from the fragmentation of knowledge decried by the innovators, but a fragmentation nevertheless. Is there an actual philosophical contradiction in the program? If so, what effects does it have on the moral development of the students? If not, how are the two apparently contradictory thrusts reconciled?

I am fascinated by the assumption that mental health gained through the counseling component is necessary for moral and religious development. I am not clear on the goal, however. Will counseling provide the moral fortitude and vision of a Martin Luther King who will press for societal changes? Or will it seek to help the individual adapt to oppressive conditions? The rationale for counseling comes across in this statement by Mahan, which is eloquent but does not address the political concern:

> Our conviction is that education is a serious business with serious risks, but that is must be built upon an assumption that growth and self-assuredness are preferable to ignoring the gnawing sense of restlessness or emptiness which is so easily translated into frenzied behaviors on the part of adolescents, especially those from less advantaged homes.[4]

Why does the "sense of restlessness or emptiness" need to be counseled away? Perhaps alienation provides the drive for African American youths to examine their society for the sources of this alienation. After all, alienation is a response to a social situation, not a personality maladjustment particular to an individual. Since this counseling emphasizes the "whys" rather than the "hows" and

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[3]Mahan, p. 5.
[4]Ibid., p. 7.

"whats"[5], it could take the form of "social therapy," in which the clients learn to analyze their behavior as "rational" behavior in dysfunctional environments caused by oppression. They then learn how to take steps to change their communities through political action. To engage in "social counseling" might put the program at odds with the school district, since its emphasis is surely on social control. So my question is: Won't counseling for moral development naturally lead to the judgement that American society treats the African American in immoral ways? How far is the project willing to allow its students to pursue this to its logical conclusion, and even more importantly, how willing is it to equip African-Americans to challenge unjust political and economic structures?

Finally, I am intrigued by the notion of "religious" as the capacity for empathy. Mahan seems to equate the moral with the religious. Perhaps, like the political implications of the project, this is a way of avoiding a conflict with the "publics" supporting a public school project. Mahan describes this aspect of the program as the "antithesis" of indoctrination since the goal is to expand students' self-awareness by studying belief systems of other eras and other faiths. Certainly empathy in the form of "perspective-taking" is important for understanding other cultures and their belief systems. However, self-awareness in itself might not promote a spiritual awareness in the absence of "spiritual experiences." The question Mahan's program raises for me is: Does it do justice to the spiritual sphere to place it "merely" in the domain of the moral? Doesn't such a conflation diminish the spiritual connotation of the "religious"?

Given that the students are African American youth, deeply steeped in a religious tradition of Christianity, it would seem that many of these youth might have a more expanded conception of the "religious" than that held by the project staff. Perhaps this is one advantage that so-called "disadvantaged" youth might have. The project might benefit by listening to the students talk about the place of religion in one's life, particularly when survival is a daily preoccupation. This may sound a bit patronizing when I mean it sincerely. My thoughts are on the Pulitzer-prizing winning psychiatrist, Robert Coles, who did just that: he listened carefully to children on the edge of survival and was surprised to find how greatly they depended on their church and religion.[6]

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[5]Ibid.

[6] See his The Moral Life of Children, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986.

*A Note of Appreciation and Respect for SAPES and Its Members**

John M. Nagle
Dean, School of Education
College of William and Mary

It is a real honor for us in the School of Education at the College of William and Mary to host this 35th annual meeting of the South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society (SAPES). I recall very clearly my conversations three years ago with Bill Losito, your current President and a member of our faculty, regarding the possibilities of hosting this annual meeting. I am both delighted and very grateful that the days that Bill and I discussed three years ago have come to fruition and that you are among us this evening.

In light of how I spend a typical day in the Dean's Office of a School of Education with nearly 1000 students, including 800 very mature and experienced graduate students and 200 very bright undergraduate students, and an equally bright, challenging, and productive faculty of 35, I was especially pleased and grateful for the opportunity this afternoon to sit in on your two plenary sessions. My compliments to David Purpel, Charles Haynes, and the members of their respondent panels. It was certainly a joy to get away from the challenges of deaning for a few hours and to be stimulated and encouraged to be thoughtful and reflective about what we do and why we do it. I found the afternoon to be a very positive experience, and for that I thank you.

When Bill gave me my charge for these few moments on your agenda, he indicated that I should not simply give you a traditional "Dean's welcome," and so I won't. For as Bill pointed out, you have already been welcomed by him and by our very capable Associate Dean Virginia Laycock, who extended a most gracious welcome to you this afternoon on behalf of the faculty of the School of Education. As Ginnie indicated, we think William and Mary is a very special place with very special people and ideas, and we are delighted to share some of that "specialness" with all of you.

Rather than a welcome, therefore, Bill's charge or invitation to me — extraordinary as it may seem — was to be reflective, albeit briefly, and to share whatever I thought might be appropriate for a group — and I use his words — as "distinguished, knowledgeable,

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* Dean Nagle delivered these remarks on September 28, 1990, during the 35th Annual Meeting of the South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society (SAPES) in Williamsburg, Virginia. Dean Nagle's remarks preceded the Presidential Address given by Heritage Professor of Education William F. Losito.

experienced, scholarly, intellectually astute, and professionally prepared to question, challenge, and eschew closure" as you are. Only a dean, of course, would have sufficient temerity and be sufficiently foolhardy to accept such an invitation, but indulge me, if you will, for a few moments of personal reflection — perhaps as a kind of personal apologia for my being with you tonight, but more importantly, I think, as evidence of the deep respect that I have for the contributions you make to schools and colleges of education through your work with both prospective and practicing school personnel. Besides, Bill promised me there would be no respondents!

My own professional life during nearly three decades now has been a bit of a mish-mash, although all in education. During those years, I have been a high school English teacher, a teacher educator, a student of school administration, a staff member in a federally-funded, university-based R and D center in education, a professor of educational administration, and an assistant dean of one institution's College of Education and dean of William and Mary's School of Education for nearly a decade. Interesting to me is the fact that the touchstones in my life, as I reflect on nearly 50 years of that life, transcend these specific, professional roles and push to higher levels of values, philosophies, and ways of thinking.

Those touchstones — at least five of the most significant — include the following:

(1) My own religious belief system, which challenges me daily to live the values of equity, justice, fairness, love, conscience, honesty, affirmation, trust, and optimism in my dealings with others in all domains;

(2) The gleanings and insights that now date back more than 30 years to a year-long History of Philosophy course that I took as a bright-eyed freshman at Hamilton College in snowy up-state New York — gleanings relative to empiricism and rationalism, ontology and epistemology, and the breadth of life's essential questions addressed by different schools of thought over the centuries;

(3) A two-year informal, but very significant "post-doctoral experience" at the University of Oregon with a colleague by the name of Lee Brissey, who was a psychologist turned philosopher of science and the finest conceptualist I have ever worked with, and who taught me both the importance of intellectual rigor and logical consistency and the skills of analyzing or "unpacking" things to their core and then finding their commonalities and relationships with other things;

(4) A simple paradigm that is derived from the ideas of communication theorist C.S. Morris and that Lee and I came to call the DAP model for understanding how human beings function as cybernetic problem-solving

systems, continually engaged in three kinds of inquiry: designative inquiry addressed to the question, "what is?" appraisive inquiry addressed to the question, "What is preferred or desired?" and prescriptive inquiry addressed to the instrumental or pragmatic question, "What can be done when there is a discrepancy between 'what is' and 'what is preferred'?" Incidentally, I am convinced that, as teachers, we are all essentially prescriptivists, intent on finding better ways to reduce the "is-ought" discrepancies we find in our students, but I am not equally confident that we spend sufficient time defining and unpacking the discrepancies that drive us.

(5) And lastly, my work during the past seven years with Heritage Professor William Losito, for while he is a superb instructor, a cogent and articulate thinker, and a highly respected colleague, Bill serves for me, in his own quiet and persuasive way, as a marvelous human being who has found a workable and important balance between his deeply held religious values and ethos on the one hand and his responsibilities as a teacher and university colleague on the other. He is, for me, a wonderful role model for all who aspire to be practicing philosophers of education.

Having cited these five touchstones in my own life as a human being and educator, I hope that you can see why I am very much committed to the work you do and to the importance of philosophical studies in the preparation and continuing education of all who call themselves educators and strive to help others develop n[illegible] knowledge, skills, attitudes, and values. In particular, I applaud the questions you ask [illegible]ether with respect to axiology, epistemology, teleology, ethics, or any other domain [illegible] philosophical discourse. And I especially applaud your willingness and ability to push beyond the veil, to penetrate beyond the superficial and profane to the quintessential, the heart and soul of things, the ultimately significant.

For me, the real import of your raison d'etre as philosophers of education is most evident in your language and, particularly, in your semantics. Let me illustrate what I mean. During the past 24 hours, I have spent two or three hours in each of three very different contexts, sharing with others and discussing ideas essential to each context. The variety is probably pretty typical among those of us who ply our skills in a deanery. Last night, for example, during a weekly class session of a doctoral seminar I teach on research in the field of educational administration, we discussed several pieces of research focused on leadership, decision-making, governance, job satisfaction, and organizational commitment, and we used the jargon of social science research: quasi-experimental design, constructs and variables, zero order correlations, multiple regression, levels of significance, degrees of freedom, and the like.

Then, earlier today, I attended a meeting to review the draft of a proposal that several of us in the School of Education and in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences have been encouraged to submit to a major corporate giant in the computer industry. The dream we hope to realize is to create a statewide network of on-line computer hardware and state-of-the-art software that will connect students and teachers in 25-30 high schools in Virginia with William and Mary science and science education faculty in a collaborative effort to increase both the skills of teachers and the performance of gifted youngsters in science and math. You can just imagine the jargon that pervaded that meeting!

But now the contrast: let me play back for you some of the parlance of this afternoon's two plenary sessions, for these are the linguistic symbols that are the essence of your daily work and that, I think, stimulate some of the most important thinking and acting that we can possibly engage in as educators, much less human beings. Sure, there were the expected, traditional terms of philosophy, like critical thinking, inquiry, discourse, argument, logic, rationality, and consistency But more significant, your conversations this afternoon were laced with words and phrases like responsibility, equity, faith, hope, commitment, civility, openness, love, compassion, values, morality, wisdom, cherished goals, moral vision, prophetic faith, joy, optimism, affirmation!

This is certainly not the language that one typically hears in higher education — and certainly not among those of us in higher education administration — but it *is* a language that says reams about what you particularly value, and it is a language that can very effectively stimulate and help others to define the mosaic or screen that undergirds — or overlays, if you prefer — all that they attempt to do as educators.

In conclusion, I compliment SAPES, Rod Owen, and the rest of his program committee for the content of this conference, for its focus on the religious dimension of democratic education, and, more broadly, for your willingness to wrestle — and simultaneously stimulate others to wrestle — with some of the quintessential issues of teaching, learning, education, and life.

As you continue your deliberations during the remainder of the conference, I wish you the very best. Thank you again for indulging me these reflections.

South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Meeting

Thirty-Fifth Annual Meeting
September 28-29, 1990

The College of William and Mary
Williamsburg, Virginia

THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION

SCHEDULE FOR FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 28th

11:00 - 1:00 Conference Registration
Lobby of the Patrick Henry Inn
Conference Center

1:00 - 1:05 WELCOME & CONVENING OF THE CONFERENCE
William Losito, President of SAPES
Washington Rooms A and B

1:10 - 2:15 FIRST CONCURRENT SESSION

1) ***With Liberty and Justice for All ... the Teaching of the Democratic Value of Social Justice***
Presenter: Warren Strandberg, Virginia Commonwealth University
Respondent: Michael Dale, Appalachian State University
Chair: Joseph Congleton, East Carolina University
Location: Washington Room C

2) ***Thomas Jefferson on "Human Interposition," Freedom of Religion and Inquiry: Problems and Paradoxes***
Presenters: James W. Garrison & Thomas C. Hunt, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Respondent: Thomas Buford, Furman University
Chair: Peter Carbone, Duke University
Location: Jones Hall 201

3) ***Sects Education in a Democracy is Like Sex Education in a Democracy***
Presenter: Robert D. Heslep, University of Georgia
Respondent: Samuel M. Craver, Virginia Commonwealth University
Chair: Tom Hawkins, University of South Carolina at Spartanburg
Location: Jefferson Room

2:15 - 2:30 Break
Hospitality Suite, Presidential
Parlor 195-197

2:30 - 3:45 FOCUS BOOK SYMPOSIUM
The Moral and Spiritual Crisis in Education: A Curriculum for Justice and Compassion in Education
Chair: Nancy Self, Texas A & M
Respondents: J. Don Reeves, Wake Forest University and John U. Davis, Bethany College
Author: David Purpel, University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Location: Washington Rooms A & B

3:45 - 4:00 Break
Lobby of Conference Center

4:00 - 5:30 KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Presenter: **Charles C. Haynes**, President of the National Council on Religion and Public Education and Chair of the Religion in Schools Committee of the National Council for the Social Studies
Respondents: Sister Lourdes Sheehan, Secretary of Education for the United States Catholic Conference and John Haynes, Associate Professor, James Madison University
Chair: Roderic L. Owen, SAPES Program Chair, Mary Baldwin College

6:15 - 7:00 Cocktail and Social Hour
Muscarelle Museum
W & M Campus

7:15 - 8:45 Banquet and Presidential Address
William Losito, SAPES President
Dodge Room of Phi Beta Kappa Hall,
W & M Campus

9:00 - Presidential Reception
Patrick Henry Inn, Hospital Suite,
195-197

SCHEDULE FOR SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 29th

8:15 - 8:45 Continental Breakfast
School of Education, Jones Hall 2nd Floor
W & M Campus

8:45 - 10:00 SECOND CONCURRENT SESSION
Location: Jones Hall, 2nd & 3rd Floors

1) ***The Supreme Court, Fundamentalist Logic and the Term "Religion"***
Presenter: David McKenzie, Berry College
Respondent: Charles Tandy, University of Missouri
Chair: Franklin Jones, Old Dominion University
Location: Jones Hall 306

2) ***The Perceptions of American Youth Regarding Their Own and Foreign Religious and Political Systems***
Presenter: Gail McEachron-Hirsch, The College of William and Mary
Respondent: Elizabeth Hoit-Thetford, Savannah Georgia and J. Hamilton Hoit, East Tennessee University
Chair: Richard Phillips, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Location: Jones Hall 307

3) ***Religion in the Schools***
Presenter: Robert Mulvaney, University of South Carolina
Respondent: James LeRoy Smith, East Carolina University
Chair: Earle West, Howard University
Location: Jones Hall 206

4) ***Beyond Tomorrow as an Extension of Today: Moves Towards an Aristotelian Spirituality in Education***
Presenter: Paul Bitting and Cheryl Southworth, North Carolina State University
Respondent: Bill J. Johnson, University of North Carolina at Wilmington
Chair: Sam Holton, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Location: Washington Room D

10:00 - 10:15 Break
Jones Hall, 2nd Floor

10:15 - 11:30 THIRD CONCURRENT SESSION
Location: Jones Hall, 2nd & 3rd Floors

1) ***Horace Mann: A Unitarian Perspective on Religion in the Public Schools***
Presenter: JoAnne Z. Wagner, University of West Virginia
Respondent: Pat Socoski, West Chester University
Chair: Virgil Ward, University of Virginia
Location: Jones Hall 306

2) ***Teaching About Religion in the Public School Curriculum: A Legal Model***
Presenter: Bruce Beezer, North Carolina State University
Respondent: Van O. Dempsey, III, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Chair: Tom Jamison, Appalachian State University
Location: Jones Hall 307

3) ***Grace in Teaching and Learning***
Presenter: Eric Bredo, University of Virginia
Respondent: James Gilman, Mary Baldwin College
Chair: Howard Ozmon, Virginia Commonwealth University
Location: Jones Hall 206

4) ***The Alienated Student, the Restless Heart and Religious Study***
Presenter: Thomas W. Mahan, The Citadel
Respondent: Paul Zisman, Mary Washington College
Chair: Roger Sullivan, University of South Carolina
Location: Jones Hall 201

11:35 - 12:30 Annual SAPES Business Meeting
Jones Hall 301, A & B